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This dissertation discusses children’s understanding of semantic contribution of the 
universal quantifier every and its interactions with negation from a logico-semantic 
perspective. The universal quantifier every evokes an asymmetric entailment pattern 
in its first and second arguments (e.g., Ladusaw, 1979), which influences both 
sentential meanings and inferential relations among them. Whereas several studies 
have revealed children’s sophisticated ability to compose the meanings of sentences 
containing every (e.g., Gualmini 2005), far less is known about whether children’s 
knowledge about every can be extended to the level of meaning comparison, i.e., to 
the computation of the inferential relations among every-sentences. We thus 
investigate whether children are able to apply their knowledge about every to the 
calculation of the inference relations between every-sentences. In particular, this 
  
dissertation aims to experimentally examine children’s ability to evaluate the 
inferences between every-sentences. 
We first report an experiment featuring the Truth Value Judgment Task (e.g., 
Crain and Thornton 1998), reconfirming children’s adult-like ability to compose 
individual sentence meanings involving every. We then introduce two novel 
experimental methodologies, the Prediction-Rephrase Task and the Demand-
Fulfillment Task, designed to assess children’s ability to evaluate inferences between 
the entailing and entailed sentences. Three experiments utilizing these new tasks 
demonstrate that children’s highly sophisticated knowledge about every is 
appropriately applied in comparing meaning relations involving every across-
propositionally. Additionally, we present experiments that reveal children’s adult-like 
knowledge regarding the semantic interaction between every and negation (e.g., 
Ludlow 2002) in both composing and comparing sentential meanings; these findings 
provide the evidence showing children’s adult-like linguistic representations of the 
sentences, in which the structural relation between every and negation determines the 
patterns of inferences. 
Taken together, these studies demonstrate children’s adult-like knowledge 
regarding the semantics of every that is applied both in the composition and 
comparison of sentential meanings, as well as their adult-like knowledge about the 
interaction between every and negation. In addition, our development of the two new 
experimental methodologies has made possible further steps toward the full 
understanding of semantic competence in child language, not only at the level of 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
As speakers of a human language, we know all about meanings, i.e., word meanings 
and sentence meanings. For example, we know what the meaning of dog is, and what 
the meaning of run is; we know how to compose the meaning of a dog is running out 
of these word meanings. In addition, we know inferential relations among meanings, 
i.e., which meaning entails which other meaning: we know that a dog is running is 
necessarily true in any circumstances that a brown dog is running is true, but not vice 
versa; we further know that every brown dog is running is true in any circumstances 
that every dog is running, but not vice versa. Crucially, entailment is a consequence 
of sentence meanings composed out of word meanings, which is computed through 
the comparison among meanings. Thus, the semantic competence of speakers of a 
human language, which is the representation of our knowledge about meanings of 
these various levels in our grammar, is considered to be the component that composes 
the sentence meanings out of the word meanings, and that computes the relations of 
sentential meanings, i.e., evaluate which sentence logically implies which other 
sentence appropriately. Therefore, to understand how logical reasoning across 
sentences is implemented in children and adult is to understand the nature of their 
semantic competence, i.e., the knowledge that allows them to represent meaning in 
language.  
Given this, children, as learners of a human language, have to learn all about 
meanings. They have to learn what the meaning of dog is; they have to learn the 
composition of meanings, i.e., what the meaning of a dog is running is. They have to 
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also learn the comparison of meanings; a dog is running is necessarily true in any 
circumstances that a brown dog is running is true, but not vice versa; they have to 
further learn that every brown dog is running is necessarily true in any circumstances 
that every dog is running, but not vice versa. Study of what young children know 
about meanings at these various levels thus would offer a window to show the process 
of how one becomes a speaker of a language.  
However, the complexity of deriving meaning from linguistic utterances 
quickly becomes apparent. In fact, notice that replacing a single element in the 
sentences above, from a to every, consequently has a huge influence on the mapping 
among the parts of one sentence in the representation of the entire meaning not only 
at the within-propositional level but also across-propositional level. Considering 
whether children indeed show this competence will in turn be illuminating whether 
children know about the contribution of the meaning of every that determines the 
relation between sentences that contain it, which has not yet been discussed actively 
in the field of linguistic research and language acquisition. This dissertation thus aims 
to experimentally examine children’s ability to compute the semantic relations 
between sentences that contain the universal quantifier every. In particular, this 
dissertation considers meaning in child language from the viewpoint of the relations 
across sentential meanings, primarily investigating whether children are able to 
compute the logico-semantic relations among sentences like the following. 
 
(1)  Every dog is running 
 
 Every brown dog is running 
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(2)  A dog is running 
 
         *  A brown dog is running  
 
 
As can be seen in the contrast between (1) and (2), every dog is running logically 
implies every brown dog is running is true, but not vice versa, contrarily to the fact 
that a brown dog is running logically implies a dog is running, but not vice versa.  
To begin with, we will first spell out the aspects of meaning computation from 
the following two points of view: (i) the within-propositional computation of 
meaning, which is the composition of the meanings of a propositional variable 
(sentence) on the basis of the word meanings and the semantic compositional rules;  
(ii) the across-propositional computation of meaning, which determines the relation 
between propositional variables through the comparison of meanings, designating the 
direction of entailments and logical inferences. Then we will consider the semantic 
contribution of the universal quantifier every, which will be focused on throughout 
this dissertation as a case study. In this discussion, we will lay out the various 
linguistic consequences of every’s semantic properties at the both levels of within- 
and across-propositional meaning computations. Finally, we will consider what has 
been reported about children’s knowledge about the universal quantifier every and 
what has not yet been discussed, claiming that there is almost nothing that has been 
revealed about children’s ability to evaluate the meanings concerning every at the 
across-propositional level, despite the fruitful contributions that have been made in 
the past regarding the meanings concerning every at the within-propositional level. 
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1.1. Meaning in Language and Semantic Competence 
 
Semantic competence in a language consists of the following two aspects: (i) 
computation of meanings at the within-proposition level (i.e., composition of 
meanings); (ii) computation of meanings at the across-proposition level (i.e., 
comparison of meanings). The first is the computation the truth conditional meaning 
of individual propositions (i.e., sentences), which is composed on the basis of the 
lexical meanings and the ways that these lexical meanings are combined. Taking the 
simplest example, let us consider the following. 
 
(3) A dog is running. 
 
The semantics at the level of the within-proposition meanings is concerned with the 
meaning relationship among words and phrases, providing the systematic rules to 
determine the conditions under which any sentence is true, i.e., truth conditions. Thus, 
the meaning of the sentence (3) is represented as in (4) - (5).1  
 (Heim and Kratzer, 1998) 
(4)  For any situation (or circumstance) v, 
{x: x is running in v} 
(5) The sentence (3) is true in the circumstance in which a variable x is a member 
of the set of dogs and x is running; otherwise it is false. 
                                                
1 We will put aside the detail technicalities about how to formalize the sentence meanings in 
the formal semantics. See Heim and Kratzer (1988), for example, for the technical details. 
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On the other hand, the second aspect of semantic competence, i.e., comparison of 
meanings, goes beyond the truth conditions for individual sentences; it represents the 
relations among propositional variables. For example, consider the relation between 
the following two propositional variables. 
 
(6) a.  A dog is running. 
b.  An animal is running. 
 
The underlined nouns in (6) constitute a set-subset relation; dog is a subset of animal. 
Keeping this in mind, consider the meaning relation between these sentences. Note 
that (6b) is necessarily true in any circumstances that (6a) is true because a dog is a 
subtype of an animal, but not vice versa; (6a) is not necessarily true even if (6b) is 
true, since the animal that is running might be a cat instead of a dog.2 Hence, we say 
that (6a) entails (6b), but not vice versa; crucially, the inference is licensed from the 
entailing expression (6a) to the entailed expression (6b). This relationship is 
illustrated as follows. 
 
(7) a.  A dog is running    (=(6a)) 
 An animal is running  (=(6b)) 
b.  An animal is running    (=(6b)) 
         *  A dog is running   (=(6a)) 
 
                                                
2 See the illustration in Figure 1, which demonstrates each situation that represents these 
relations in truths between two propositions. 
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The meaning relations that have observed above can be schematically illustrated in 
the Venn diagram as follows. 
 









  (7a) A dog is running  (7b) An animal is running  
 An animal is running             *  A dog is running  
    
 
Now, let us consider the following two sentences, in which the actions denoted in the 
verbs constitute a set-subset relation. 
 
(8) a.  A dog is running. 
b.  A dog is moving. 
 
Note that the action of running referred to in (8a) is a subset of the action of moving 
denoted in (8b). Keeping this in mind, consider the meaning relation between them. 
(8b) is necessarily true in any circumstances that (8a) is true, since running is a 
subtype of the action of moving, but not vice versa; (8b)’s being true does not 







be walking instead of running.3 Thus we say that (8a) entails (8b), and which can be 
illustrated as in (9), on a par with the case of (6).  
 
(9)  a.  A dog is running (=(8a)) 
 A dog is moving (=(8b)) 
b.  A dog is moving (=(8b)) 
         *  A dog is running (=(8a)) 
 
The across-propositional meaning relations that have observed above can be 
schematically illustrated in the Venn diagram as follows. 
 
Figure 2 Schematized Pattern of Across-propositional Meaning Relation for  






  (9a) A dog is running  (9b) A dog is moving 
    A dog is moving            *  A dog is running 
 
 
Thus, the across-propositional relations in meanings are related to the direction of the 
logical inference; the crucial observation is that the inference licensed from the 
                                                
3 See the illustration in Figure 2, which demonstrates each situation that represents the 







entailing to the entailed propositions. As we have discussed, the default pattern of the 
across-sentential relation in meanings, i.e., the default direction of logical inferences, 
is from the subset-denoting expression to its relating superset-denoting expression. 
 To sum up, the semantic competence in human language requires the ability to 
compute the meanings at the following two levels: (i) the ability to compute the truth 
conditional meanings of individual propositions (i.e., the computation of lexical 
meanings on the basis of the semantic composition rules); (ii) the ability to license the 
logical inferences between propositional variables appropriately (i.e., which 
proposition entails which other proposition). Hence, “a grammar does not stop at 
rules for relating words (e.g., De Villiers and De Villiers, 1979)”; “it also has means 
of expressing the relationship between whole propositions or events (ibid.)”. 
 However, thus far we have only observed the simplest example of how the 
relationship among sentential meanings is represented, in which an inference is 
licensed from the subset-denoting expression to the superset-denoting expression as a 
default. In the following section, we will look at a case demonstrating that the default 
pattern is not always licensed, focusing on the role that the universal quantifier every 
plays in determining the inference pattern. 
 
1.2. Entailments, Inferences and the Universal Quantifier “Every” 
 
Before considering inferences, let us start with a survey of various linguistic 
phenomena with respect to the semantic contribution of the universal quantifier every. 
In fact, the universal quantifier every provides an interesting domain for considering 
 9 
both of the two aspects of semantic competence that we have described in the 
previous section. The universal quantifier every not only influences the meanings of 
individual sentences containing it at the within-propositional (truth conditional) level 
but also determines the across-propositional meaning relations among individual 
sentences containing it in a non-canonical way. 
 Being a quantificational determiner, every gives speakers “the power to move 
beyond talk about properties of particular individuals to saying what quantity of the 
individuals in a given domain have a given property (Chierchia and McConnell-
Ginet, 1990)”. At the semantic level, every is mapped onto a two-place relation 
holding between sets of individuals: the first argument (i.e., the NP) is a property that 
holds of objects or of individuals; the second argument (i.e., the VP) is also a property 
that holes of objects or individuals. Consider a simple sentence that contains every as 
the one in (10) as an example. 
 
(10)  Every dog is running. 
 
In the sentence (10), a two-place relation holds between the first argument dog, which 
denotes the set of dogs, and the second argument is running, which denotes the set of 
runners. The sentence (10) is true if the set of dogs is a subset of the set of runners, as 

















Crucially, it is well known that the universal quantifier every shows an 
asymmetry in its first argument (i.e., the NP) and its second argument (i.e., the VP) in 
a sentence that contains it, with respect to some aspects in determining its truth-
conditional meaning. In particular, the first argument of every patterns on a par with 
negation with respect to licensing some specific linguistic element or interpretation at 
the within-propositional level of meaning, whereas the second argument of every does 
not.  
First, every licenses a negative polarity item (NPI) such as ever or any in its 
first argument, as (11a) and (12a) show, but not in its second argument, as (11b) and 
(12b) show. 
 
(11)   a.  [Every student who has ever read Chomsky] should know it. 
b.      * Every student has ever read Chomsky. 
(12)   a.  [Every child who ate any vegetable at lunch] may go out and play. 






Note that the contrast between (a) sentences and (b) sentences in (11) and (12) is 
parallel to the contrast between affirmative and negative sentences, i.e., (a) sentences 
and (b) sentences in (13) and (14). 
 
(13)  a.  The students have not ever read books by Chomsky. 
b.      * The students have ever read book by Chomsky. (cf. (11)) 
(14)  a.  The children did not eat any vegetables at lunch. 
b.      * The children ate any vegetables at lunch.   (cf. (12)) 
 
Thus the first argument of every, but not the second argument, licenses an NPI, on a 
par with that the negative sentences, but not the affirmative sentences, licenses an 
NPI. 
Second, every licenses disjunction to be interpreted in a way as if it were 
equal to conjunction4 in its first argument, as (15a) shows, but not in its second 
argument, as (15b) shows. 
 
(15)   a.  [Every child who ate a carrot or a green pepper] may go out and play. 
≈ Every child who ate a carrot and every child who ate a green 
pepper may go out and play. 
b.       Every child ate a carrot or a green pepper. 
      * ≈ Every child ate a carrot and every child ate a green pepper. 
 
                                                
4 Higginbotham (1991) called this phenomenon the conjunctive interpretation of disjunction.  
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Note again that the contrast between (15a) and (15b) is parallel to the contrast 
between (16a) and (16b) below. (Higginbotham, 1991) 
 
(16)  a.  The children did not eat a carrot or a green pepper. 
≈ The children did not eat a carrot and the children did not eat a 
green pepper. 
b. The children ate a carrot or a green pepper.  
         * ≈ The children ate a carrot and the children ate a green pepper.
       (cf. (15)) 
 
The “conjunctive” interpretation of disjunction in the relevant linguistic contexts calls 
to mind one of the De Morgan’s laws of propositional logic: ¬(A∨B)  ¬A∧¬B.5 
The truth tables in Table 1 below illustrate the logical equivalence between 
disjunction under the scope of negation and the conjunction of the two negated 
premises. 
 
                                                
5 Unlike English, Japanese apparently does not follow De Morgan’s laws with respect to the 
disjunction under negation. In the Japanese simple negative sentence that corresponds to 
(16a), the disjunction ka does not receive the conjunctive interpretation. (Szabolcsi, 2002; 
Goro, 2003; Goro, 2004; Goro and Akiba, 2004; Szabolcsi, 2004)goro 
(i) Kodomo-tachi-wa ninjin-ka piiman-o tabe-naka-tta. 
child-pl.-NOM    carrot-or green pepper-ACC eat-neg-past 
 
For a theoretical analysis about disjunction and negation in Japanese, see Goro (2003, 2004), 
which claims that the Japanese disjunction ka is a positive polarity item (PPI). (See also 
Szabolcsi (2002, 2004) for the analyses of the Hungarian disjunction in the same vein.) For a 
detailed discussion about disjunction and negation in child Japanese, see Goro and Akiba 
(2004). For a related discussion about disjunction in the covert DE in English and Japanese, 
see Crain, Goro and Minai (2005), Goro, Minai and Crain (2004a, 2004b) and Minai, Goro 
and Crain (2004).  
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Table 1 The Truth Tables of Disjunction and Conjunction wrt. Negation 
A B A∨B ¬(A∨B) ¬A ¬B ¬A ∧¬B 
   0 0 0      1     1    1         1 
   0 1 1      0       1    0        0 
   1 0 1      0       0    1        0 
     1 1 1      0   0    0        0 
 
 
Thus, the first argument, but not the second argument, licenses the “conjunctive” 
interpretation of disjunction, on a par with that the negative sentences, but not the 
affirmative sentences, licenses the “conjunctive” interpretation of disjunction. 
The distinction between the negative and affirmative sentences with regard to 
the above aspects is said to be a consequence of the semantic property entailment. 
The negative sentence creates a downward entailment (henceforth, DE) linguistic 
environment, in which an NPI and the conjunctive interpretation of disjunction are 
licensed, whereas the affirmative sentences do not. Hence, on a par with the 
distinction between affirmative and negative sentences, we say that the first argument 
of every is a DE environment, whereas the second argument of every is a non-DE 
environment.6 
The discussion so far has focused on the contrast between the first and second 
argument of every with respect to how they determine the individual sentential 
meanings (at the within-propositional level). Keeping that discussion in mind, let us 
move on to the relation between the entailment structure that the universal quantifier 
every asymmetrically creates in both arguments, and the across-propositional 
meaning relations regarding the sentences containing every. 
                                                
6 See Ladusaw (1979, 1980) for a detailed discussion of the entailment structure of the 
arguments of every and their consequences. (Ladusaw, 1979; Ladusaw, 1980). 
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 First, consider the following sentences, in which logical inferences are created 
with respect to the NP-denotation in the first argument of every. 
 
(17)  a.  Every dog is running. 
 Every white dog is running. 
b.  Every white dog is running. 
         *  Every dog is running. 
(Goro, 2004; Goro and Akiba, 2004; Goro, Minai and Crain, 2004a; Goro, Minai and 
Crain, 2004b; Minai, Goro and Crain, 2004; Crain, Goro and Minai, 2005) 
As (17a) shows, if every dog is running is true, every white dog is running is 
necessarily true, but not vice versa; even if every white dog is running is true, it does 
not follow that every dog is running is true, as (17b) demonstrates, because there may 
be dogs of other colors that are not running in the domain.7 Thus, the contrasts in (17) 
illustrate that the first argument of every, being DE, licenses an inference from a set-
denoting expression, i.e., dog, to its subset-denoting expression, i.e., white dog.  









                                                
7 See the illustration in Figure 4, which demonstrates each situation that represents the 
relation in truths between the two sentences. 
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(17a) Every dog is running  (17b) Every white dog is running 
  Every white dog is running             *  Every dog is running 
 
 
Note that the inferential pattern observed between every-sentences in (17) 
above is the opposite of the default pattern that we have observed in (6) and (8), 
which are repeated below. 
 
(18)  a. A dog is running    (=(6a)) 
 An animal is running  (=(6b)) 
b.  An animal is running    (=(6b)) 
         *  A dog is running   (=(6a)) 
(19)  a.  A dog is running    (=(8a)) 
 A dog is moving   (=(8b)) 
  A dog is moving    (=(8b)) 







As can be seen, the examples above show that the inferences are licensed from the 
subset-denoting expression to the set-denoting expression; this is the opposite of the 
patterns that were demonstrated in (17).  
Note now that the same pattern observed in (17) could be seen in the case of 
the negative versions of (6) and (8), which is another DE environment. Consider (20) 
and (21). If an animal is not running, then it is necessarily true that a dog is not 
running, but not vice versa; likewise, if a dog is not moving, then it is necessarily true 
that a dog is not running, but not vice versa. 
 
(20) a.  A dog is not running    (cf. (6a)) 
         *  An animal is not running  (cf. (6b)) 
b.  An animal is not running    (cf. (6b)) 
  A dog is not running  (cf. (6a)) 
(21)  a. A dog is not running    (cf. (8a)) 
         *  A dog is not moving  (cf. (8b)) 
b.  A dog is not moving    (cf. (8b)) 
  A dog is not running  (cf. (8a)) 
  
Let us now consider the inferences that are created with respect to the noun 
denotation in the second argument of every. 
 
(22)   a.  Every dog caught a bug. 
         *  Every dog caught a blue bug. 
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b.  Every dog caught a blue bug. 
 Every dog caught a bug. 
 
Contrary to the pattern observed in (17) (with respect to the first argument of every), 
in any circumstance every dog caught a blue bug is true, it is necessarily true that 
every dog caught a bug, as (22b) illustrates; however, even if every dog caught a bug 
is true, it does not necessarily follow that every dog caught a blue bug, as (22a) 
shows, since there is no necessity for the bugs referred to in the first half of (22a) to 
be blue.8 Therefore, (22) demonstrates that the second argument of every, being non-
DE, patterns in the same way as the default pattern, licensing an inference from a 
subset-denoting expression, i.e., blue bug, to its set-denoting expression, i.e., bug. 
 The meaning relation between above sentences can be illustrated as follows. 
 









 (22a) Every dog caught a bug  (22b) Every dog caught a blue bug 
            *  Every dog caught a blue bug   Every dog caught a bug 
 
                                                
8 See the illustration in Figure 5, which demonstrates each situation that represents the 






To sum up, we have observed various consequences of the semantic properties 
of the universal quantifier every, which asymmetrically creates a DE environment in 
its first argument but not in its second argument. We thus conclude that the semantic 
property of every is consequently reflected at the level of across-propositional 
meaning relations, as well as the within-proposition meanings, and that, as speakers 
of a human language, we all share the intuition about the behavior of every observed 
above that determines both within-propositional and across-propositional levels of 
meanings.  
 
1.3. Semantic Competence and “Every” in Child Language 
 
Let us now consider semantic competence in child language, focusing on the case of 
the universal quantifier every that we have discussed in the previous section. Recall 
that children, as language learners, need to learn the following two abilities that 
constitute the semantic competence: 
 
(23) a.  The ability to compute the within-proposition meanings, i.e., the truth  
conditional meanings of individual propositional variable (the 
computation of lexical meanings on the basis of the semantic 
composition rules) 
b.  The ability to compute the across-proposition meanings, i.e., to license  
the logical inferences between propositional variables (which 
proposition entails which other proposition) 
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What children need to learn about the universal quantifier every thus includes not 
only the ability to be able to compute the truth conditional meanings of individual 
sentences containing it, but also the ability to able to compute inferences created 
between sentences that contain it. In particular, in order for a child to be a matured 
speaker of a language, he/she must know what kind of inferences are licensed by the 
meanings that contain every at the within-propositional level.  
 In the past, a number of studies have discussed children’s knowledge about 
every with respect to their ability to compute the meanings of individual sentences 
containing every at the within-propositional level. The initial studies seemed to show 
that children’s semantic computations related to every were not adult-like. Inhelder 
and Piaget (1958, 1964) have observed how preschool children interpreted the 
following sentence containing every in (24), when it is presented in the context such 
that there are four elephants, three of which are being ridden by a boy each and the 
other is being ridden by no boy. (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958; Inhelder and Piaget, 
1964) 
(24) Every boy is riding an elephant. 
 
For adults, this sentence should be true in the above context regardless of how many 
elephants are left unridden, as long as each of the boys is riding an elephant. This 
demonstrates that in one aspect, every quantifies over the denotation of the subject 
NP, but not over the denotation of the VP, in the adult’s grammar. Contrary to this 
interpretation, children evaluated this sentence as false on the basis of the above 
context, pointing the unridden elephant as the falsifier. Crucially, children seem to 
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have symmetrically applied the quantification of every over the VP as well as the 
subject noun. 
 Inhelder and Piaget’s observation has triggered a number of studies that seek 
to provide explanations for what the locus of children’s errors would be; Gualmini 
(2005) called the studies in this line the Partial Competence View, which attribute 
children’s errors to a fundamental difference among children’s and adults’ semantic 
knowledge.  
Let us now briefly survey some studies in this vein. Drozd and Loosbroek (in 
press), for example, claimed that children wrongly treat the universal quantifier every 
as if it were equal to the weak quantifiers many (the Weak Quantifier Hypothesis). 
Crucially, the meaning of the weak quantifier many is context-related and thus 
computed on the basis of relative quantity, which evokes an ambiguity with respect to 
what parts in a sentence it quantifies over. Consider the following examples. 
 
(25) Many Scandinavians have won the Nobel Prize in literature.  
(Westerstål, 1985) 
 
One interpretation of many in (25) allows the sentence to yield a reading such that the 
number of the Scandinavians who have won the Nobel Prize in literature is large, 
compared with the number of the Scandinavians. When this interpretation is 
computed, the quantification of many spreads over the denotation of the subject noun, 
Scandinavians. On the other hand, under a second interpretation of many, the 
sentence would yield a reading such that the number of the Scandinavians who have 
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won the Nobel Prize in literature is large, compared with the number of Nobel Prize 
winners in literature. With this interpretation, the quantification of many ranges over 
the denotation of the VP. Given this, Drozd and Loosbroek, on the basis of the 
speculation that children treat every in the same way as they treat many, argued that 
children’s non-adult symmetric errors in applying the quantification of every to the 
VP are due to a similar mechanism that yields the latter reading of many for adults. 
Meroni, Gualmini and Crain (2000) formalized adults’ and children’s semantic 
representations of (25) provided in the Drozd and Looseboek’s framework, as 
follows. 
(Meroni, Gualmini and Crain, 2000) 
(26)  Adults’ interpretation 
EVERY [boy][λx (x is riding an elephant)](boy ∩ λx [x is riding an 
elephant]) ∈ EVERY (boy) 
(27)  Children’s additional interpretation 
EVERY [elephant][λx (boy is riding x)](elephant ∩ λx [x is ridden by a boy]) 
∈ EVERY (elephant)               (Meroni et al. 2000) 
 
Whereas the interpretation as in (26) is the adult-like interpretation, children allow the 
interpretation in (27), in a non-adult-like way. 
 In the similar vein, Geurts (2003a) argued that children interpret the strong 
determiner as if it were weak, and thus the problem lies in the mapping between 
syntactic form and semantic representation. Crucially, Geurts (2003a) assumes that 
the strong quantifiers including every require a more complex semantic representation 
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than the weak quantifiers, and the source of children’s non-adult interpretations is 
their wrong association between every and a semantic representation for a weak 
quantifier. (Geurts, 2003a) 
Also, Philip (1995) attributed children’s errors observed in Inhelder and 
Piaget (1964) to their analysis of the universal quantifier as an unselective binder, like 
the temporal adverbs such as usually and always (the Event Quantification 
Hypothesis). According to Philip, the determiner every, analyzed on a par with the 
temporal adverbs, can quantify over events in child grammar, whereas it only 
quantifies over individuals in adult grammar. Under the Event Quantification 
Hypothesis, children’s non-adult interpretation of the sentence (24) requires a one-to-
one symmetric association between individuals and events. Hence, children’s 
interpretation of (24) would be stated as follows. 
 
(28)  Symmetrical reading 
All events that involve a boy or an elephant (or both) are events of a boy 
riding an elephant. 
 
 
Hence, in order for (24) to be true in children’s (non-adult) interpretation, for every 
elephant there must be a boy riding on that elephant. The ‘extra-object’ context in 
discussion contains an elephant that is not being ridden by any boy, and thus it 
falsifies (24) in child grammar. Gualmini (2005) described children’s non-adult 
interpretation of (24) under this hypothesis as follows: (Gualmini, 2005) 
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(29)  For every event e in which either an elephant or a boy participates, or which is   
a possible sub-event of a boy-riding-an-elephant, a boy is riding an elephant in 
e.9 
 
On the other hand, an alternative view has been proposed by Crain, Thornton, 
Boster, Conway, Lillo-Martin and Woodams (1996). According to Crain et al., the 
studies that supported the Partial Competence View have missed certain pragmatic 
felicity conditions in designing and conducting the experiments, which induced 
children’s non-adult responses that apparently demonstrated their limited linguistic 
competence (the Full Competence View10, 11). Crucially, Crain et al. claimed that in 
the Truth Value Judgment Task (Crain and McKee, 1985; Gordon, 1996; Crain and 
Thornton, 1998), the stories presented to the children should be controlled in a way 
that both answers (“Right” and “Wrong”) to the truth value evaluations should be 
made available as genuine options. As applied to sentence (24) presented in the “extra 
object” condition, making the target sentence felicitous would require a scenario in 
which the possibility that some boys don’t ride an elephant is considered as well. If 
this possibility would be left out of consideration, children would be confused as to 
why the experimenter wants to know if the statement is true. Crain et al. then reported 
experiments with this felicity condition satisfied, in which children performed as well 
as adults. On the basis of these results, they concluded that young children have full 
                                                
9 For a detailed explanation, see Philip (1995). 
10 The Full Competence View is based on the idea of the Nativists View (e.g., Pinker, 1984; 
Crain, 1991; Crain and Pietroski, 2001). 
11 See also Freeman, Sinha and Stedmon (1982) and Freeman and Stedmon (1986) for 
another example of non-linguistic account of children’s non-adult responses to sentences with 
the universal quantifier. (Freeman, Sinha and Stedmon, 1982; Freeman and Stedmon, 1986) 
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grammatical competence with universal quantification, and their apparent non-adult 
performance was due to the lack of satisfaction of the felicity condition in the earlier 
experiments. 
 Since Crain et al., the Full Competence View has developed; for example, a 
number of experimental studies by Crain and his colleagues have revealed children’s 
adult-like ability to compute the truth conditional meanings of every-sentences in 
various respects. Meroni et al. (2000) replicated the “Extra Object” Condition that has 
drawn researchers’ attention since Inhelder and Piaget (1958, 1964), controlling the 
felicity condition in the experiment, with the further modification that salience is 
added to the extra elephant that is not being ridden by any boy. Despite the fact that 
the extra elephant is highlighted, children were not influenced by the salience placed 
on that elephant; they did not reject the sentence like (24) on the basis of the presence 
of the salient and extra elephant. Meroni et al’s findings thus have provided strong 
empirical evidence in favor of the Full Competence View, demonstrating the 
improvement of the “Extra Object” Condition directly by means of controlling the 
experimental environment. 
The most recent achievement along this line has been by Gualmini (2005). In 
his dissertation, Gualmini has reported a series of experimental studies that 
demonstrate children’s adult-like ability to compute the truth-conditional meanings of 
every-sentences, in the way that adults do with respect to the following consequences 
that the entailment property of every determines, including NPI-licensing and (30a) 
and licensing the conjunctive interpretation of disjunction (30b). 
(Crain, Thornton, Boster, Conway, Lillo-Martin and Woodams, 1996). 
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(30) a.  Being DE, the first argument of every licenses an NPI such as any, but  
its second argument does not, since it is not DE. 
b.  Being DE, the first argument of every licenses a conjunctive 
interpretation of disjunction, but its second argument does not, since it 
is not DE. 
 
These studies together suggest that children possess the adult-like semantic 
knowledge about the universal quantifier every, with respect to both of these within-
sentence properties. 
Thus, beginning with Inhelder and Piaget (1958, 1964), children’s 
interpretation of the universal quantifier every has drawn a lot of attention from many 
researchers that are concerned in child language studies. The most up-to-date 
experimental research has revealed that children’s systematic errors, originally 
pointed out Inhelder and Piaget, in which children interpret every-sentences as if 
every quantified over the events denoted in the verb as well as the objects denoted in 
the subject nouns, are due to the lack of appropriate control of the felicity conditions 
in the experimental workspace. Thus, the primary contribution of the previous studies 
that have been discussed above is the experimental demonstration of children’s 
possession of the adult-like ability to compute within-sentence meanings with respect 
to the universal quantifier every.12 (Geurts, 2000; Philip and Lynch, 2000; Sugisaki 
and Isobe, 2001; Gouro, Norita, Nakajima and Ariji, 2002) 
 
                                                
12 For more discussion on the contrast between the Partial Competence View and the Full 
Competence View, see Gordon (1996), Geurts (2000), Philip and Lynch (2000), Sugisaki and 
Isobe (2001) and Gouro, Norita, Nakajima and Ariji (2002) among others.  
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1.4. Linguistic Studies on Logical Inference in Child Language 
 
Having now established that children have all of the components of every to compute 
the within-propositional meaning, we can ask about their across-propositional 
computation of meanings; what is known about children’s ability to compute the 
across-sentence meaning relations involving the universal quantifier every?  
To the best of my knowledge, far less has been discovered about children’s 
ability to compute the across-propositional semantics in general from a linguistic 
point of view. Furthermore, no linguist has ever examined children’s knowledge 
about the universal quantifier every, with respect to its creation of the asymmetric 
entailment structure in both arguments from the perspective of whether this 
knowledge can be applied to the computation of the across-propositional meaning 
relations, despite a number of studies have discussed children’s ability to compute the 
within-propositional meanings with respect to the universal quantifier every, as has 
been discussed in the previous section.13, 14  
                                                
13 In the field of developmental psychology, children’s ability to evaluate the deductive logics 
has been discussed, and there have been several studies about children’s understanding of 
logical reasoning linguistically encoded. According to them, children were found to be 
sensitive to the validity of Modes Ponens (If p is true, then q is true; p is true; therefore q is 
true) and Modes Tollens (If p is true, then q is true; q is not true; therefore p is not true) and 
the invalidity of Asserting-the-Consequence fallacy (If p is true, then q is true; q is true; 
therefore p is true) and Denying-the-Antecedent fallacy (If p is true, then q is true; p is not 
true; therefore q is not true) (e.g., Kuhn, 1977; Bucci, 1978; Smith, 1979). Among them, 
Smith (1979) reported children’s ability to solve inference problems involving the 
construction and evaluation of hierarchies relating to the quantifiers such as all.  In Smith 
(1979), children were asked to evaluate the relation between the two premises containing all 
by answering the question as in (ii) (i.e., the consequence) that immediately followed the 
presentation of the sentence as in (iii) (i.e., the antecedent). 
 
(ii)  All milk has lactose. 
(iii)  Does all chocolate milk has to have lactose? 
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Investigating children’s computation of the across-propositional meaning 
relations involving the universal quantifier every would thus not only be the next 
valuable step to consider their knowledge about the semantics of every, but also 
would make a significant contribution toward a new aspect of children’s semantic 
competence, i.e., the ability to compute inferences in general, which has not yet been 
energetically discussed in the field. 
 In making the initial step toward the exploration of the new aspect of 
children’s semantic competence, it is worthwhile to start with the review of a series of 
studies (Philip and de Villiers, 1992; De Villiers, Curran, DeMunn and Philip, 1998) 
that have challenged children’s ability to evaluate the logical inferences across 
sentences from the linguistic standpoint. Though their primary focus was not on the 
asymmetric entailment patterns related to the universal quantifier every, they have 
provided some important issues in considering how we can assess children’s ability to 
calculate inferences between propositions. In what follows, we will briefly review 
these studies. 
The relevant linguistic phenomena that these studies feature (which did not 
involve the universal quantifier every) are as follows. Philip and de Villiers (1992) 
examined whether children are aware of the fact that the default pattern of inferences, 
i.e., the one created in a non-DE environment which is licensed from a subset-
                                                                                                                                      
According to the results, the older children such as kindergartners and first graders got 
virtually all the questions correctly, whereas the 4-year-olds answered the questions correctly 
at above chance level. The younger children’s errors were reported to come mostly from the 
lack of the knowledge about have to. This study strongly suggested children’s adult-like 
ability to compute the inferential relation relating to the universal quantifier all. However, no 
study considered children’s sensitivity to the asymmetric entailment structure that the 
quantifier every creates in each argument, which we focus on throughout this dissertation.  
14 As for the review of researches on children’s logical reasoning in broader aspects, see 
Brain and Rumain (1983). (Braine and Rumain, 1983) 
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denoting expression to its set-denoting expression, is blocked by the presence of some 
adverbs such as often, as the following examples show. 
 
(31)  a.  Jimmy eats grapes with a fork. 
 Jimmy eats grapes. 
b.  Jimmy often eats grapes with a fork. 
         *  Jimmy often eats grapes. 
 
Since the VPs underlined above in the sentences in (31a) are in a non-DE 
environment, the inference between the first and second sentences in (31a) is validly 
licensed from the subset-denoting expression (eats grapes with a fork) to its set-
denoting expression (eats grapes). On the other hand, when the adverb often is added 
in the sentences in (31a), the inference from eats grapes with a fork to eats grapes is 
blocked, as (31b) shows. Their experimental results failed to demonstrate any 
conclusive findings toward either perspective as to whether children are sensitive to 
the validity of inferences. 
De Villiers et al. (1998) focused on the verb forget, assuming that the verbs 
like forget semantically contain the implicit negation that would yield the DE effect 
in the inference, as the contrast between (32) and (33) shows.  
 
(32)  a.  The boy bought apples. 
         *  The boy bought green apples. 
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b.  The boy bought green apples. 
 The boy bought apples. 
(33) a.  The boy forgot to buy apples. 
            The boy forgot to buy green apples. 
b.  The boy forgot to buy green apples. 
         *  The boy forgot to buy apples. 
 
Example (32) demonstrates the “default” non-DE pattern, in which the inference is 
validated from a subset-referring expression (green apples) to its related set-denoting 
expression (apples) as in (32b), but not vice versa as in (32a). Example (33) 
contrastively exhibits the opposite, DE pattern, in which the inference is licensed 
from a set-referring expression (apples) to its related subset-denoting expression 
(green apples) as in (33a), but not vice versa as in (33b). Once again, their results 
revealed no conclusive findings. 
 These studies utilized the Questions after Stories Task (e.g., De Villiers and 
Roeper, 1996). In this task, the antecedent among two propositions (between which 
an inference is licensed validly or invalidly depending on the denotations of the 
relevant linguistic expressions) was presented in a short story depicted in the picture 
materials, and the consequence was presented in a question sentence the child was 
asked to evaluate with respect to the antecedent. For example, in examining 
children’s evaluation of the invalid inference as in (31b) in Philip and De Villiers 
(1992), the child was first shown a picture in which a boy named Jimmy is eating a 
grape with a fork. Then, the child was asked to answer the comprehensive Yes-No 
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question about the contents of a picture, such as “Does Jimmy often eat grapes?”. In 
such a case, the child was expected to answer “No”, since the rejection of such 
question (i.e., the consequence, “Jimmy often eat grapes?”) on the basis of the 
comprehension of the contents of the picture (i.e., the antecedent, “Jimmy often eats 
grapes with a fork”) demonstrate the child’s awareness that the inference from Jimmy 
often eats grapes with a fork to Jimmy often eats grapes is blocked. 
In a similar way, in De Villiers at al (1998) in which tokens like the one in 
(33b) was tested, the consequence was embedded in a question such as “Does that 
mean that the boy forgot to buy apples?”, which followed the presentation of the 
antecedent proposition as in (33a) in a story with pictures. In such a case, the child 
was expected to answer “No” to show their sensitivity to the invalidity of the 
inference from the boy forgot to buy green apples to the boy forgot to buy apples.  
Their experiments, however, did not demonstrate any clear patterns of 
responses from the children; thus it would be difficult to draw any conclusions about 
children’s evaluation of the validity of logical inferences from these studies. Detailed 
discussion aside at the moment,15 we can conclude that a new experimental approach 
is required to successfully access children’s semantic competence with respect to the 
across-proposition meaning relations and determine whether children possess the 
adult-like ability to distinguish the valid and invalid logical inferences between 
sentences. 
On the other hand, recall the recent findings in the framework of the Full 
Competence View (e.g., Crain, et al., 1996) regarding children’s knowledge about the 
                                                
15 We will discuss in detail the methodological issues that were raised in Philip and De 
Villiers (1992) and De Villiers et at. (1998) in Chapter 3. 
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universal quantifier every. As has been pointed out, it has been revealed that children 
are aware of the various consequences of the asymmetric entailments that every 
evokes at the within-propositional level (Meroni, et al., 2000; Gualmini, 2005). On 
the basis of the findings from these studies, it would be predicted that children are 
aware of the validity in the logical inferences involving the universal quantifier every, 
demonstrating the adult-like ability to evaluate the meaning relations across-
propositionally with respect to the consequences that the asymmetric entailment 
structure that every yields. Thus, the evidence for children’s adult-like composition of 
meanings involving every and the apparent lack of evidence for children’s adult-like 
comparison of meanings involving every would constitute a puzzle, which we will 
aim to solve in the present paper. 
Therefore, the research questions will be addressed as follows. 
 
(34) Research Questions 
a.  Can children compute inferences from subsets to supersets and vice 
versa appropriately? 
b.  Does their knowledge about the universal quantifier every extend to 
the computation of the valid and invalid inferences created between 
propositions involving every? 
 
In particular, we aim to provide the answer to the question in (34a), by considering 
the question in (34b), i.e., considering children’s knowledge about across-
propositional meaning relations (their ability to evaluate logical inferences) by taking 
 32 
the universal quantifier every as a case study. Ultimately, this investigation 
contributes (i) a novel approach to investigate children’s computation of inferences 
from linguistic structures, (ii) demonstration that children have adult-like knowledge 
of the unique properties of the universal quantifier in building across-sentence 
meaning relations (i.e. what makes (34b) an extremely challenging and interesting 
special case of (34a) from a linguistic and a language development point of view), 
and (iii) engaging the questions of what it means for children to have acquired and 
employed this knowledge – including what it suggests about the acquisition of ‘hard 
words’ like quantifiers and their impact on meaning in and across linguistic 
structures. 
 
1.5. Organization of the Dissertation 
 
In what follows, we will report six experiments in which children’s knowledge about 
the universal quantifier every is investigated from a logico-semantic point of view. 
The goal of the first three experiments is to directly examine children’s ability to 
evaluate the inferences created between the sentences containing every with respect to 
the asymmetrical properties of the first and second arguments of every. The last three 
experiments seek to extend the question in (34), testing the linguistic phenomenon in 
which the relevant entailment regarding every is reversed due to the semantic 
interaction between every and negation, as a further ground for investigating 
children’s logico-semantic competence. 
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 The organization of the dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 is devoted to 
discussing the experiment (Experiment I) conducted as a pre-test to ensure that 
children know the truth-conditional meanings of entailing and entailed sentences that 
contain every. Given the results drawn from Experiment I, Chapter 3 and 4 report two 
experiments (Experiments II and III) designed to directly assess children’s ability to 
evaluate the logical inferences involving every, featuring newly designed 
experimental methodologies. Chapter 5 will revisit the research questions in (34), 
considering the phenomenon of reversed entailment. Reversed entailment also 
addresses a related issue that directly bears on the relation of linguistic structure and 
logical inference in child language: the relationship among entailment, inference and 
scope representation. The rest of the chapters will be devoted to discussing the 
experiments we conducted to examine children’s knowledge about the reversed 
entailment. Chapter 6 then reports two experiments (Experiments IV and V) to 
investigate children’s ability to compute the truth-conditional meanings of the 
entailing and entailed sentences that contain both every and negation, which affects 
the direction of entailments under specific circumstances. Chapter 7 then reports an 
experiment featuring the new methodology introduced in Chapter 4 (Experiment VI) 
which examines children’s ability to evaluate the logical inferences determined by the 
reversed entailment due to the semantic interaction between every and negation. 
Chapter 8 will be devoted to the general discussion of the findings from all the 
experiments reported thus far and the research questions stated in (34), including 
consideration of related further issues. 
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Chapter 2. Experiment I: Truth Conditional Evaluation of 
Entailing and Entailed Propositions 
 
 
Experiment I was conducted as the pre-test to explore children’s semantic 
competence with respect to the meaning computed at the across-proposition level. 
The objective of this experiment is thus to ensure that children are able to compute 
the truth conditional meanings that are individually assigned to the entailing and 
entailed sentences containing every (i.e., the antecedent and the consequence of the 
relevant inferences involving every).  
 Given the recent achievement in the studies within the framework of the Full 
Competence View (e.g., Crain, et al., 1996; Meroni, et al., 2000; Gualmini, 2005), it 
would be hypothesized that children possess the highly sophisticated knowledge 
about every. Thus Experiment I aims to consider the following hypothesis. 
 
(35) Hypothesis: Experiment I 
Children were found to be aware of the consequences of the entailments that 
are created in the first and second argument of the universal quantifier every. 
Therefore, children would be able to compute the opposing truth values that 
are assigned to each of the entailing and entailed sentences with respect to 
both arguments of every. 
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In order to consider this hypothesis, the experiment was designed featuring the Truth 
Value Judgment Task (e.g., Crain and McKee, 1985; Gordon, 1996; Crain and 




Let us start with the simplest case to illustrate the basic paradigm. As we have 
discussed previously, the default pattern of inferences between sentences are created 
from a subset-denoting expression to a superset-denoting expression, as (36) 
demonstrates. 
 
(36) A brown dog found a snack. 
 A dog found a snack. 
 
Keeping this in mind, consider the truth conditions these sentences receive at the 
same time in the same context. First, whenever the entailing sentence is true, the 
entailed sentence is necessarily true (i.e., whenever it is true that a brown dog has a 
snack, it must be true that a dog has a snack). On the other hand, when the entailing 
sentence is false, an asymmetry emerges; the entailed sentence does not have to be 
necessarily false ––– it can logically be either true or false. For example, consider the 
context in which it is false that a brown dog has a snack. In this context, it is also 
false that a dog has a snack if there is no dog that has a snack in the domain; but in 
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the same context, it can be true that a dog has a snack, if, for example, there is a 
white dog that has a snack in the domain.  
The crucial summary here is as follows. When these minimal-paired sentences 
receive the opposing truth values in the same context at the same time, it is necessary 
that the entailing sentence is false while the entailed sentence is true, but not vice 
versa; logically, there cannot be any situations in which the entailing sentence is true 
while the entailed sentence is false in at the same time. Such relation in truths 
between these two sentences can be illustrated in the following Venn diagram. 
 






A brown dog found a snack (True)   A brown dog found a snack (False)   A brown dog found a snack (False)  
A dog found a snack (True)            A dog found a snack (True)               A dog found a snack (False) 
 
A brown dog found a snack (True) 
A dog found a snack (False) 
 
 
To sum up, the following table illustrates how the logical relation between 
entailing and entailed sentences can be reflected in the truth values assigned to each 
sentence at the same time. 
 
 








Table 2 Truth Values and Entailment between Sentences 







Recall now that the objective of this experiment is to examine whether 
children are aware of the truth conditional meanings of the entailing and entailed 
sentences that are respectively assigned. For the purpose of this objective, we will 
focus on the situation in which the entailing sentence is false while the entailed 
sentences is true, i.e., the situations that are represented in the shaded cells in Table 2 
above. In particular, if we are to set out the situation to assign the contrastive truth 
values to each sentence in the experimental workspace, the experiment designed with 
the Truth Value Judgment Task would be the most effective approach to children’s 
ability to compute the meanings of the entailing and entailed sentences at the within-
propositional level. 
 Keeping this paradigm in mind, let us now illustrate the detailed logic that 







2.1.1. First Argument of “Every” 
Let us first focus on the first argument of every. Remember first that the first 
argument of every is a DE environment, which patterns the opposite of the default. 
Consider the sentences in (37) as an example. 
  
(37) a.  Every dog has a snack 
b.  Every brown dog has a snack 
(38)  Every dog has a snack   (=(37a)) 
 Every brown dog has a snack (=(37b)) 
(39) Every brown dog has a snack   (=(37b)) 
         *  Every dog has a snack  (=(37a)) 
 
The sentence as in (37a) entails the one like (37b), but not vice versa; consequently, 
the inference is licensed from superset (dog) to its subset (brown dog), but not vice 
versa, as (38) and (39) show, since the first argument of every, where superset/subset-
denoting expressions (dog, brown dog) appear, is a DE environment. Note that there 
is a context in which (37a) is false and (37b) is true at the same time, which we will 
discuss in what follows. 
 
Context: First argument of every  
Suppose that the sentences in (37) are presented in the following situation. There are 
five dogs: three brown dogs and two white dogs. The three brown dogs got a snack 
each, while the two white dogs did not. See the illustration below. 
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Figure 7 Dogs and Snacks I 
 
  brown     brown      brown  white  white 





                              
    snack        snack          snack 
 
 
Truth values of the every-sentences (37) in the context  
The context in Figure 7 makes the sentence (37a) false, since not all the dogs got a 
snack, whereas it makes the sentence (37b) true, since all the brown dogs got a snack, 
even though the white ones did not. 
 
(40)  a.  Every dog has a snack.  (False)  (=(37a)) 
b.  Every brown dog has a snack. (True)   (=(37b)) 
 
2.1.2. Second Argument of “Every” 
In the same way, let us now consider the case of the second argument of every, taking 
the sentences (41) as an example.  
 
(41) a.  Every dog has a snack. 
b.  Every dog has a big snack. 
(42) Every dog has a snack.   (=(41a)) 
         *  Every dog has a big snack. (=(41b)) 
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(43) Every dog has a big snack.   (=(41b)) 
 Every dog has a snack.  (=(41a)) 
 
Sentence (41b) entails sentence (41a), but not vice versa; as a consequence, the 
inference is licensed from subset (big snack) to its superset (snack), but not vice 
versa, as (42) and (43) show, since the second argument of every, where set/subset-
denoting expressions (snack, big snack) appear, is non-DE. Note that there is a 
context in which the entailing sentence (41b) is false and the entailed sentence (41a) 
is true at the same time. 
 
Context: Second argument of every 
Suppose that the sentences in (41) are presented in the following situation. There are 
five dogs, three of which got a big snack each, and two of which got a small snack 
each. See the illustration below. 
 
Figure 8 Dogs and Snacks II 
 





                 
 
 big      big        big            small  small 




Truth values of the every-sentences in (41) in this context 
The context in Figure 8 determines the opposing truth values of the sentences in (41); 
it makes (41b) false, since not all the dogs got a big snack, but two of them got a 
small snack, whereas it makes (41a) true, since all the dogs got a snack, even though 
some of them got a big snack, and others got a small snack. 
 
(44)  a.  Every dog has a snack.  (True)  (=(41a)) 
b.  Every dog has a big snack.  (False)  (=(41b)) 
 
 
 Let us now illustrate the relevant paradigm that has been discussed thus far; 
see the following table. 
 
Table 3 Entailment and Truth Conditions 
Relevant 
argument 
Minimal-paired sentences Entailing/ 
entailed 
TV in a 
relevant 
context 
(37a) Every dog has a snack Entailing False 1st arg. : DE 
(37b) Every brown dog has a snack Entailed True 
(41a) Every dog has a snack  Entailed True 2nd arg.: non-
DE (41b) Every dog has a big snack  Entailing False 
 
 
To sum up, for minimal-paired (entailing and entailed) sentences as in (37) 
and (41), there is a context such that it falsified the entailing sentence and verifies the 
entailed sentence at the same time, reflecting the entailment relations between them. 
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In order to examine children’s ability to compute the truth conditional meanings of 
the entailing and entailed sentences (i.e., the antecedent and the consequence of the 
relevant inference) in the most efficient way, we will exploit such contexts in the 
Truth Value Judgment Task, discussing in detail in what follows 
 
2.2. Experimental Design 
 
On the basis of the paradigm that was described above, we designed the experiment 
to examine children’s interpretation of minimal-paired sentences that contain every, 
featuring the Truth Value Judgment Task (e.g., Crain and McKee, 1985; Gordon, 
1996; Crain and Thornton, 1998). In particular, we examined whether children know 
the fact that the entailing sentence is false while the entailed sentence is true in a 
certain context, which reflect the entailing relation between the two sentences. This 
experiment serves as the pre-test to explore children’s semantic competence with 
respect to the meaning computed at the across-proposition level; our purpose here is 
to ensure that they are aware of the truth-conditional meaning of each of the entailing 
and entailed sentences in minimal pair that are contrastively assigned individually to 
each sentence in the same context. 
 The generic procedure was as follows. There were two experimenters, one of 
which acted out short stories using toys and props, and the other of which 
manipulated the puppet such as Kermit the Frog. The puppet watched stories along 
with the subject. In the end of each story, the puppet described what he thought had 
happened in the story, which was expressed in the target sentences. The child’s task 
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was to evaluate the puppet’s description on the basis of the outcome of the story, and 
judge him as to whether he was right or wrong. 
 The two experimental conditions, the “True” Condition and the “False” 
Condition, were included. Recall that the minimal-paired every-sentences receive the 
opposing truth values respectively, i.e., the entailing sentence is false while the 
entailed sentence is true, in a certain context. Taking advantage of this fact, the 
current experiment was designed in a way that the true sentences (i.e., the entailed 
every-sentences) and false sentences (i.e., the entailing every-sentences) were 
presented in virtually identical contexts. Each condition contains the two types of test 
items: “First-Argument” items manipulated the first argument of every; “Second-
Argument” items manipulated the second argument of every. A full list of target 
sentences is in (45) - (48) below.  
 
“First-Argument” items 
(45)   a.  Every troll ate a potato chip.  (False) 
b.    Every yellow troll ate a potato chip. (True) 
(46)   a.  Every dog rode a horse.  (False) 
b.   Every white dog rode a horse. (True) 
“Second-Argument” items 
(47)   a.  Every smurf caught a bug.  (True) 
b.  Every smurf caught a blue bug. (False) 
(48)  a.  Every mermaid found a jewel. (True) 
b.  Every mermaid found a red jewel. (False) 
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The sentences in (45) and (46) involve inference with respect to the first argument of 
every, and the ones in (47) and (48) involve inference with respect to the second 
argument of every. Note that the sentences in (45) and (46) show an inference from 
(a) to (b), which is licensed from a set-denoting expression (troll/dog) to a subset-
denoting expression (yellow troll/white dog), whereas the ones in (47) and (48) show 
an inference from (b) to (a), which is oppositely licensed from a subset-denoting 
expression (blue bug/red jewel) to a set-denoting expression (bug/jewel). Each pair of 
sentence was presented in the same context, and the assigned truth values were shown 
in the brackets in the end of each sentence above. The following table illustrates the 
conditions and stimuli in a schematic way. 
 
Table 4 Condition and Stimuli 
 “True” Condition “False” Condition 
(45b) Every yellow troll ate a 
potato chip  
(45a) Every troll ate a potato chip  “First-
Argument” 
items (46b) Every brown dog rode a 
horse 
(46a) Every dog rode a horse  




items (48a) Every mermaid found a 
jewel 





The study adopted a Latin Square design. Each child heard two sentences 
from (45) and (46), and two sentences from (47) and (48). There were also four filler 
trials; two were designed to elicit positive responses, and two were designed to elicit 
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negative responses. Expected truth values in all the sentences in a session were 
randomized. The following are the lists of the test sentences in each group; half of the 
children participated in the first group, and half participated in the second group. 
 
(49) List of the test sentences for Group A 
a.  Every troll ate a potato chip.  (False)  (=(45a)) 
b.  Every white dog rode a horse. (True)  (=(46b)) 
c.  Every smurf caught a bug.  (True)  (=(47a)) 
d.  Every mermaid found a red jewel. (False)  (=(48b)) 
(50)  List of the test sentences for Group B 
a.  Every yellow troll ate a potato chip. (True)  (=(45b)) 
b.  Every dog rode a horse.  (False)  (=(46a)) 
c.  Every smurf caught a blue bug. (False)  (=(47b)) 
d.  Every mermaid found a jewel. (True)  (=(48a))  
 
The following is the sample trial to examine children’s evaluation of inference with 
respect to the first argument of every, in which the target sentences in (45) were 
presented independently in each session. 
 
(51)  Sample trial 1: “Hungry Trolls” Story 
This is a story about Tigger and his friends, five trolls. One day, Tigger got a 
new kitchen. He was so happy that he invited the trolls to serve them with his 
homemade snacks. Three trolls have yellow hair and two trolls have purple 
hair. Tigger says: “Hi friends! I have prepared a lot of food for you. Look, I 
have baked three regular potato chips and one extra spicy potato chip. I also 
baked two cookies and one donut. Help yourselves!” The trolls consider their 
choices. The first yellow troll thought about having something sweet such as 
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cookies, but he remembered that he had bad teeth and decided to take a potato 
chip that is not sweet. The second yellow troll loves potato chips, and he 
thought about having the orange potato chip, but he thought that it might be so 
spicy that he changed his mind and took a regular potato chip. The third 
yellow troll also took a regular potato chip. The purple trolls love sweets, and 
each of them took a cookie and a donut. 
 
The final outcome of this trial is illustrated below. 
 
Figure 9 “Hungry Trolls” Story: The Final Outcome 
 
 
Target sentences presented in this outcome: 
(45a) Every troll ate a potato chip.  (False) 




Turning now into the “Second-Argument” items, the following is a sample trial to 
examine children’s evaluation of inference with respect to the second argument of 




(52)  Sample trial 2: “Smurfs’ Bug-catching Game” Story 
This is a story about five smurfs who go to a fair. They want to play a game 
being operated by Mickey Mouse. In this game, there is a big swimming pool 
in which some animals are swimming. There are four blue bugs; three small 
ones and one very big one. In addition there is a red bug, a green bug and a 
frog. The idea of the game is to catch one of the animals, to win a prize. 
Mickey Mouse tells the smurfs that if they catch the big blue bug, they will 
get a bigger prize. At first the smurfs try to catch the frog, but the frog is very 
quick, and jumps away. Then three smurfs each catch a small blue bug. The 
remaining smurfs first attempt to catch the big blue bug, but they give up. One 




The final outcome of this story is show in the following figure. 
 
Figure 10 “Smurfs’ Bug-catching Game” Story: The Final Outcome 
 
  
  Target sentences presented in this outcome: 
  (47a) Every smurf caught a bug  (True) 








Recall that the objective of this experiment is to investigate whether children are able 
to evaluate the truth values of the individual sentences containing every that 
constitutes a minimal pair. As the logical consequence, the entailing sentence can be 
false when the entailed sentence is true (but not vise versa) in a certain context. We 
hypothesized as in (35) that if children were able to correctly compute the truth 
conditions of each sentence, it would demonstrate their awareness of consequence of 
entailment pattern which is reflected in the truth conditions. Thus, given that the 
entailment pattern is evoked asymmetrically in each argument of a sentence 
containing every, children must crucially know that the first argument of every is DE 
and its second argument is non-DE in order to compute the relevant truth conditions 
assigned to the entailing and entailed sentences. 
 In particular, if children knew that the first argument of every is DE while the 
second argument is not, then they should know that, among the minimal-paired every-
sentences with respect to the first argument such as (45) and (46), the sentences in (a) 
(i.e., the ones with superset-denoting expression) is entailing and thus is false, and the 
sentences in (b) (i.e., the ones with subset-denoting expression) is entailed and thus is 
true, in the relevant context. Likewise, children should know that, among the 
minimal-paired every-sentences with respect to the second argument such as (47) and 
(48), the sentences in (b) (i.e., the ones with subset-denoting expression) is entailing 
and thus is false, and the sentences in (a) (i.e., the ones with superset-denoting 
expression) is entailed and thus is true, in the relevant context. 
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An alternate possibility would be that they assign the truth conditions 
randomly to the sentences. One potential reason for this alternate would be that they 
don’t know the superset-/subset-relations between nouns in the relevant positions in 
the target sentences, e.g., troll vs. yellow troll and bug vs. blue bug. In particular, if 
children would not know the function of restrictive adjectives to narrow down the 
class specifications of the nouns, they would not know the semantic relation between 
the two words and might treat them as the words that are not semantically related. If 
this alternate would be borne out, then children would not be able to semantically 
relate the two sentences in minimal-pair, and thus their truth value judgments might 
not systematically pattern. Indeed, while this is not the main focus of the experiment, 
it is worth noting that children’s adult-like performance on this task would also 




Twenty English-speaking children aged 3;8 to 5;11 (mean 4;10) participated in this 
experiment. The participants were children enrolled for the Center for Young 
Children at University of Maryland, College Park; all participants had their parental 
permission to participate in the study. Half of them participated in Session A, and the 
other half participated in Session B, both of which presented virtually the same set of 
stimulus with different stories. The children were tested one by one in a separate quiet 





Let us start with children’s truth value judgments of the target sentences with respect 
to the first argument of every, which are repeated as follows. 
 
“First-Argument” items 
(53)   a.  Every troll ate a potato chip.  (False)  (=(45a)) 
b.    Every yellow troll ate a potato chip. (True)  (=(45b)) 
(54)   a.  Every dog rode a horse.  (False)  (=(46a)) 
b.   Every white dog rode a horse. (True)  (=(46b)) 
 
As for judging “First-Argument” items as the ones shown in (53) and (54), the 
children accepted the true sentences like (53b) and (54b) 100% (20/20) of the time, 
whereas the children accepted the false sentences like (53a) and (54a) only 10% 
(2/20) of the time. A t-test was conducted to analyze the percentages of the 
acceptance within this condition, showing that these differences are significant, t(19) 
= 13.077, p < 0.0001, Standard Error Mean=6.88.  
Let us now turn to children’s interpretation of the minimal-paired sentences 
with respect to the second argument of every, which are repeated below. 
 
“Second-Argument” items 
(55)   a.  Every smurf caught a bug.  (True)  (=(47a)) 
b.  Every smurf caught a blue bug. (False)  (=(47b)) 
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(56)  a.  Every mermaid found a jewel. (True)  (=(48a)) 
b.  Every mermaid found a red jewel. (False)  (=(48b)) 
 
As for judging “Second-Argument” items as in (55) and (56), the children accepted 
the true sentences like (55a) and (56a) 95% (19/20) of the time, while the children 
never accepted the false sentences like (55b) and (56b) (0%, 0/20). A t-test was 
conducted to analyze the percentages of the acceptance within this condition, with the 
results again significant, t(19) = 19.00, p < 0.0001, Standard Error Mean = 5.00.  
Taken together, these results are illustrated in the following table and the 
figure. 
 
Table 5 Percentages of the Acceptance 
 “True” Condition “False” Condition 
“First-Argument” items 100% (20/20) 10% (2/20) 











Figure 11 Percentages of the Acceptance 
 
 
 A chi-square test was conducted to examine the distribution of the response 
patterns across conditions (i.e., “True” Condition vs. “False” Condition), according to 
which there was a significant association between the conditions and the type of 
responses, χ2(1) = 68.493, p < 0.0001. Hence, it was demonstrated that children’s 
truth value judgments were based on the condition (i.e., the truth values of the 
sentences).16   
 
 
                                                
16 Another chi-square test analyzed the distribution of the response patterns across items (i.e., 
“First-Argument” item vs. “Second-Argument” item), which revealed that there was no 
significant association between the type of items and the type of responses, χ2(1) = 0.300, p < 
0.58. This analysis demonstrated that there was no significant difference in how well children 





As for the first of argument of every, Experiment I revealed children’s consistent 
acceptance of the entailed sentence in which the relevant position holds the subset-
denoting expression (e.g., brown dog), and the significantly low rate in acceptance of 
the entailing sentence in which the relevant position holds the relating set-denoting 
expression (e.g., dog). The findings demonstrate that children know that, where A’ ⊆ 
A, the same context can falsify sentences of the form Every A is B, but verify ones of 
the form Every A’ is B, as well as that children know that entailing and entailed 
minimal-paired sentences receive different truth values in the same context in the way 
that it reflects which sentence entails which other one. These findings provided 
supporting evidence for children’s sensitivity to the fact that the first argument of 
every is DE. 
 Experiment I also revealed children’s high rate of acceptance of the entailed 
sentences in which the relevant position holds the subset-denoting expression (e.g., 
blue bug), and the consistent rejection of the entailing sentences in which the relevant 
position carries the relating superset-denoting expression (e.g., bug). The results 
showed children’s knowledge that minimal-paired sentences as in (5) and (6) receive 
different truth values, and that the truth values in these sentences show the opposite 
pattern to the ones in sentences like (3) and (4), i.e., where B’ ⊆ B, the same context 
can verify sentences of the form Every A is B, but falsify ones of the form Every A is 
B’, which also demonstrating the children’s sensitivity to the fact that the second 
argument of every is non-DE. 
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 Taken together, the results in Experiment I provided the novel support for the 
findings of the previous studies under the Full Competence View (e.g., Crain, et al., 
1996; Meroni, et al., 2000; Gualmini, 2005), rather than the Partial Competence View 
(e.g., Drozd and Philip, 1992; Philip, 1995; Drozd and Van Loosbroek, in press), 
from the viewpoint of the logico-semantic consequence of the universal quantifier 
every. In particular, this experiment demonstrated that children know the consequence 
of the asymmetric entailment patterns created in the first and second arguments of 
every, which is reflected in the opposing truth conditions assigned to the entailing and 
entailed sentences containing every. 
 To sum up, Experiment I, serving as the pre-test to explore children’s 
knowledge about the inferential relation between every-sentences in minimal-pair, 
examined children’s knowledge of the truth values of the minimal-paired sentences 
that contain every. It demonstrated children’s ability to compute the truth values of 
the entailing and entailed every-sentences with respect to both first and second 
arguments of every, in which the entailing sentence is false and the entailed sentence 
is true in the same context. 
 Note once again that Experiment I ensured that children are aware of the 
opposing truth conditions assigned to the independent minimal-paired sentences 
containing every between which inferences are created depending on the entailment 
direction regarding each of its arguments. Thus, it does not directly prove anything 
about children’s ability to evaluate the validity of inferences across every-sentences. 
Hence, these findings motivate our subsequent experiments ahead to directly explore 
children’s evaluation of the logical inferences between two propositions, which will 
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be discussed in the following chapters. 
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Appendix 2A: Full Sentences and Stories provided in Experiment I 
 
Trial 1 (=(51) on p. 45) 
 
Story: This is a story about Tigger and his friends, five trolls. One day, 
Tigger has got the new kitchen. He was so happy that he invited the 
trolls to serve them with his homemade snacks. Three trolls have 
yellow hair and two trolls have purple hair. Tigger says: “Hi friends! I 
have prepared a lot of food for you. Look, I have baked three regular 
potato chips and one extra spicy potato chip. I also baked two cookies 
and one donut. Help yourselves!” The trolls consider their choices. 
The first yellow troll thought about having something sweet such as 
cookies, but he remembered that he had bad teeth and decided to take a 
potato chip that is not sweet. The second yellow troll loves potato 
chips, and he thought about having the orange potato chip, but he 
thought that it might be so spicy that he changed his mind and took a 
regular potato chip. The third yellow troll also took a regular potato 
chip. The purple trolls love sweets, and each of them took a cookie and 
a donut. 
 
Target sentences:  (1A) Every troll ate a potato chip.  (False) 




Story:  This is a story about five dogs, three white dogs and two brown dogs 
who arrived at the big lake and want to swim across the other side of 
the lake. But none of the dogs are good swimmer, so they decided to 
look for some aid. Then, there came some horses and dolphins came, 
and talked to them. “Hey, doggies! You seem to want to go to the 
other side of the lake. We, horses, are so tall and so fast runners that 
we can run across the lake! And we, dolphins, are good swimmers, so 
it’s easy to swim across the lake! Why don’t we give you a ride?” The 
dogs are so happy to hear that, and decided to accept their offer. The 
first white dog rode a horse, and safely arrived at the other side of the 
lake. The second white dog rode another horse, and safely arrived at 
the other side of the lake, too. The third white dog also rode another 
horse, and safely arrived at the other side of the lake. Now, it’s turn of 
brown dogs. The first brown dog tried to ride a horse, but he found that 
horse in a weird color! He has some spots in acid color and does not 
seem so friendly and healthy. So he changed his mind and rode a 
dolphin. The second brown dog rode another dolphin, too. In the end, 
all the dogs could reach the other side of the lake! 
 
 57 
Target sentence:  (2A) Every white dog rode a horse. (True) 




Story: This is a story about the ocean. It is the birthday of the king of the 
ocean. He ordered the five mermaids living in this ocean to look for 
something beautiful for the birthday present. Mermaids started to 
search for the beautiful things in the ocean. The first mermaid found a 
beautiful red jewel behind the rock at the bottom of the ocean. The 
second mermaid also found a red jewel on the sea shell in the coral. 
The third mermaid also found a red jewel at the bottom of the ocean. 
The fourth mermaid found a red jewel, too, but she found it really big 
and so heavy that she could not pick it up. So she gave it up and 
instead found a smaller green jewel. The fifth mermaid also found the 
big red jewel too heavy for her to carry, so instead she found a purple 
jewel. 
 
Target sentences: (3A) Every mermaid found a jewel.  (True) 
    (3B) Every mermaid found a red jewel. (False) 
 
 
Trial 4  (=(52) on p. 47) 
 
Story: This is a story about five smurfs who go to a fair. They want to play a 
game being operated by Mickey Mouse. In this game, there is a big 
swimming pool in which some animals are swimming. There are four 
blue bugs; three small ones and one very big one. In addition there is a 
red bug, a green bug and a frog. The idea of the game is to catch one 
of the animals, to win a prize. Mickey Mouse tells the smurfs that if 
they catch the big blue bug, they will get a bigger prize. At first the 
smurfs try to catch the frog, but the frog is very quick, and jumps 
away. Then three smurfs each catch a small blue bug. The remaining 
smurfs first attempt to catch the big blue bug, but they give up. One of 
them catches a red bug and one catches a green bug. 
 
 
 Target sentences: (4A) Every smurf caught a blue bug.  (False) 
    (4B) Every smurf caught a bug.  (True) 
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Appendix 2B: Individual Reponses of the Subjects 
 
Group A  
 
Subject # Age Target (1A) (F) Target (2A) (T) Target (3A) (T) Target (4A) (F) 
Subject 1 3;8 W R R W 
Subject 2 4;2 *R R R W 
Subject 3 4;3 *R R R W 
Subject 4 4;5 W R R W 
Subject 5 4;8 W R R W 
Subject 6 4;10 W R *W W 
Subject 7 4;11 W R R W 
Subject 8 5;5 W R R W 
Subject 9 5;11 W R R W 
Subject 10 5;11 W R R W 
 
(T) = “True” Condition 
(F) = “False” Condition 
R = “Right” responses (Judged as “True”) 
W = “Wrong” responses (Judged as “False”) 




Subject # Age Target (1B) (T) Target (2B) (F) Target (3B) (F) Target (4B) (T) 
Subject 11 4;2 R W W R 
Subject 12 4;3 R W W R 
Subject 13 4;5 R W W R 
Subject 14 4;5 R W W R 
Subject 15 4;5 R W W R 
Subject 16 4;7 R W W R 
Subject 17 4;10 R W W R 
Subject 18 4;11 R W W R 
Subject 19 5;1 R W W R 
Subject 20 5;10 R W W R 
 
(T) = “True” Condition 
(F) = “False” Condition 
R = “Right” responses (Judged as “True”) 
W = “Wrong” responses (Judged as “False”) 
* = Incorrect responses 
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Given the results from Experiment I, in which children are found to be able to 
compute the truth values of the entailing and entailed sentences containing every, 
Experiment II was conducted to directly test children’s ability to distinguish among 
valid and invalid inferences created entailing and entailed every-sentences like those 
were used in Experiment I. That is, can we find any direct evidence that children can 
evaluate linguistically-encoded inferences such as “Every dog has a snack. Therefore, 
every brown dog has a snack”? On the basis of the findings from Experiment I, we 
will address the following hypothesis to be examined in Experiment II. 
 
(57) Hypothesis: Experiment II 
The pattern of inferences created between the minimal-paired sentences is 
determined by the pattern of entailments between the sentences.  Children 
were found to be aware of the various consequences of the asymmetric 
entailment patterns created in the arguments of every (e.g., Gualmini 2005), 
and were also found to be able to compose the meaning of the antecedent and 
the consequence of the relevant inference containing every (Experiment I). 
Thus, they would be able compare the meanings of the antecedent and the 
consequence on the basis of the entailment patterns, i.e., to compute 
inferences created between the entailing and entailed sentences containing 
every with respect to its both arguments appropriately. 
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In pursuing the above hypothesis, we now need to establish an experimental 
methodology that can directly access to the new aspect of child semantics, i.e., the 
comparison of meanings.  In what follows, let us first discuss in detail the logic that 




The focus here was made on how to design the experimental task, in which children 
will be encouraged to evaluate the semantic relation between the two propositions, 
without receiving any extraneous burden in the process. The most simple and 
straightforward evaluation of logical inference between sentences, in an ideal design, 
would be to present the two propositional variables one after another, and simply ask 
the evaluator whether the second proposition logically follows from the first 
proposition.17 However, with children as the evaluators, this straightforward approach 
would not be feasible. Therefore, the crucial issue is how to develop an experimental 
task in which children can feasibly participate as evaluators (while also addressing the 
experimental pitfalls which have frustrated previous attempts in the literature, as we 
show in the next paragraph). 
 Recall now the challenge that has been previously made in the studies by 
Philip and De Villiers (1992) and De Villiers et al. (1998), which has been briefly 
reviewed in Chapter 1. We have briefly pointed out the necessity for improvement of 
the experimental design over the methods used in those two studies, in order to 
                                                
17 See Geurts (2003b), Geurts and van Der Slik (2005) for the experimental studies about 
deductive reasoning with adults. As for the psychological model of deductive reasoning in 
adults, see Rips (1994). (Rips, 1994; Geurts, 2003b; Geurts and van Der Slik, 2005) 
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successfully assess children’s ability to evaluate the logical inferences between 
propositions. Keeping the potential difficulty in doing this, let us look more closely at 
the methodological aspects of these studies; this will raise some important issues to 
be addressed in the new experimental design. 
 
3.1.1. Philip and De Villiers (1992) 
 
In Philip and De Villiers (1992), the contrastive linguistic phenomenon that they have 
focused on was the one as follows. 
 
(58)  a.  Jimmy ate grapes with a fork. 
b.   Jimmy ate grapes. 
 
The relevant set-subset relation is constituted with respect to the underlined VPs 
above; the VP in (58a) (ate grapes with a fork) is a subset-denoting expression with a 
restriction by the PP with a fork, while the VP in (58b) (ate grapes) is a set-denoting 
expression. The valid inference is from (58a) to (58b), which is from the subset-
denoting expression (ate grapes with a fork) to the set-denoting expression (ate 
grapes), showing the default pattern created in a non-DE environment, as illustrated 
below. 
 
(59)  Jimmy ate grapes with a fork.    
  Jimmy ate grapes. 
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The crucial observation is that once an adverb such as often is added to the sentences 
in (58) as seen in (60), the inference from ate grapes with a fork to ate grapes is 
blocked, as (61) shows. 
 
(60)  a.  Jimmy often eats grapes with a fork.  
b.  Jimmy often eats grapes. 
(61) Jimmy often eats grapes with a fork.    
            *  Jimmy often eats grapes. 
 
Now the inference from the subset-denoting expression to the relating set-denoting 
expression is not valid any more. In other words, the presence of often blocks 
licensing of the inference observed in (58).  
Focusing on this observation, Philip and De Villiers conducted an experiment 
presenting using the Questions after Stories Task (De Villiers and Roeper, 1996), 
where the test sentences, which are presented together with a picture depicting the 
context situation, were followed by the comprehensive questions as in (62b).18 
                                                
18 The primary focus in the study was made on the blocking effect of wh-movement from the 
logico-semantic point of view, in conjunction with on the blocking effect of the logical 
inference. They adopted the claim by Szabolsci and Zwarts (1993) that the non-monotone 
increasingness (downward entailment) blocks the wh-movement, as observed in the following 
examples. (For an alternative discussion of this examples from the syntactic perspective, see 
Chomsky (1986) and Rizzi (1990).). (Chomsky, 1986; Rizzi, 1990) (Szabolcsi and Zwarts, 
1993) 
(iv)  Whyi did he say he sent flowers ti? 
(v)     * Whyi did he often say he sent flowers ti? 
 
On the basis of Szabolsci and Zwarts who claimed that an inherent semantic property of the 
expression interferes the long distance wh-movement, Philip and de Villiers predicted that 
children block long distance movement only when they know that an expression that is 
crossed over by wh-phrase is not monotone increasing. The trial we discuss in the present 
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(62)   a.  Jimmy often eats grapes with a fork. 
b.  Does Jimmy often eat grapes? 
 
The expected answer was either “No” or “I don’t know”, because the rejection of the 
question like (62b) demonstrates their ability to block of the valid inference from the 
subset-denoting expression to the relating set-denoting expression, as is seen in (61).  
However, the children participated in their experiment showed only 50% 
adult-like valid inferences, where they rejected the question as in (62b) saying “No” 
or “I don’t know. On the basis of these findings, they concluded that the results 
showed the absence of children’s ability to block the invalid inferences, and that they 
failed to differentiate the sentences containing adverbs from the sentences without 
adverbs, treating them both in a “default” fashion.  
There are several issues which make these conclusions difficult to draw. The 
first problem to be pointed out lies in the linguistic material they have utilized. The 
crucial observation was that the presence of the adverb often blocks the valid subset-
to-set inference created in the non-DE (default) pattern. Note that often is a ‘habitual’ 
adverb that provides the information about the frequency of the character’s being 
involved in the event that is denoted in the verb. Let us go back to their test item 
again. 
 
(63)  a.  Jimmy often eats grapes with a fork. 
b.  Does Jimmy often eat grapes? 
                                                                                                                                      
paper is a part of their experimental tasks, which examines if children are sensitive to the 
non-monotone increasingness that would block the long distance wh-movement.  
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The premise as in (63a) would yield two kinds of ambiguity: (i) with respect to what 
often modifies, either the event of eating (denoted in the entire VP) or the means by 
which the event of eating is taken place (denoted in the PP with a fork); (ii) with 
respect to the comparison sets, whether Jimmy’s eating grapes with a fork is 
relatively frequent compared to the standard of other people’s doing so. The 
ambiguity in interpreting the premise would have produced the extraneous difficulty 
that has puzzled children.19  
In addition, it is not so obvious whether the relation between the premise (63a) 
and the consequence (63b) are logically related in the way that they can be evaluated, 
from the logical point of view, as the premise and consequence. In particular, whether 
Jimmy often eats grapes or not, which is asked in the question (63b) without 
mentioning his use of a fork, is not relevant in evaluating (63a). Thus, it does not 
follow whether or not Jimmy often eats grapes in the consequence like (63b) such that 
Jimmy often eats grapes with a fork. Therefore, it might be that children were 
confused when answering this question in this context, and as a result, they failed to 
reject the question. Thus, the low rate of children’s adult-like responses that they 
revealed would be due to the poorly controlled context, rather than their lack of 
                                                
19 The control condition that they conducted in comparison with the one in (63) is illustrated 
as follows. 
 
(vi)  Story: Yesterday Bob and Kathy made pictures. Bob used a red crayon and  
Kathy used a paint brush. 
        Question: Did Bob use a crayon? 
        Expected answer: “Yes” 
        Results:  More than 95% of the expected (“Yes”) responses 
 
Contrary to the chance-level correct responses in the crucial condition, children showed a 
high rate of adult-like responses in this condition. These results would be also suggestive to 
conclude that the source of children’s lower rate of the expected responses on the test item 
would be the presence of often. 
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linguistic knowledge. Therefore, the findings in this study do not suggest anything 
about children’s ability to distinguish two patterns of inferences created between two 
sentences. 
Another locus of their problem is in their experimental task. Note that they 
presented the sentences with a habitual adverb such as often in a story with a picture. 
Crain and Thornton (1998) have pointed out that it is risky to assume that children are 
able to interpret pictures in the same way as adults do, on the basis of the poorer 
results from the task using pictures than the results from the versions with vignettes 
acted out by the experimenter with toys and props (Crain, Thornton and Murasugi, 
1987; Miyamoto and Crain, 1991 among others). Therefore, it is not straightforward 
to determine what triggers children’s errors especially in interpreting sentences in 
response to pictures; whether it is the lack of linguistic knowledge or it is simply the 
limitation of their non-linguistic skill to interpret the information depicted on the 
pictures. In addition, according to Crain and Thornton, the capacity of depicting the 
context in pictures are limited, because they only represent “snapshots”, and thus the 
types of verbs and predicates that can be used in the test sentences are constrained. 
Remember that their test sentence refer to the habitual event of Jimmy’s grape eating. 
It would not be straightforward to exhibit the outcome of a character’s habit, using 
the “snapshot” illustration.  
(Crain, Thornton and Murasugi, 1987; Miyamoto and Crain, 1991) 
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3.1.2. De Villiers et al. (1998) 
 
Now consider the follow-up study conducted later with the slight modification (De 
Villiers et al. (1998). De Villiers et al. (1998) employed the mental verbs forget 20 to 
test children’s inference. Their motivation was the notion that the verbs like forget 
semantically contain implicit negation that would yield the DE effect in the inference.  
 
(64)  The boy forgot juice. 
            The boy forgot juice from witches.  
 
According to their analysis, the DE feature of forget is due to the implicit negation 
that licenses a negative operator in the lower, but not in the higher, CP. As the 
following example shows, the covert negation can license the NPI as any(one), which 
is a hallmark of yielding a DE environment. 
 
(65)  The boy {forgot NEGi} [OPi that he saw anyione] 
 
Assuming this, they examined whether children could validate the valid inference 
regarding the verbs like forget. The target sentences were presented basically in the 
same way as Philip and De Villiers (1992), with a slight improvement in the question 
                                                
20 As Philip and de Villiers (1992), their experimental focus has been three-way folded; one 
of them is children’s awareness of inferences that are contrastively created by the different 
verbs, on which we have been focused on. We will not discuss their analysis from the rest of 
the two perspectives, focusing on the analysis from the viewpoint of inferences, which is 
related to the present paper. 
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following the target sentence so that children do not have to provide the response “I 
don’t know” as the correct response.  
 
(66)  a.  The boy forgot that his mother told him to avoid juice from witches. 
b.  Does that mean the boy forgot that his mother told him to avoid juice? 
 
The expected answer was “No”, because rejecting the question like (66b) shows their 
blocking the invalid inference from the subset-denoting expression (juice from 
witches, with the restrictive PP) to the set-denoting expression (juice), such as 
follows. 
 
(67)  The boy forgot his mother told him to avoid juice from witches. 
               *  The boy forgot his mother told him to avoid juice. 
 
According to their analysis of the results drawn from the experiments, children again 
failed to demonstrate consistent adult-like judgments regarding inferences.  
  Again, there are some concerns which make these conclusions difficult to 
draw. The locus of the primary problem in this task is the use of mental verb such as 
forget in the experiment, which may be considered to be a factor inducing extraneous 
difficulty for the child to complete the experimental task. It is not straightforward to 
represent a character’s mental state such as forgetting and its outcome in the 
experimental workspace. Although De Villiers et al. did not explain how they present 
the stories in this experiment in detail, it might be possible that the children’s 
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performance observed in their experiment in was due to the drawbacks of the 
presentation of the stories, which must depict an event of a character’s forgetting, as a 
result of which would induce children’s performance errors. Therefore, on the basis 
of this series of studies in which children’s ability to evaluate the logical inferences 
between sentences were examined, it remains an unsolved puzzle whether children’s 
poor performance in creating the valid inference reflects their lack of linguistic 
knowledge or stems from the extraneous non-linguistic demands of the experimental 
design.  
 
3.1.3. Methodological Lessons 
Taken together, these studies highlighted the difficulties in designing experiments to 
investigate children’s ability to compute inferences between sentences. These are in 
turn the difficulty in controlling the felicity in the experimental context as regards 
how two propositions to be evaluated, in conjunction with the difficulty in choosing 
the best materials to test. The problem that is raised in the following would imply 
certain improvements to be considered, in assessing children’s logical aspect of 
semantic competence successfully. 
It is particularly notable that the locus of the difficulty lies in the evaluation of 
the propositions by answering the Yes/No questions, as is done in the experiments 
using the Questions after Stories Task. Recall, in De Villiers et al (1998), that 
children were asked to evaluate the inferences between the two propositions by 
answering a comprehensive question. The crucial part in the trial structure, which was 
illustrated in (66), will be repeated here. 
 69 
(68) a.  The boy forgot that his mother told him to avoid juice from witches. 
b.  Does that mean the boy forgot that his mother told him to avoid juice? 
 
The children were asked to answer the question (68b) after they were presented with 
the story described in (68a) with the corresponding pictures. From a logical 
perspective, a child is asked to evaluate the target sentence inductively, rather than 
deductively, in this context. The question sentence (68b) provides the consequence 
(The boy forgot that his mother told him to avoid juice), and a child is asked to 
evaluate the premise (The boy forgot that his mother told him to avoid juice) 
addressed in (68a) as to whether it would induce the consequence, rather than the 
former is deduced from the latter. Hence, in order to provide the expected response 
(i.e., saying “No”) to this question, a child has to compute his/her answer in the 
following steps: (i) imagine premises other than the one that is described in the target 
sentence (68a): (ii) evaluate whether they can induce the conclusion that is described 
in the question sentence (68a). Therefore, this task requires complicated computation 
of the answer to the question, and as a result, it may have added considerable noise to 
the responses, and made interpretation of the results incredibly difficult. 
 The same critique applies to the evaluation by question-and-answer session in 
the first study Philip and De Villiers (1992), in which the comprehensive question 
was presented in a slightly different fashion. The crucial part of the trial structure in 




(69)  a.  Jimmy often eats grapes with a fork. 
b.  Does Jimmy often eat grapes? 
 
The children were asked to answer the question (69b) in evaluating whether the 
proposition addressed in (69b), i.e., Jimmy often eat grapes, follows from (69a). In 
the same way that we have just described above, a child may have evaluated the 
target stimuli addressed in the question (69b) inductively rather than deductively. The 
question sentence (69b) provides the consequence (Jimmy often eats grapes), and a 
child is asked to evaluate the premise (Jimmy often eats grapes with a fork) addressed 
in (69a); again, from the evaluator’s point of view, this could be answered as to 
whether it would induce the consequence, rather than the former is deduced from the 
latter. In order to provide the expected response (i.e., saying “No”) to this question, a 
child has to compute his/her answer in the following steps: (i) imagine premises other 
than the one that is described in the target sentence (69a): (ii) evaluate whether they 
can induce the consequence that is described in the question sentence (69b): and (iii) 
somehow suppress the inductive conclusion. Therefore, this task requires complicated 
computation of the answer to the question, and as a result, it would have produced 
considerable noise to the responses, which made interpretation of the results 
extremely difficult. 
 On the basis of the discussion above, we conclude that the abandoning the 
task in the Question-after-Story style is inevitable in thinking about the design for 
Experiment II; the crucial evaluation phase should be constituted such that children 
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will make their decisions following the deductive logic in some clear (and 
entertaining) way. 
 Keeping this in mind, a novel task was designed to provide a testing ground 
for children to evaluate the logical inferences based on the deductive reasoning. In 
particular, instead of the evaluation in the question-and-answer fashion, the children 
are expected to evaluate the relations between the two propositions as to whether the 
second proposition could be construed as a rephrase of the first (where the re-phrasal 
is either a logically-implied consequence of the first proposition, in one condition, or 
is not a logically-implied consequence of the first proposition, in the other condition) 
The following section will be devoted to discussing the new methodology in detail. 
 
3.2. Experimental Design–“Prediction-Rephrase” Task 
 
In order to investigate the above hypothesis, we designed the experiment featuring the 
novel task, on the basis of the methodology lessons discussed in 3.1. 
 
3.2.1. Basic Plot 
The novel task is called “Prediction-Rephrase” Task, in which two propositional 
variables (premise and consequence) are presented sequentially in the conversation 
between two puppets. The two experimenters played the role of puppets in this task; 
one manipulated Merlin the Magician, and the other manipulated Kermit the Frog. 
Merlin the Magician served as a magic teacher, and Kermit the Frog was supposed to 
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be his pupil who wanted to learn how to be a magician from him. The conversation 
started with the following lead-in by Merlin. 
 
(70) The lead-in by Merlin:   
I will give you some magic training, Kermit. I will make something happen by 
saying my magic words. Before performing each magic trick, I will tell you 
what will happen. You should practice making a prediction; think about what 
else you can say, based on what I say, without being wrong. 
 
 
The first propositional variable (i.e., the premise) was presented by Merlin’s saying 
what will happen, and the second propositional variable to be evaluated based on the 
first one (i.e., the consequence) was presented by Kermit’s prediction, or what else he 
can say based on what Merlin said. 
In what followed, Merlin first showed the set of toy characters on which his 
magic trick would happen. He then said what he would make happen, which served as 
the premise, and let Kermit think about what else he can say. Next, Kermit rephrased 
what Merlin said, which served as the consequence to be evaluated based on the 
premise.  
Note that the introduction of the set of toy characters in the beginning was 
only the visual stimuli that was presented to the child prior to their judgment of the 
rephrase, and the outcome of the magic trick, i.e., what ended up happening on these 
toy characters, was presented after their evaluation, which did not affect our re-phrase 
task, but was crucial to the experimental purpose, in order simply to keep the 
children’s attention and satisfy their curiosity regarding the magic tricks. The reason 
why the entire course of the magic trick was not visually presented before the 
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evaluation was to let the child to reason whether the consequence logically follows 
from the premise (i.e., whether what Kermit said would happen really followed from 
what Merlin said would happen), rather than to relate the statement to situation in 
front of them.21  
 
3.2.2. Experimental Conditions and Stimuli 
In one experimental session, there are four tokens of evaluation tasks and four filler 
trials. The pairs of entailing and entailed propositions tested in the re-phrase task are 
listed below.  
 
“First-Argument” items 
(71)  a.  Every dog will have a pizza. 
b.  Every white dog will have a pizza. 
(72)  a.  Every dog will get a teddy bear. 
b.  Every white dog will get a teddy bear. 
“Second-Argument” items 
(73)  a.  Every koala bear will get a candy. 
b.  Every koala bear will get a green candy. 
(74)  a.  Every koala bear will get an alien. 
b.  Every koala bear will get a blue alien. 
 
                                                
21 I express my deepest gratitude to Jill de Villiers, who was the first person to point out the 
necessity of removing of the visual information, in which children could match each 
statement with the situation presented in front of them, rather than logically reason directly 
via the two statements and evaluate the relation between them. 
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The two experimental conditions were created by the alternating the order of 
presentation among each member of the sentence pairs listed above (generating valid 
inferences in one condition, and invalid inferences in the other, as discussed below). 
Within each condition, there are two types of items: “First-Argument” items are pairs 
of sentences (premise and consequences) which are minimal-paired with respect to 
the first argument of every (i.e., (71) and (72)); “Second-Argument” items are 
premises and consequences minimal-paired with respect to the second argument of 
every (i.e., (73) and (74)).22 
The first condition is the “Valid” Inference Condition, providing the pairs of 
premises and consequences between which the valid inferences are created. In 
particular, among “First-Argument” items, i.e., the sentences in (71) and (72) in 
which the relevant inference is created with respect to the first argument of every, the 
(a) sentences containing the set-denoting nouns in the relevant position were 
presented as the premise in Merlin’s utterance, and the (b) sentences with the subset-
denoting nouns in the relevant position were sequentially presented as the 
consequence to be evaluated in Kermit’s rephrases. As for the “Second-Argument” 
items, i.e., the sentences in (73) and (74) in which the relevant inference is created 
with respect to the second argument of every, the (b) sentences containing the subset-
denoting nouns in the relevant position were presented as the premise, and the (b) 
                                                
22 Additionally, the two practice trials were presented in the beginning, in which the premise 
and the consequence were represented in sentences without containing the universal 
quantifier every. In this task, these trials were merely provided as the genuine practice for the 
children to get the idea about how the task works, and the results for these trials were not 
analyzed as a control in comparison with the test trials. This point was improved in the 
modified novel task which will be discussed in the next chapter, in which the tokens without 
every were provided as a control in comparison with the test items, as well as serving the 
purpose of proving a practice phrase for the children. 
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sentences with the subset-denoting nouns in the relevant position followed as the 
consequence to be evaluated.  
The second condition is the “Invalid” Inference Condition, providing the 
pairs of premises and consequences between which the invalid inferences are created. 
The pairs of sentences were presented in the reversed order. In particular, among the 
“First-Argument” items, (b) sentences with the subset-denoting nouns were presented 
as the premise, and the (a) sentences with the set-denoting nouns were presented as 
the consequence. As for the “Second-Argument” items, the (a) sentences with the 
subset-denoting nouns were presented first as the premise, and the (b) sentences with 
the set-denoting nouns were presented as the consequence. 
The conditions and stimuli were illustrated in the following table. 
 
Table 6 Conditions and Stimuli 






(71a) Every dog 
will have a pizza  
(71b) Every brown 










koala bear will 
get a green 
candy 
(73a) Every koala 






white dog will 
get a teddy bear 
(72a) Every dog will 









koala bear will 
get an alien 
(74b) Every koala 





3.2.3. Sample Trials 
The followings are the sample trials from each condition. 
 
(75)  a.  “Valid” Inference Condition – “First-Argument” item 
Merlin: We have white dogs and brown dogs here. I promise 
you to make the following happen; every dog will have 
a pizza (= (71a)). 
Kermit: Ok, Merlin has just said that every dog would have a 
pizza. So that must mean that I can also say that every 
white dog will have a pizza (=(71b)). 
b.  Pattern of inference: 
 Every dog will have a pizza  Every white dog will have a pizza 
 
(76)  a.  “Invalid” Inference Condition – “First-Argument” item 
Merlin: We have white dogs and brown dogs here. I promise 
you to make the following happen; every white dog will 
get a teddy bear (=(72b)). 
Kermit: Ok, Merlin has just said that every dog would have a 
pizza. So that must mean that I can also say that every 
dog will get a teddy bear (=(72a)). 
b.  Pattern of inference: 
Every white dog will get a teddy bear * Every dog will get a teddy 
bear 
 
3.2.4. Evaluation of Kermit’s Rephrase 
In the end of each trial, the child was asked to consider whether Kermit said 
something good, or whether he said something he could not say based on what 
Merlin’s said. The expected response, thus, would be “Yes” Responses in the “Valid” 
Inference Condition, such as their saying “You can say that, Kermit”; on the other 
hand, Non-“Yes” Responses was expected in the “Invalid” Inference Condition, such 
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as their saying “You cannot say that, Kermit” or “It doesn’t sound good”. The “Yes” 
Responses in the “Valid” Inference Condition, in which children accepted Kermit’s 
utterance as the correct “rephrase” of Merlin’s utterance, were mediated as their 
treatment the sequence of the premise and consequence as the logically valid 
inference between them. On the other hand, the Non-“Yes” Responses in the 
“Invalid” Inference Condition, in which children rejected Kermit’s “rephrase” of 





On the basis of the findings from Experiment I, in which children were found to be 
aware of the opposing truth conditions assigned to the antecedent and the 
consequence of the relevant inferences involving every, we have hypothesized that 
children would demonstrate their adult-like ability to distinguish the valid and invalid 
inferences If children were aware of the validity of inferences, as would be predicted 
on the basis of the contributions of the previous studies which revealed children’s full 
competence of the semantics of the universal quantifier every in computing within-
proposition meaning, we would expect their adult-like responses in evaluating the 
relationship between the two sentences presented sequentially in this experimental 
context (see (57)). According to this hypothesis, it could be predicted that children 
would provide the “Yes” responses in the “Valid” Inference Condition, without being 
influenced by the order of the presentation of the set-/subset-denoting nouns; on the 
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other hand, children would provide the “No” responses in the “Invalid” Inference 
Condition, without being influenced by the order the set-/subset-denoting nouns were 
presented. 
 Alternately, if children lack the sensitivity to the distinction between the valid 
and invalid inferences, we would expect the patterns of errors in which children were 
purely tracking the order of presentation among the set-/subset-denoting nouns. In 
particular, (i) children would consistently provide the “Yes” Responses whenever the 
set-denoting noun precedes in the sequential presentation of the two propositions, and 
consistently provide the Non-“Yes” Responses whenever the opposite, or (ii) children 
would consistently provide the “Yes” Responses whenever the subset-denoting noun 
precedes in the sequential presentation of the two proposition, and consistently 
provide the Non-“Yes” Responses whenever the opposite. Another alternate scenario 
demonstrating children’s non-adult evaluations of the inferences would be that 
children would be completely confused, and show the random patterns in responses. 
 
Subjects 
Seven English-speaking children, aged from 5;3 to 6;5 (mean age 5;9), participated in 
this experiment. The participants were children enrolled for the Center for Young 
Children at University of Maryland, College Park; all participants had their parental 
permission to participate in the study. The children were tested one by one in a 





The percentages of the “Yes”-Responses observed in each condition were calculated. 
In the “Valid” Inference Condition, children provided the “Yes” Responses, i.e., the 
expected responses, 71% (5/7; Standard Error=18.443) of the time in evaluating the 
valid inferences with respect to the first argument of every, and 100% (7/7) of the 
time in evaluating the valid inferences with respect to the second argument of every. 
In the “Invalid” Inference Condition, children provided the “Yes” Responses, i.e., the 
non-expected responses, only 14% (1/7; Standard Error=14.289) of the time in 
evaluating the invalid inferences with respect to the first argument of every, and never 
did this in evaluating the invalid inferences with respect to the second argument of 
every.23 
A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test was conducted in order to examine whether the 
percentages of “Yes”-Responses observed in the “Valid” Condition were significantly 
higher than the percentages of “Yes”-Responses recorded in the “Invalid” Condition. 
In doing so, the sum of the correct answers was calculated in the following way. First, 
each of the “Yes” Responses observed was scored as 1, and each of the Non-“Yes” 
Responses was scored as 0. Then, the sum of the total scores in each condition (i.e., 
the potential maximum score was 7, while the potential minimum score was 0 for 
                                                
23  One of the subjects provided the Non-“Yes” Responses in the “Invalid” Inference 
Condition (i.e., the correct responses) by saying “Maybe” consistently. Considering an 
invalid inference on the basis of the “deduction” could be a valid inference on the basis of the 
“induction”, this would be considered to be “fully adult-like” responses, because this child 
might have been aware of the two possible validities for the relevant consequence depending 
on how it would be evaluated (i.e., deductively or inductively). Such responses are consistent 
with children’s adult-like evaluations of the fallacies of the deductive logics (Asserting-the-
Premise fallacy and Denying-the-Consequence fallacy) that were reported in the studies by 
Kuhn (1979) and Smith (1978) (see the footnote 13). 
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each condition) was compared in terms of whether the total score for the “Valid” 
Inference Condition was significantly higher than the one for the “Invalid” Inference 
Condition. According to the results, the total scores for the “Valid” Inference 
Condition were significantly higher than those for the “Invalid” Inference Condition, 
z = -2.000, p < 0.05.  
 These results are illustrated as follows.  
 
Table 7 Percentages of “Yes” Responses 













dog will have a 
pizza  
(71b) Every 
brown dog will 
have a pizza 
Set-to-subset 
(Valid DE) 






koala bear will 
get a green 
candy 
(73a) Every 
koala bear will 








white dog will 
get a teddy 
bear 
(72a) Every dog 










koala bear will 
get an alien 
(74b) Every 
koala bear will 

















As the data shows, the overall ratio of children’s adult-like responses was 
significantly above chance. It thus would suggest children’s adult-like ability to 
distinguish the valid and invalid inferences concerning every. 
 However, it should be noted that the number of subjects who participated in 
this experiment is significantly small, and the average age of the children was 
significantly high. This is because the younger children could not appreciate the task, 
and thus their data was eliminated from the analysis. This fact leads us to reconsider 
the experimental design and the possible difficulty that children had to handle in the 
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task. Let us look more closely at the experimental plot in order to examine where the 
difficulty may have arisen. 
Recall the trials demonstrated in (75) and (76), which are repeated in (77) and 
(78) respectively as follows. 
 
(77)   a.  “Valid” Inference Condition – “First-Argument” item 
Merlin: We have white dogs and brown dogs here. I promise 
you to make the following happen; every dog will have 
a pizza (= (71a)). 
Kermit: Ok, Merlin has just said that every dog would have a 
pizza. So that must mean that I can also say that every 
white dog will have a pizza (=(71b)). 
b.  Pattern of inference: 
 Every dog will have a pizza  Every white dog will have a pizza 
 
(78)  a.  “Invalid” Inference Condition – “First-Argument” item 
Merlin: We have white dogs and brown dogs here. I promise 
you to make the following happen; every white dog will 
get a teddy bear (=(72b)). 
Kermit: Ok, Merlin has just said that every dog would have a 
pizza. So that must mean that I can also say that every 
dog will get a teddy bear (=(72a)). 
b.  Pattern of inference: 
Every white dog will get a teddy bear * Every dog will get a teddy 
bear 
 
A couple of points in these dialogues should be pointed out, which impose the 
extraneous difficulties for the child to compete the task in the way that the 
experimenters expected them to do. First factor in the difficulty would be some 
felicity factor in the context. Note that the consequence was provided by Kermit’s 
rephrase of Merlin’s prediction, which served as the premise. This part was 
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introduced as “Kermit’s practice to become a professional magician”, as part of 
magician’s feature to make a right prediction. Introducing rephrase of a prediction as 
making a correct prediction would not have sounded felicitous in the conversation.  
More specifically, Merlin’s request might have sounded strange to the child, and the 
child might have been confused as to what Kermit should do to satisfy Merlin’s 
request. With such non-canonical dialogue, what the children was expected to do in 
the task might have been blurred, and children might have been confused. A second 
factor in the difficulty for children would have lied in Kermit’s line, led by the 
fragment “It must mean that I can also say …”. This fragment, with the multiple 
embedding structures in sentence, would have simply been too complicated for the 
children at preschoolers’ age, and it would have confused children.24 
The discussion above thus considered some possible sources of difficulty 
which strictly limited the ability to test younger subjects. What was clear from these 
results, although promising with the older children, is that we then needed to develop 
an improved methodology that would remove, as much as possible, the difficulties 
which prevented the younger children from participating successfully. The next 
                                                
24  Given that the dialogues presented in this experiment have yielded the pragmatic 
difficulties that may have puzzled children, there is a potential risk to induce some sort of 
type I errors, in which children might have provided the “correct” responses for the “wrong” 
reason (e.g., Crain and Thornton, 1998). That is, assuming that children are strongly “Yes” 
biased subjects, tending to provide the “Yes” responses even when they are not certain about 
what they were asked to answer, it would not have been obvious whether their “Yes” 
Responses were provided on the basis of their adult-like evaluation of the re-phrase, or 
whether they simply said “Yes” without knowing what they were expected to do in 
accomplishing the task. On the other hand, children were found to be likely to say “No” when 
they were confused in the experimental contexts (Fritzley and Lee, 2003). Given this report, 
the same concerns would have been the case when children provided the Non-“Yes” 
Responses; it would not have been obvious whether children provided the negative responses 
based on their linguistic evaluation of the items or based on their puzzlements. This also 
strongly suggests that the risk to trigger children’s confusion should be minimized as much as 
possible. This point will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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chapter will be devoted to discuss the experiment featuring the alternate novel 








Merlin: Hi, I’m Marlin! Guess what, I’m the greatest magician in the 
world! Can you believe it? I will promise you something: I will 
make many fancy things happen with my magic words and 
magic cloth.  
 
Kermit: Wow, that sounds really cool! I want to see if Merlin can do 
good as he promises us. Merlin, how can you be a great 
magician? 
 
Merlin: Do you want to be like me? 
 
Kermit: Yes! It’s great to be a magician. 
 
Merlin: Ok, Kermit. Then why don’t you practice something about 
magic? It is important to make a good prediction about what 
will happen. Here is how our game goes. When I perform my 
magic, I will first tell you what is going to happen. When I do 
it, I really mean it. I promise you to make it happen, for sure. 
You should listen to me really carefully, and something about 
what will happen. 
 
Kermit: Ok, I will say something about what Merlin promises us to 
show. 
 
Merlin: Good. But don’t say something weird. I heard that you are 
sometimes silly. Listen to my promise carefully, and don’t say 
something so different from what I say. Think carefully about 
what else you can say without being wrong. 
 
Kermit: Ok, I will. 
 
 
Trial 1: Practice Item–“Valid” Inference Condition 
 
Premise: The troll will get an orange egg. 
Consequence: The troll will get an egg. 
 
Merlin: Ok, here is the first magic. We have a troll here. I will promise 
Troll to make the following happen: the troll will get an 
orange egg. 
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Kermit: Wow, cool! Ok, Merlin said that the troll will get an orange 
egg. So that must mean that I can also say that the troll will 
get an egg. 
 
 
Trial 2: Practice Item–“Invalid” Inference Condition 
 
 Premise: The troll will get a ball. 
 Consequence: The troll will get an orange ball. 
 
Merlin: Ok, the next magic. This time I promise Troll to make the 
following happen: the troll will get a ball. 
 
Kermit: Ok, Merlin said that the troll will get a ball. So that must mean 
that I can also say that the troll will get an orange ball. 
 
 
Trial 3: “First-Argument: Item–“Valid” Inference Condition (=(75) on page 76) 
 
 Premise: Every dog will have a pizza. 
 Consequence: Every white dog will have a pizza. 
 
Merlin: We have white dogs and brown dogs here. I promise you to 
make the following happen: every dog will have a pizza. 
 
Kermit: Ok, Merlin has just said that every dog would bark. So that 




Trial 4:“First-Argument” Item–“Invalid” Inference Condition (=(76) on page 76) 
 
 Premise: Every white dog will get a teddy bear. 
 Consequence: Every dog will get a teddy bear. 
 
Merlin: We have white dogs and brown dogs here. I promise you to 
make the following happen; every white dog will get a teddy 
bear. 
Kermit: Ok, Merlin has just said that every dog would bark. So that 








Trial 5: “Second-Argument” Item–“Valid” Inference Condition 
 
 Premise: Every koala bear will get a green candy. 
 Consequence: Every koala bear will get a candy. 
 
Merlin: Now we have five koala bears. Next magic goes like this. I will 
promise the koala bears to make the following happen: every 
koala bear will get a green candy. 
 
 Kermit: Ok, Merlin said that every koala bear will get a green candy. 
So that must mean that I can also say that every koala bear 
will get a candy. 
 
 
Trial 6: “Second-Argument” Item–“Invalid” Inference Condition 
 
Premise: Every koala bear will get an alien. 
Consequence: Every koala bear will get a blue alien. 
 
Merlin: Now, the last magic. I promise the koala bears to make the 
following happen: every koala bear will get an alien. 
 
Kermit: Ok, Merlin said that every koala bear will get an alien. So, that 
must mean that I can also say that every koala bear gets a 
blue alien. 
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Appendix 3B: Individual Reponses of the Subjects  
 





Subject 1 5;3 *N N *N N Y N 
Subject 2 5;6 Y N Y N Y N 
Subject 3 5;6 Y N *N N Y N 
Subject 4 5;9 Y *Y Y N Y N 
Subject 5 6;1 Y N Y N Y N 
Subject 6 6;1 Y N Y N Y N 
Subject 7 6;5 Y N Y *Y Y N 
  
P1 = Practice Item 1 
P2 = Practice Item 2 
First-Valid = “First-Argument” Item in the Valid Condition 
First-Invalid = “First-Argument” Item in the Invalid Condition 
Second-Valid = “Second-Argument” Item in the Valid Condition 
Second-Invalid = “Second-Argument” Item in the Invalid Condition 
Y = “Yes” Responses 
N = Non-“Yes” Responses  
* = Incorrect responses 
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Intending to examine younger children’s behaviors, Experiment III aims to 
investigate the same hypothesis as Experiment II, which is repeated as follows. 
 
(79) Hypothesis: Experiment III 
The pattern of inferences created between the minimal-paired sentences is 
determined by the pattern of entailments between the sentences.  Children 
were found to be aware of the various consequences of the asymmetric 
entailment patterns created in the arguments of every (e.g., Gualmini 2005), 
and were also found to be able to compose the meaning of the antecedent and 
the consequence of the relevant inference containing every (Experiment I). 
Thus, they would be able compare the meanings of the antecedent and the 
consequence on the basis of the entailment patterns, i.e., to compute 
inferences created between the entailing and entailed sentences containing 
every with respect to its both arguments appropriately. 
 
In what follows, we will first discuss the logic that we exploit in revising the 





Consider the inclusive relation between entailing and entailed expressions. Crucially, 
the entailing expression is logically stronger than the entailed expression. Thus, the 
inference is licensed from the logically stronger expression to the logically weaker 
expression. The relation between the entailing and the entailed expression described 
here can be explicitly observed in the following linguistic context. Let us have a 
demonstration, taking the following minimal-pair of entailing and entailed sentences 
as our example below. 
 
(80)   a.  John brings Mary a pen 
b.  John brings Mary a red pen 
 
Note that an inference is created from (80b) to (80a), i.e., the ‘default’ pattern from a 
subset-denoting expression (red pen) to a set-denoting expression (pen), as (81) 
demonstrates, since the relevant underlined position in these examples is a non-DE 
environment. 
 
(81)   a.  John brings Mary a red pen    (=(80b)) 
  John brings Mary a pen  (=(80a)) 
b.  John brings Mary a pen    (=(80a)) 
         *  John brings Mary a red pen (=(80b)) 
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Now consider these sentences in the following context. Suppose Mary needs a pen, 
and he demands John to bring one. In response, John brings Mary a red pen. This 
situation layouts the sentences (80a) and (80b) in the context of fulfilling Mary’s 
demand of John’s responding. This situation is depicted in (82) below. 
 
(82)   a.  Mary’s demand: John brings Mary a pen  (=(80a)) 
b.  John’s response: John brings Mary a red pen (=(80b)) 
 
Mary’s demand is logically satisfied by John’s bringing a red pen, and this outcome 
should also be pragmatically acceptable as far as Mary did not specify the color of the 
pen she wants, and thus that any color will do in order to satisfy Mary’s demand. 
Therefore, Mary’s demand as represented in (82a) was satisfactorily fulfilled by 
John’s response as the outcome represented in (82b). 
 Consider now the following context. Suppose Mary needs a red pen, and she 
demands John to bring one. In response, John somehow ends up bringing a pen, 
without knowing what color it is. This situation is depicted in (83) below. 
 
(83)  a.  Mary’s demand: John brings Mary a red pen  (=(80b)) 
b.  John’s response: John brings Mary a pen  (=(80a)) 
 
Contrary to the first case, Mary has explicitly specified the color of the pen that she 
needs. Therefore, John’s bringing a pen without specifying what color it is would not 
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logically satisfy Mary’s demand, as long as the color of the pen John is not explicitly 
determined. 
Note now that the order of the two (entailing and entailed) propositions in 
such contexts determines whether the demand is logically satisfied by the response. 
Crucially, when the demand logically implies the fulfilling response deductively (e.g., 
John brings a red pen, therefore John brings a pen), as in (83), the fulfilling response 
fails as the logical satisfaction of the demand in this context (e.g., bring me a red pen; 
*I brought you a pen (of unspecified color)). 
Contrarily, when the demand does not logically imply the fulfilling response 
(e.g., John brings a pen, *therefore John brings a red pen), as illustrated in (82), the 
fulfilling response logically satisfies the demand in this context (e.g., bring me a pen; 
I brought you a red pen). The relationship among inference and demand-fulfillment in 
this paradigm is schematized in the following chart. 
 
Figure 13 Relation among sentences in inference and demand-satisfaction 
 
  Demanded       Fulfillment   Inference Demand 
  Outcome (D)       Outcome (F)  (D)  (F) Satisfaction 
  John brings a pen      John brings a red pen Invalid  Satisfactory 
  John brings a red pen     John brings a pen  Valid  Unsatisfactory 
 
 
 Keeping this in mind, let us now consider the relation among sentences 
containing every in inference and demand-satisfaction. First, consider every-sentences 
with respect to its first argument, such as (84). As (85) demonstrates, an inference is 
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licensed from the set-denoting expression (pen) to the relating subset-denoting 
expression (red pen), due to the DE environment of the first argument of every.  
 
(84)  a.  John brings Mary every pen 
b.  John brings Mary every red pen 
(85)  John brings Mary every pen    (=(84a))  
 John brings Mary every red pen  (=(84b)) 
 
Suppose that Mary owns a set of pens, a few red pens and blue pens, but she does not 
carry them with her at the moment; now she demands that John bring them all to her. 
In response, forgetful John somehow ends up bringing only the red pens. The demand 
and attempted fulfillment propositions in this context are as follows.  
 
(86)  a.  Mary’s demand: John brings Mary every pen   (=(84a)) 
b.  John’s response: John brings Mary every red pen  (=(84b)) 
 
(86) illustrates a case in which the demand is not logically satisfied; the demand in 
this context is for John to bring every pen in the domain, including both red and blue 
pens that Mary owns, and thus John’s bringing every red pen in response only 
partially fulfills the demand because of the lack of bringing every blue pen. Recall 
that the demand logically implies the fulfilling response (i.e., bringing every pen 
logically implies bringing every red pen), as is illustrated in (87), and thus it does not 
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logically satisfy the demand (i.e., the request for every pen cannot be satisfied by 
bringing every red pen), just as in (82).  
 Now consider the reverse version; Mary demands that John bring every red 
pen, in the same context. The reversed order of propositions results in an invalid 
logical inference between them (i.e., bringing every red pen does not entail bringing 
every pen), as shown in (87) below. 
 
(87) John brings Mary every red pen   (=(84b)) 
         *  John brings Mary every pen  (=(84a)) 
 
Suppose further that Mary does not care so much about whether she gets every blue 
pen, but she crucially needs every red pen.25 In response, forgetful John ends up 
bringing every pen, which yields the demand and fulfillment pair in (88). 
 
(88)  a.  Mary’s demand: John brings Mary every red pen  (=(84b))  
b.  John’s response: John brings Mary every pen   (=(84a)) 
 
Note that John’s bringing every pen logically satisfies Mary’s demand; Mary 
originally needs every red pen, which is satisfied as far as all the red pens in the 
domain are brought to her, regardless of whether every blue pen is also included. 
                                                
25 Some pragmatic factor imposes the implicature in which the demand should be satisfied if 
only the red pens are brought, excluding the blue pens. This additional information in the 
context is to eliminate such pragmatic inference in which the every blue pen should be 
excluded from the set of the pens that are to be brought, because they are not referred to in 
the demand. This factor is to be controlled in the experiment that will be discussed in the 
following section. 
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Recall, again, that the demand logically implies the fulfilling outcome (i.e., bringing 
every red pen does not logically imply bringing every pen), as illustrated in (85a), and 
thus it does logically satisfy the demand (i.e., the request for every red pen can be 
satisfied by bringing every pen), just as in (83). 
 The same logic applies to the inferences with regard to the second argument 
of every. Consider the following pair of entailing and entailed every-sentence in (89) 
below; since the relevant position is non-DE, the inference from pen to red pen is not 
valid, as (90) shows. 
 
(89)  a.  Every one of the boys brings Mary a pen. 
b.  Every one of the boys brings Mary a red pen. 
(90)  Every one of the boys brings Mary a pen.    (=(89a)) 
         *  Every one of the boys brings Mary a red pen.  (=(89b)) 
 
Suppose now that there are three boys, John, Bill and Tom. Mary demands that each 
of the boys bring her a pen. In response, each boy somehow brings a red pen to her. 
This leads us to layout the propositions in (89) in the context as follows. 
 
(91)  a.  Mary’s demand: Every one of the boys brings Mary a pen. 
b.  The boys’ response: Every one of the boys brings Mary a red pen. 
 
Mary’s demand is logically satisfied by every boy’s bringing a red pen, since she 
does not specify the color of the pen in the demand, and so any color will do. Note 
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that the demand does not logically the fulfilling response (i.e., every one of the boy’s 
bringing me a pen does not logically imply every one of the boy’s bringing me a red 
pen), as (90) shows, and thus the demand is logically satisfied by the fulfilling 
response (i.e., the request of every one’s bringing me a pen is satisfied by every one’s 
bringing me a red pen), just as in (82) and (88). 
 Once again, let us now reverse the order of the two propositions, which 
evokes a valid inference between them, as in (92) below. 
 
(92)  Every one of the boys brings Mary a red pen.   (=(89b)) 
           Every one of the boys brings Mary a pen.  (=(89a)) 
 
Consider the reversed demand and the fulfillment, as shown in (93). 
 
(93)  a.  Mary’s demand: Every one of the boys brings Mary a red pen.  
b.  The boys’ response: Every one of the boys brings Mary a pen. 
 
Note that while the logical inference from subset-to-set denotation is licensed, the 
demand is not logically fulfilled (i.e., unless the pens that each boy brought to Mary 
turn out to be red). This mirrors the pattern of the above cases in (83) and (86). 
 Thus, the relation among every-sentence in inference and demand-satisfaction 
can be schematized as the following chart, summarizing the basic patterns we have 
observed in this section regarding the first and second argument of every. 
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Figure 14 Relation among Every-sentences in Inference and Demand-satisfaction 
 Demand (D) Fulfillment in response 





(84a) John brings 
Mary every pen 
(84b) John brings Mary 
every red pen 
Valid Unsatisfactory 1st arg. of 
every (DE)  
(84b) John brings 
Mary every red pen 
(84a) John brings Mary 
every pen 
Invalid Satisfactory 
(89a) Every one of the 
boys brings Mary a 
pen 
(89b) Every one of the 
boys brings Mary a red 
pen 
Invalid Satisfactory 2nd arg. of 
every 
(non-DE) 
(89b) Every one of the 
boys brings Mary a 
red pen 
(89a) Every one of the 




To sum up, among minimal-paired propositions containing the relating 
superset-/ subset-denoting expressions, which proposition entails which proposition is 
reflected in the context of demand-fulfillment. In particular, when the proposition 
referred to in the demand logically implies the proposition referred to in the 
fulfillment, the demand is not logically satisfied by the fulfillment; when the 
proposition referred to in the demand does not logically imply the other proposition 




4.2. Experimental Design–“Demand-Fulfillment” Task 
 
Exploiting the logic discussed in 4.1., we designed a new experimental task, which is 
called the “Demand-Fulfillment” Task, in order to examine whether children are able 
to evaluate the logical strength of the entailing and entailed expressions presented in 
these contexts. Recall that the discussion on the previous studies seeking to 
investigate this issue has highlighted the importance of controlling children’s task so 
that it would be easy for children. The new task that we will discuss in the present 
section was designed in the way that children can evaluate the logical inference 
between sentences while minimizing the difficulty of the task; the children’s task 
would be simply to evaluate whether the fulfillment of a demand in a story was 
satisfactory or not, which demonstrates their evaluation of the inferential relations 
among the demand and fulfillment propositions as shown in the previous section. 
Keeping these issues in mind, we will present the detail of the proposed experimental 
methodology in this section. 
 
4.2.1. Basic Plot 
Demand-fulfillment contexts similar to the cases discussed in the previous section are 
presented in a skit featuring toy characters familiar to the children. The basic structure 
of the skit that served as a context in which the demand-fulfillment was felicitously 
presented, was as follows. The bad genie appeared and he put a spell on the other 
characters, to turn them into little monsters. The process of putting a spell on each 
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character was presented via the animated images in Microsoft PowerPoint format on 
the monitor of a laptop computer (which was called “Genie’s magic screen” for the 
purpose of the story presentation). The genie demanded that Grover bring him what 
he wants in exchange for freeing each character under his spell. Grover leaves for a 
while to look for what the genie wants. Grover is said to be forgetful, and as a result 
he brings something that is close to, but not exactly, what the genie requested. The 
object(s) that the genie demands and the one(s) that Grover brought as the fulfilling 
outcome are related via superset-subset relations; for example, the genie demands a 
car and Grover brings a red car, the genie demands a blue train and Grover brings a 
train, and so on. Crucially, what Grover brings as the fulfilling outcome is carried in a 
closed box so that no visual cues were provided about what Grover brought until 
certain point. Grover then tells the child what he brought to the genie in response to 
the genie’s demand, without showing what he brought in the box, and asks the child 
whether he did something good enough to satisfy the genie. After the child answers 
Grover’s question, he/she is asked to open the box and to show what is inside to the 
genie. If it turns out that Grover could satisfy the genie’s demand, the spell is 
removed and the character is set free on the screen. If it turns out that Grover failed to 
satisfy the genie’s demand, the child is asked to help Grover correct his mistake. In 
the end, the character is freed as well. 





(94)  The Basic Plot – Simplified Outline 
a.  The genie puts a spell on a character. (The laptop computer “Genie’s 
magic screen” shows the transformation of the character in the 
animated pictures.) 
b.  The genie presents the demand < the demand presented >  
“If you want me to free this character, bring me X.” 
c. Grover leaves for a while and comes back with a box. 
d.  Grover provides a description of what is inside the box without 
showing it < the fulfilling outcome presented > 
“I brought him X’.” 
e.  After the child answers, Grover lets the child open the box and see  
what is inside. 
f.  If Grover satisfied the genie, then the spell was resolved. 
g.  If Grover failed to satisfy the genie, the child was asked to help  
Grover correct his mistake so that the character is freed. 
 
4.2.2. Experimental Conditions and Stimuli 
The two experimental conditions were created: “Satisfactory” Condition, in which 
the demand is logically satisfied by the fulfilling outcome, and thus the demand does 
not logically imply the fulfillment; “Unsatisfactory” Condition, in which the demand 
is not logically satisfied by the fulfilling outcome, and thus the demand does logically 
imply the fulfillment. 
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 We developed three types of stimuli (i.e., the propositions about “bringing”) 
to be provided both in “Satisfactory” Condition and “Unsatisfactory” Condition. All 
the stimuli were listed below. The stimuli can be categorized into the following three 
types. The first type of the tokens are Control Item, listed in (95a) and (96a), which 
do not contain the universal quantifier every; this type served as a control item to test 
set-/subset-denotation inferences without every, in comparison with the ones 
involving every. They are also provided in order also to provide the child a practice 
session. “First-Argument” Items served as a test case to provide the items showing 
the relevant inference with respect to the first argument of every, i.e., the ones listed 
in (95b) and (96b). “Second-Argument” Items served as a test case to provide the 
items showing the relevant inference with respect to the second argument of every, 
i.e., the ones listed in (95c) and (96c).  
 
(95) “Satisfactory” Condition 
a.  Control Item 
i)   Demand: “Bring me a car” 
ii)   Response: “I brought you a red car” 
b.  “First-Argument” Item 
i)   Demand: “Bring me every gold coin” 
ii)   Response: “I brought you every coin” 
c.  “Second-Argument” Item 
i)    Demand: “Every one of you brings me a cat” 
ii)   Response: “Every one of us brought you a white cat” 
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(96) “Unsatisfactory” Condition 
a.  Control Item 
i)    Demand: “Bring me a blue train” 
ii)   Response: “I brought you a train” 
b.  “First-Argument” Item 
i)   Demand: “Bring me every dog” 
ii)   Response: “I brought you every brown dog” 
c.  “Second-Argument” Item 
i)   Demand: “Every one of you brings me a green noodle” 
ii)   Response: “Every one of us brought you a noodle” 
 
4.2.3. Evaluation of the Stimuli 
We set out the two points at which the child may evaluate the stimuli. The primary 
evaluation of the stimuli was made at the point at which Grover asked the child 
whether he did something good enough, without showing what’s inside his box (i.e., 
at the point of (94d) in the simplified chart above). This requires the child consider 
whether what Grover said logically satisfies what the genie demanded, rather than 
relate the statements to the situation visually presented in front of them as in 
Experiment I using the Truth Value Judgment task. In the “Satisfactory” Condition, 
the expected response would be to provide an affirmative answer to Grover’s 
question, such as “Yes”; we call these “Yes” Responses. In the “Unsatisfactory” 
Condition, the expected response would be to provide a negative answer such as “No, 
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or uncertain answer, such as “I need to check inside the box”; we call these Non-
“Yes” responses. 
 After the primary evaluation, the children were given the second phase to 
confirm their evaluation. They were asked to open Grover’s box, and check inside to 
see whether Grover brought something that satisfies the genie (i.e., at the point of 
(94e) in the simplified chart above).  
For the sake of convenience, we call the primary evaluation Before-Open-the-
Box Evaluation and the secondary evaluation After-Open-the-Box Evaluation. 
Note that in the “Unsatisfactory” Condition, in which the fulfilling outcome 
does not logically satisfy the demand, the After-Open-the-Box phase removed the 
logical uncertainty in the fulfillment in the way that the final outcome of the fulfilling 
turns out not to satisfy the demand. For example, in the trial like (83), in which 
bringing a red pen was demanded and bringing a pen was provided as the fulfilling 
outcome, it does not logically satisfy the demand, unless the pen that was brought 
turns out to be red; the After-Open-the-Box phase reveals that the pen in the box turns 
out not to be red. Throughout all the trials in the “Unsatisfactory” Condition, the 
demand has never been satisfied, not only logically but also as a matter of fact upon 
opening the box. 
 
4.2.4. Interpretation of Responses in Each Experimental Condition 
The children’s responses at the two evaluation phases in each experimental condition 
are interpreted as follows.  
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What counts as “Yes” Responses, which is expected in the “Satisfactory” 
Condition, is to answer “Yes” to Grover’s question at the Before-Open-the-Box-
Evaluation, and further to confirm the answer at the After-Open-the-Box-Evaluation, 
with checking what is inside the box.  
The Non-“Yes” Responses, which is expected in the “Unsatisfactory” 
Condition, is scored when the children’s responses met either one the following two 
conditions: (i) providing negative or uncertain answer to Grover’s question at the 
Before-Open-the-Box-Evaluation (e.g., “No, you didn’t do something good enough”, 
or “I don’t know until I see what’s inside your box.”); (ii) providing non-negative 
answer to Grover’s question at the Before-Open-the-Box-Evaluation (e.g., “Yes” or 
“I think so”), which is apparently inconsistent with the adult-like evaluation of the 
inference, but rejecting it at the After-Open-the-Box-Evaluation (e.g., “No, this is not 
what the genie wanted”). 
 
4.2.5. Notes on the Non-“Yes” Responses 
One would wonder why we allowed the two patterns of children’s reactions to be 
counted as the legitimate Non-“Yes” Responses in the “Unsatisfactory” Condition, as 
has been just described above. The primary reason why the After-Open-the-Box-
Evaluation was installed in the task was as follows. We seriously took the claim that 
children are by nature “Yes” biased subjects, as has been sometimes observed (e.g., 
Crain and Thornton, 1998). Children provide the negative responses only when they 
are completely sure why they negate/reject the stimuli. This means that children may 
provide “Yes” Responses for the wrong reason, i.e., not only on the basis of their 
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linguistic evaluation but also on the basis of their uncertainty that comes from some 
non-linguistic uncertainty, such as obscurity about what they are expected to say. 
Thus it is important for the experimenters to confirm that children’s responses 
certainly reflect their decision on the basis of the linguistic evaluation of the stimuli, 
and it is crucial to tease apart the cases in which children say “Yes” because of their 
linguistic decision and the cases in which they say “Yes” because they do not know 
what they are expected to say, leaving out the latter scenario from the experimental 
workspace.  
Given the discussion above, the “Demand-Fulfillment” Task and the nature of 
its request for children to accomplish is not very simple, even though it is a task that 
has been carefully designed to elicit judgments across linguistically-encoded 
propositions based on deductive logic, with several pitfalls addressed based on 
lessons from the previous studies by Philip and De Villiers (1992) and De Villiers 
(1998). The children’s task is to evaluate the logical relation between the demanded 
outcome and the fulfilling outcome, as to whether the demand-fulfillment is logically 
satisfactory. Thus, while we took pains to make the initial evaluation as 
straightforward as possible, we found it still very desirable to have a second 
opportunity to probe the reason for children’s responses. Therefore, the After-Open-
the-Box-Evaluation was provided as a second opportunity for the children to 
demonstrate that their decision is solely based on evaluation of the demand sentence 
and the attempted fulfillment. In the After-Open-the-Box-Evaluation, they were 
expected to make a decision as to whether the fulfilling outcome presented visually, 
in conjunction with the linguistic material, logically satisfies the demanded outcome, 
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by means of matching what has been demanded and what has been provided as the 
fulfillment.26  
 
4.2.6. Sample Trials 
The full script for a sample trial in “Satisfactory” Condition is provided below.27 
 
(97)  Sample Trial: “Satisfactory” Condition (Control Item) 
Lead-in: This is a story about the genie and Grover. The genie is a great 
magician, but sometimes he uses his magic power to do some 
tricks on the other people. Now, Grover is visiting the genie’s 
palace. Let’s see what is going to happen. 
Genie: I’ll show you something interesting. Here we have Mickey 
Mouse (An image of Mickey Mouse shows up on the monitor of 
the lap top computer), and I will turn him into a little monster. 
(Magic word…) Can you believe that this little creature is in 
fact Mickey Mouse (Mickey Mouse disappears and a strange 
monster appears instead on the monitor)? I put a spell on 
Mickey Mouse, and he turned into a little monster. Hahaha. 
Grover: Oh-oh, poor Mickey Mouse… Genie, that was a cool magic, 
but I think Mickey Mouse wants to come back. Free him! 
Genie:  If you want me to free him, bring me a car. 
Grover: Ok, I will look for a car for you and will be back right away. 
But I’m sometimes silly and forgetful, so I have to be careful 
not to forget the request.  
(Grover leaves the genie’s palace and disappears. And he reappears with a 
box.) 
Grover: I think I got it. But I might have forgotten exactly what the 
genie said. So before going back to the genie’s palace, I want 
                                                
26 We will discuss more about the interpretation of the After-Open-the-Box-Evaluation in the 
later section. 
27 We here demonstrate the sample trials for presenting the “Control Items” instead of the 
ones for presenting the test items that contain every. The reason is to spell out how the basic 
plot we have demonstrated in (94) was incorporated into the full script in the most 
straightforward way; the scripts for presenting the test items with every contain additional 
information to make it felicitous to use every in the context, which we will discuss later. 
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to make sure with you (=the child) whether I did something 
good enough. I brought him a red car in this box. Do you think 
it is good enough and Mickey Mouse will be freed? (=Before-
Open-the-Box-Evaluation) 
Child:  (Expected to say) Yes. 
Grover: Ok, now let’s open the box and show it to him together. 
Child: (Open the box and see what’s inside) 
Grover: Did you find something good enough to free Mickey Mouse? 
(=After-Open-the-Box-Evaluation) 
Child: (Expected to say) Yes. 
 
The following is the full script of a sample trial of the “Unsatisfactory” Condition. 
Note that it will be revealed that Grover did not satisfy the genie’s demand at the 
After-Open-Box-Evaluation phase.  
 
(98)  Sample Trial: “Unsatisfactory” Condition (Control Item) 
Genie: Here we have Donald Duck (An image of Donald Duck 
appears on the monitor of the lap top computer), and I will also 
put a spell on Donald Duck, and he turned into a little monster 
(Donald Duck disappears and a strange monster appears on 
the monitor). Hahaha. 
Grover: Hey Genie, you are being bad today. Oh poor Donald… Genie, 
I think it was a cool magic, but Donald Duck wants to come 
back. You should free him! 
Genie:  If you want me to free him, bring me a blue train. 
Grover: Ok, I will look for one for you and will be back right away. But 
I’m silly and forgetful, so I should be really careful not to 
forget what the request is. 
(Grover leaves the genie’s palace and disappears. And he reappears with a 
box.)    
Grover: I think I got it. But I might have forgotten exactly what the 
genie said. So before going back to the genie’s palace, I want 
to make sure with you (=the child) whether I did something 
good enough. I brought him a train in this box. Do you think 
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Donald Duck will be freed? (=Before-Open-the-Box-
Evaluation) 
Child: (Expected to say) No/I don’t know/What kind of train did you 
bring?/I need to see inside the box… etc. 
Grover: Oh-oh, did I make a mistake? Let’s check inside the box 
together. 
Child: (Open the box; there is a yellow train) 
Grover: Do you see something good enough to make the genie happy? 
(=After-Open-the-Box-Evaluation) 
Child: (Expected to say) No, it’s not a blue train. It’s a yellow train! 
Genie: Oops, Don’t you remember I told you to bring me a blue train? 
Exp.: (Child name), why don’t you help Grover? Here is a blue train 
he should have brought. Can you give it to genie? 
Child: (Give a blue train to the genie) 
Genie: Very good! Thank you so much, (Child name). Now I will free 
Donald Duck. 
 
4.2.7. Additional Information for the Felicity 
For the demand-fulfillment scenarios containing every, additional lead-in material 
was incorporated in the basic plot described above, in order to make it felicitous to 
use every in the context of the story. First, additional information was added to show 
what counts as “every NP” in the context (e.g., introducing the story by explaining 
that the genie had every dog he owns escape) for “First-Argument” items, as in (95b) 
and (96b). The set of what counts as “every NP” (e.g., every dog the genie owns) was 
visually presented on the screen of the laptop computer, after the genie’s spell was 
shown. Second, to support the presentations “Second-Argument” items, as in (95c) 
and (96c), two more characters, Big Bird and Cookie Monster, joined Grover to free 
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characters under the genie’s spell, in order to make it felicitous to use ‘Every NP 
brings me a cat’.28 
To sum up, the following table schematically represents the condition and 
stimuli. 
 
Table 8 The Schema of “Demand-Fulfillment” Task 
Types 
of Items 
Demand (D) Fulfillment in 




(D)  (F) 
Validity of 
Inference 
(D)  (F) 
Demand 
Satisfaction 
Control (95a.i) Bring 
me a car. 
(95a.ii) I brought 







me every gold 
coin. 
(95b.ii) I brought 






one of you 
brings me a 
cat. 
(95c.ii) Every one 
of us brought you 







Control (96a.i) Bring 
me a blue 
train. 
(96a.ii) I brought 







me every dog. 
(96b.ii) I brought 







one of you 
brings me a 
green noodle. 
(96c.ii) Every one 










                                                
28 See Appendix 4A for the full script of all the trials. Also see the footnote 27 for the reason 




On the basis of the findings from Experiment I and the suggestive trend in the results 
from Experiment II, we hypothesized that children demonstrate the adult-like 
evaluation of the demand-fulfillment pairs that reflect the direction of the inference, 
as introduced above (see (79)). According to this hypothesis, children would be 
expected to distinguish the satisfactory and unsatisfactory demand-fulfillment 
relationships appropriately, depending on the direction of inferences created with 
respect to the first and second arguments of every. In the “Satisfactory” Condition, 
children would be expected to provide the “Yes” Responses across all types of 
tokens; in the “Unsatisfactory” Condition, they would provide the Non-“Yes” 
Responses across tokens. Crucially, in such a scenario, children are expected to judge 
the demand-fulfillment not relying on the order of set-/subset-denoting nouns 
presented in the two propositions (e.g., “Yes” Responses across all the tokens holding 
a set-denoting noun in the demand and a subset-denoting noun in the fulfillment, and 
Non-“Yes” Responses across all the tokens hosting a subset-denoting noun in the 
demand and a set-denoting noun in the fulfillment, or vice versa). Instead, they are 
expected to judge the demand-fulfillment depending on the direction of the 
inferences. If this prediction were to be borne out, it would demonstrate children’s 
sensitivity to the direction of the inference, which is crucially determined by the 
linguistic environment (i.e., the direction of entailment) in the relevant positions, 
rather than the presentation order of the set-/subset-denotation in nouns in the relevant 
positions.  
 111 
 Alternatively, if children lack the adult-like sensitivity to the validity in the 
logical inferences, they would not be able to distinguish the difference in the 
satisfactory and unsatisfactory demand-fulfillment. One possible scenario would be 
that they would treat all the tokens consistently on the basis of the order of set-/ 
subset-denoting nouns presented in the two propositions, regardless of the logical 
satisfaction of the demand. Another possible scenario would be that they would be 
sensitive to some other unintended feature of the experiment, showing the random 
pattern in providing the “Yes” and Non-“Yes” Responses, or showing the “Yes” 
Responses consistently because of their “Yes”-biased nature.  
 
Subjects 
Sixteen English-speaking children aged from 4;2 to 6;0, whose average age was 4;10, 
participated in this experiment. The participants were children enrolled for the Center 
for Young Children at University of Maryland, College Park; all participants had their 
parental permission to participate in the study. The children were tested one by one in 




Results: “Satisfactory” Condition 
In the “Satisfactory” Condition, children overall demonstrated a high rate of “Yes” 
Responses, as was expected if children possess adult-like competence in encoding 
and evaluating logical inferences among propositions. In evaluating the satisfactory 
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demand-fulfillment in the Control items, in which the inference pattern from the 
demand to the fulfillment is invalid non-DE pattern, i.e., “set-to-subset” pattern, the 
percentage of the “Yes” Responses was 81% (13/16). More specifically, in evaluating 
the satisfactory demand-fulfillment in the “First-Argument” items, in which the 
inference pattern from the demand to the fulfillment is invalid DE pattern, i.e., 
“subset-to-set” pattern, the percentage of the “Yes” Responses was 92% (12/13).29 In 
evaluating the satisfactory demand-fulfillments in “Second-Argument” items, in 
which the inference pattern from the demand to the fulfillment is invalid non-DE 
pattern, i.e., “set-to-subset” pattern, the percentage of the “Yes” Responses was 100% 
(16/16). 
 
Results: “Unsatisfactory” Condition 
In the “Unsatisfactory” Condition, the ratio of the “Yes” Responses was significantly 
lower, as predicted under the hypothesis of adult-like logico-semantic competence. In 
evaluating the unsatisfactory demand-fulfillment in the Control items, in which the 
inference pattern from the demand to the fulfillment is valid non-DE pattern, i.e., 
“subset-to-set” pattern, the percentage of the “Yes” Responses was 19% (3/16). More 
specifically, in evaluating the unsatisfactory demand-fulfillments in “First-Argument” 
items, in which the inference pattern from the demand to the fulfillment is valid DE 
pattern, i.e., “set-to-subset” pattern, the percentage of the “Yes” Responses was 15% 
(2/13).30 In evaluating the unsatisfactory demand-fulfillments in “Second-Argument” 
                                                
29 Three children gave up evaluating the demand-fulfillment. No reminder worked out. Their 
responses were thus excluded from the analysis discussed here for the statistical reason. 
30 Three children could not complete the evaluation task. One was the same child who could 
not complete the task in the “Satisfactory” Condition as well; he could not complete the task 
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items, in which the inference pattern from the demand to the fulfillment was valid 
non-DE pattern, i.e., “subset-to-set” pattern, the percentage of the “Yes” Responses 
was 6.25% (1/16). These results are illustrated below. 
 
Table 9 Results-Percentages of “Yes” Responses 
Condition Validity of 
Inference  
(D)  (F) 
Types of Item Pattern of Inference  
(D)  (F) 
% of “Yes” 
Responses 































                                                                                                                                      
with the “First-Argument” items in both conditions (see the foot note 29). The data from 
these children was excluded from the analysis for the statistical reason. 
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Figure 15 Percentages of “Yes” Responses 
 
 
 A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test was conducted to examine whether the number 
of “Yes” Responses observed in the “Satisfactory” Condition was significantly higher 
than number observed in the “Unsatisfactory” Condition. The children’s correct 
responses were calculated in the same way as Experiment II; a “Yes” Response was 
scored as 1, and a Non-“Yes” Response was scored as 0. Then the sum of the total 
scores in each condition was compared in terms of whether the total score for the 
“Satisfactory” Condition was significantly higher than the one for the 
“Unsatisfactory” Condition with respect to each type of items. According to the test, 
the total scores for the “Satisfactory Condition” were significantly higher than those 
for the “Unsatisfactory” Condition with respect to each type of item: z = -2.887, p < 
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0.005 for the Control Items; z = -3.162, p < 0.003 for the “First-Argument” items; z = 
-3.873, p < 0.001 for the “Second-Argument” items. 
A t-test was also conducted across-conditionally. There was a significant 
difference in the percentages of “Yes” Responses in each type of token: t(15) = 4.083, 
p < 0.001 for Control Items; t(12) = 6.325, p < 0.02 for “First-Argument” items; t(15) 




The results revealed children’s sensitivity to the validity of the logical inferences 
between two propositions, which were reflected in the demand-fulfillment contexts, 
as to whether the demand is logically satisfied by the fulfillment. Therefore, the 
findings provides empirical evidence in favor of children’s adult-like semantic 
competence in computing the across-proposition meaning involving every.   
 
4.5.1. Children’s Sensitivities to the Entailment Patterns 
Recall that the “Demand-Fulfillment” Task took advantage of the fact that the 
demand-fulfillment is satisfied when the inference from the demand to the fulfillment 
is not valid, and is not satisfied when the inference from the demand to the fulfillment 
is valid. Also recall that the entailment pattern determines the direction of inferences, 
i.e., the DE environment (the first argument of every) licenses inferences from a 
superset-denoting expression to a subset-denoting expression, while the “default” 
non-DE environment (the second argument of every) licenses inferences from a 
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subset-denoting expression to a superset-denoting expression. In order for children to 
compute the inferences in an adult-like way, they need to be aware that it is the 
entailment patterns that determine the direction of inferences, without being 
influenced by the order of the set-/subset-denoting nouns presented in the two 
premises. Therefore, in this task they were expected to accept the demand-fulfillment 
when the demand does not logically imply the fulfillment, and to reject the demand-
fulfillment when the demand does logically imply the fulfillment. If children had 
relied on the presentational order of the set-/subset-denoting nouns, they would have 
presented the response patterns committing the non-adult-like errors. Thus, if it were 
the case, the children would have accepted the demand-fulfillment when the demands 
consistently contain either the superset-denoting nouns or the subset-denoting nouns, 
and would have rejected the demand-fulfillments when otherwise. In fact, this 
alternate possibility was not borne out; let us discuss it more in detail in what follows. 
The fact that children were found to be aware of the direction of inferences 
(due to the entailment patterns) would be straightforwardly recognized when it is 
compared across-conditionally. For example, simply compare the Control items and 
“First-Argument” items across-conditionally, in terms of the order of the presentation 







Figure 16 Across-conditional Comparison of Control Item and Type 1 Item 
 A B C D E 
 Demand (D) Fulfillment (F) Pattern of 
Inference  





Bringing an X’ Bringing an X Subset  Set Valid Unsatisfactory Control  
Bringing an X Bringing an X’ Subset  Set Invalid Satisfactory 
Bringing every X’ Bringing every X Subset  Set Invalid Satisfactory “First-
Arg.” Bringing every X Bringing every X’ Set  Subset Valid Unsatisfactory 
 
 
Figure 16 above illustrates the basic schema in the difference between these two types 
of tokens. Note that at the schematic representation above, the Control Item and 
“First-Argument” Item constitute minimal pairs with respect to the determiner, as 
Columns A and B contrastively show. If children were not sensitive to this minimal 
replacement of the determiner across tokens, without knowing the semantic 
contribution of every relevant in this dissertation, then they would evaluate the 
demand-fulfillment on the basis of the order of superset-/subset-denotations in the 
nouns, showing systematic errors such as: (i) they consistently provide “Yes”-
Responses when the subset-denoting noun precedes the superset-denoting noun, or; 
(ii) they consistently provide “Yes”-Responses when the superset-denoting noun 
precedes the subset-denoting noun, regardless of the logical satisfaction of the 
demand. Let us call the first scenario “Scenario A” and the second “Scenario B” at 





Table 10 Alternate Response Patterns on the Basis of Noun Denotations  


































Subset  Set Non-YES YES Unsatisfactory 
 
 
Recall, now, that the patterns of children’s responses drawn from our experiment 
were indeed consistent with our prediction, i.e., “Yes”-Responses in “Satisfactory” 
Condition, and Non-“Yes”-Responses in “Unsatisfactory” Condition, rather than 
either of these two alternative scenarios. Compare Table 10 with Table 11 below, 
focusing on the contrast between Columns D and E on one hand and Column F/F’ on 









Table 11 Comparison between Actual and Alternate Response Patterns 



















































As can be seen from the comparison, the pattern drawn from across-conditional 
analysis clearly shows that children’s response patterns reflect evaluation of the 
demand-fulfillment on the basis of the logical satisfaction of the demand rather than 
the order of the presentation of set-/subset-denoting nouns in the relevant positions. 
This demonstrates children’s sensitivity to the direction of inferences, i.e., the very 
source of the demand-satisfaction patterns.  
 
4.5.2. Evaluations at the Two Phases: Before- and After-Open-the-Box 
Now recall that the “Demand-Fulfillment” Task provided the two phases for children 
to evaluate the test items; the Before-Open-the-Box-Evaluations and the After-Open-
the-Box-Evaluations. Recall that children’s responses were interpreted whether “Yes” 
or Non-“Yes” in terms of each of these evaluation points on the basis of the following 
criteria. 
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(99) “Yes” Responses, expected in “Satisfactory” Condition 
To answer “Yes” to Grover’s question at the Before-Open-the-Box-
Evaluation, AND To confirm the answer at the After-Open-the-Box-
Evaluation, with checking what is inside the box. 
(100)  Non-“Yes” Responses, expected in “Unsatisfactory” Condition 
a.  To provide a negative or uncertain answer to Grover’s question at the 
Before-Open-the-Box-Evaluation (e.g., “No, you didn’t do something 
good enough”, or “I don’t know until I see what’s inside your box.”), 
OR 
b.   To provide a non-negative answer to Grover’s question at the Before-
Open-the-Box-Evaluation (e.g., “Yes” or “I think so”), but rejecting it 
at the After-Open-the-Box-Evaluation (e.g., “No, this is not what the 
genie wanted”) 
 
As for the legitimate “Yes” Responses observed in the experiment, all of them met 
the standard in (99). On the other hand, there were two independent criteria for the 
legitimate Non-“Yes” Responses, (100a) and (100b), and a response can be 
interpreted as Non-“Yes” if it meets either one. Thus, as for the legitimate Non-“Yes” 
Responses, it should be an issue how many of them met the standard in (100a) and 
how many met the standard in (100b). The following table and chart illustrate the 
percentages of the Non-“Yes” Responses both at the Before-Open-the-Box-
Evaluations and the After-Open-the-Box-Evaluations within the “Unsatisfactory” 
Condition, where the Non-“Yes” Responses were interpreted as “correct”. 
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Table 12 Percentages of Non-“Yes” Responses at the Before- and After-Open-
the-Box-Evaluations in “Unsatisfactory” Condition 
 Before-Box After-Box 
Control 31% (4/13) 69% (9/13) 
“First-Argument” 100% (11/11) 0% (0/11) 
“Second-Argument”  47% (7/15) 53% (8/15) 
 
 
Figure 17 Percentages of Non-“Yes” Responses at the Before- and After-Open-
the-Box-Evaluations in “Unsatisfactory” Condition 
 
 
 As can be seen above, Non-“Yes” Responses in the evaluation of the “First-
Argument” items were made only at the Before-Open-the-Box-Evaluation phase, 
whereas those on the evaluation of the “Control” and “Second-Argument” items were 
made both at the Before- and After-Open-the-Box-Evaluation phases. Notice that the 
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“First-Argument” items in “Unsatisfactory” Conditions are the inferences in DE 
pattern validly created with respect to the first argument of every, whereas the rest of 
the two items (Control and “Second-Argument” items) are the valid inferences in 
non-DE pattern. Therefore, the contrast in discussion would serve as the additional 
evidence to confirm our hypothesis in which children have the sensitivity to the 
difference in the entailment pattern.31  
 Another relevant observation would be that there was an across-conditional 
distinction in the types of “Yes”-Responses provided at the “Before-Open-the-Box-
Evaluation phase. That is, whereas all the “Yes”-Responses recorded in the 
“Satisfactory” Condition (i.e., the correct responses) were encoded by explicitly 
saying “Yes”, there were two variations in the “Yes”-Responses observed in the 
“Unsatisfactory” Condition (i.e., the incorrect responses): (i) by saying “Yes”; (ii) by 
saying “I think so”. This contrast implies that the children might have shown some 
sensitivity to the unsatisfactory in the demand-fulfillment, even though they failed to 
correctly make an explicit negative response at the Before-Open-the-Box-Evaluation 
in the “Unsatisfactory” Condition. 
 
                                                
31 Why the “First-Argument” items triggered the Non-“Yes” Responses at the Before-Open-
the-Box Evaluation phase (i.e., the genuine logical reasoning without relying on other non-
linguistic cues) would be an interesting issue that has been brought up. One potential source 
of this tendency would be that the denotation of the nouns in the relevant position (i.e., the 
first argument of every) is a set, i.e., the plural objects. Recall that at the experimental 
workspace, the objects of the relevant set were visually presented on the screen of the laptop 
computer. This might have caused a saliency effect about what objects were involved in the 
relevant search of Grover to satisfy Genie’s demand, which might have made it easier for 
children to evaluate the fulfillment without looking inside Grover’s box. However, such a 
speculation turns out not to be the case in Experiment VI, in which the “Demand-Fulfillment” 
in the negative version was conducted with respect to the first argument of every under 




4.5.3. Notes on the After-Open-the-Box-Evaluation 
It should be noted that the Before-Open-the-Box-Evaluation is a genuinely logical 
assessment of whether the demand was logically satisfied by the fulfilling outcome in 
the sense that children solely rely on the propositions presented only in the linguistic 
material. For example, if a child could provide the expected Non-“Yes” Response at 
the Before-Open-the-Box-Evaluation in the “Unsatisfactory” Condition, following the 
genuine logical evaluation process, it would be strong evidence to demonstrate that 
he/she could calculate the logical relation between the demand and the fulfillment, 
without relying on any other non-linguistic cues. On the other hand, the After-Open-
the-Box-Evaluation is made on the basis of a different kind of information, i.e., 
through matching between what was required in the linguistically addressed demand, 
and what was actually brought visually presented. Thus, one might wonder whether 
the After-Open-the-Box-Evaluation reflects anything about children’s logical ability 
to evaluate the inference between two propositions, and thus whether the After-Open-
the-Box-Evaluation per se exhibits any aspects of children’s logical calculation 
between the two premises, rather than merely demonstrating their knowledge of 
relating what was demanded and what objects appear in the visual scene with the 
fulfilling outcome. Therefore, if children failed to provide the Non-“Yes” Response at 
the Before-Open-the-Box-Evaluation, but provided the Non-“Yes” Response at the 
After-Open-the-Box-Evaluation, there may be concerns whether it constitutes 
evidence to show their adult-like evaluation on the basis of logical reasoning. 
 However, we think that the After-Open-the-Box-Evaluation can be considered 
to be the logical evaluation on a par with the Before-Open-the-Box-Evaluation. Note 
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that even at the After-Open-the-Box-Evaluation phase, the linguistic description 
about exactly what Grover brought was not provided; Grover was uncertain about 
exactly what object(s) he brought even when opening the box, merely repeating the 
same fulfilling outcome verbally. Therefore, at the After-Open-the-Box-Evaluation, 
the visual information was newly added, but no extraneous linguistic description that 
would supplement the consequence was provided, such that children did not make a 
decision simply on the basis of the mere matching strategy without following the 
logical reasoning. What the child is expected to do at the After-Open-the-Box-
Evaluation is as follows: (i) checking inside the box and see exactly what object(s) is 
(are) brought (e.g., collecting the information about the color of the object, if it was 
not addressed previously by what Grover said); (ii) linguistically encoding the final 
outcome on the basis of the visual information; (iii) evaluating the output 
representation of the linguistic encoding process, comparing it with the premise 
linguistically presented previously. Thus, the visual information provided at the 
After-Open-the-Box-Evaluation would aid children to encode the final fulfillment 
into the linguistic representation about what ended up happening, rather than 
providing the extraneous information that would guide the children going beyond the 
logical reasoning. Therefore, the After-Open-the-Box-Evaluation serves as the 
evaluation phase in which children’s decision making is reflected as the output of 





4.6. Discussion of Experiments I, II and III 
 
Let us now summarize the experimental findings that have been discussed so far. 
Experiment I, serving as a pre-test to investigate children’s logical ability to evaluate 
the inferences between propositions containing the universal quantifier every, 
examined their truth value judgments of the entailing and entailed propositions 
individually. The children demonstrated the adult-like truth value judgments in 
evaluating the antecedent and the consequence of the relevant inferences, in which 
the antecedent is falsified and the consequence is verified at the same time in the 
same context. Consistent with the previous studies about children’s knowledge about 
every in computing the within-propositional meanings (Crain, et al., 1996; Meroni, et 
al., 2000; Gualmini, 2005), Experiment I have ensured that children’s sensitivity to 
the validity of inferences that were consequently reflected at the level of truth-
conditional representation. 
 Experiment II was the first assessment to directly approach children’s logico-
semantic competence, featuring a newly designed experimental methodology called 
“Prediction-Rephrase” Task. The task provided the workspace for children to 
evaluate the two every-propositions sequentially presented in the dialogue between 
two puppets, as to whether the second proposition sounds a “good rephrase” of the 
first. The results suggested that the older preschoolers around the age of 6 could 
evaluate the logical inferences between two propositions in the way that adult do, but 
also highlighted the necessity to improve the experimental design to accommodate 
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the younger children, especially as concerns the felicity of the dialogue provided in 
the experimental workspace. 
 Based on the findings from Experiment II, we developed a modified novel 
experimental method called the “Demand-Fulfillment” Task. In this task, the two 
every-propositions were provided in the “demand-fulfillment” pragmatic template, in 
which the first proposition served the demand and the second served as the 
fulfillment. The crucial observation is that when the demand logically implies the 
fulfillment, the demand is not logically satisfied by the fulfillment, whereas when the 
demand does not logically imply the fulfillment, the demand is logically satisfied by 
the fulfillment. The children’s task was to judge whether the fulfilling outcome 
exhibited in the story logically satisfied the demand. The results revealed young 
children’s adult-like ability to distinguish the satisfactory and unsatisfactory demand-
fulfillment, which in turn is a reflection of the validity of the inferences. 
 Taken together, Experiments I, II and III have demonstrated children’s 
sensitivity to the validity in the logical inferences created between the propositions 
containing every. In particular, they are aware that an inference is licensed from the 
set-denoting expression to the subset-denoting expression, showing the “non-default” 
DE pattern, in the first argument of every, whereas an inference is licensed from the 
subset-denoting expression to the set-denoting expression, showing the “default” non-
DE pattern, in the second argument of every. 
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Appendix 4A: Full Script of “Demand-Fulfillment” Task 
 
General Lead-in 
This is a story about the genie and Grover. The genie is a great magician, but 
sometimes he uses his magic power to do some tricks on the other people. 
Now, Grover is visiting the genie’s palace. Let’s see what is going to happen. 
 
 
Trial 1: Control Item–“Satisfactory” Condition (=(97) on p. 106) 
 
Demand: Bring me a car. 
Fulfillment: Bringing a red car. 
(“Invalid” inference from Demand to Fulfillment) 
 
Genie: I’ll show you something interesting. Here we have Mickey 
Mouse (An image of Mickey Mouse shows up on the monitor of 
the lap top computer), and I will turn him into a little monster. 
(Magic word…) Can you believe that this little creature is in 
fact Mickey Mouse (Mickey Mouse disappears and a strange 
monster appears instead on the monitor)? I put a spell on 
Mickey Mouse, and he turned into a little monster. Hahaha. 
 
Grover: Oh-oh, poor Mickey Mouse… Genie, that was a cool magic, 
but I think Mickey Mouse wants to come back. Free him! 
 
Genie:  If you want me to free him, bring me a car. 
 
Grover: Ok, I will look for a car for you and will be back right away. 
But I’m sometimes silly and forgetful, so I have to be careful 
not to forget the request. 
 
(Grover leaves the genie’s palace and disappears. And he reappears with a 
box.) 
 
Grover: I think I got it. But I might have forgotten exactly what the 
genie said. So before going back to the genie’s palace, I want 
to make sure with you (=the child) whether I did something 
good enough. I brought him a red car in this box. Do you 
think it is good enough and Mickey Mouse will be freed? 
(=Before-Open-the-Box-Evaluation) 
 
Child:  (Expected to say) Yes. 
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Grover: Ok, now let’s open the box and show it to him together. 
 
Child: (Open the box and see what’s inside) 
 
Grover: Did you find something good enough to free Mickey Mouse? 
(=After-Open-the-Box-Evaluation) 
 
Child: (Expected to say) Yes. 
 
 
Trial 2: Control Item–“Unsatisfactory” Condition (=(98) on p. 107) 
 
Demand: Bring me a blue train. 
Fulfillment: Bringing a train. 
(“Valid” inference from Demand to Fulfillment) 
 
Genie: Now we have Donald Duck (An image of Donald Duck 
appears on the monitor of the lap top computer), and I will also 
put a spell on Donald Duck, and he turned into a little monster 
(Donald Duck disappears and a strange monster appears on 
the monitor). Hahaha. 
 
Grover: Hey Genie, you are being bad today. Oh poor Donald… Genie, 
I think it was a cool magic, but Donald Duck wants to come 
back. You should free him! 
 
Genie:  If you want me to free him, bring me a blue train. 
 
Grover: Ok, I will look for one for you and will be back right away. But 
I’m silly and forgetful, so I should be really careful not to 
forget what the request is. 
 
(Grover leaves the genie’s palace and disappears. And he reappears with a 
box.) 
    
Grover: I think I got it. But I might have forgotten exactly what the 
genie said. So before going back to the genie’s palace, I want 
to make sure with you (=the child) whether I did something 
good enough. I brought him a train in this box. Do you think 
Donald Duck will be freed? (=Before-Open-the-Box-
Evaluation) 
Child: (Expected to say) No/I don’t know/What kind of car did you 
bring?/I need to see inside the box… etc. 
 
Grover: Oh-oh, did I make a mistake? Let’s check inside the box 
together. 
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Child: (Open the box; there is a yellow train) 
 
Grover: Do you see something good enough to make the genie happy? 
(=After-Open-the-Box-Evaluation) 
 
Child: (Expected to say) No, it’s not a blue train. It’s a yellow train! 
 
Genie: Oops, Don’t you remember I told you to bring me a blue train? 
 
Exp.: (Child name), why don’t you help Grover? Here is a blue train 
he should have brought. Can you give it to genie? 
 
Child: (Give a blue train to the genie) 
 




Trial 3: “First-Argument” Item–“Satisfactory” Condition 
 
 Demand: Bring me every gold coin. 
 Fulfillment: Bringing every coin. 
 (“Invalid” inference from Demand to Fulfillment) 
 
Genie: Now, I will tell you something that happened yesterday. Look 
at my magic screen (=the monitor), these are my coins, the 
gold ones and the silver ones (Gold and silver coins are shown 
on the monitor of a lap top computer). But while I was taking a 
walk yesterday, I lost them somewhere. They are my treasures, 
and I’m not happy at all! So I will put a spell on Peter Pan here, 
and look, now he is a little monster, too (The monitor shows 
Peter Pan, and then replaces it with a monster). Hahaha. 
 
Grover: Oh-oh. You are bad Genie. Free Peter Pan! 
 
Genie: Hum, I’ll tell you something. My gold coins are really 
precious. I want them back. I really don’t care about silver 
coins because they are not so precious as gold ones, but the 
gold ones are really valuable. So, if you want me free Peter 
Pan, bring me every gold coin! 
 
Grover: Ok, I will do so and will be back right away. But I should not 
be forgetful this time. 
 
(Grover leaves the genie’s palace and disappears. He reappears with a box.) 
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Grover: Ok I think I found them! But I’m afraid I might have forgotten 
what the request was. So before going back to the palace, I 
want to make sure with you (the child). I brought him every 
coin. Do you think it is good enough and Peter Pan is freed? 
(=Before-Open-the-Box-Evaluation) 
 
Child:  (Expected to say) Yes. 
 
Grover: Thank you, (Child name). Genie, here is my box. (Child name), 
can you open it for him? 
 
Child: (Open the box. All the coins are inside.) 
 
Grover: Did I do something good enough to make the genie happy? 
(=After-Open-the-Box-Evaluation) 
 
 Child:  (Expected to say) Yes. 
 
Genie:  Wonderful! Thank you. Now I will free Peter Pan. 
 
 
Trial 4: “First-Argument” Item–“Unsatisfactory” Condition 
 
 Demand: Bring me every dog. 
 Fulfillment: I brought you every brown dog. 
 (“Invalid” inference from Demand to Fulfillment) 
 
Genie: Mmm, I remember something bad that happened yesterday. I’ll 
show you. Here is what happened to me yesterday. Look at my 
magic screen (=the monitor). I have cute little dogs. Brown 
ones and white ones (The monitor shows the images of three of 
brown and white dogs). But, they escaped from my palace! I 
really miss my dogs. Since I’m not happy without my dogs, I 
will put a spell on Nemo (The monitor shows Nemo.). Look, 
now he is a little monster (Nemo turns into a strange monster 
in the monitor.). Hahaha. 
 
Grover: You should free him! 
 
Genie: Well, I will be happy again when my dogs are back. Remember 
my dogs that escaped yesterday? Brown ones and white ones? 
So, if you want me free Nemo, bring me every dog! 
 
Grover: Ok, I will do so and will be back right away. But I’m silly and 
forgetful, so I have to be really careful not to forget what the 
request is! 
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(Grover leaves the genie’s palace and disappears. He reappears with a box.) 
  
Grover: Ok I think I found them! But I’m afraid I might have forgotten 
what the genie said. So before going back to the palace, I want 
to make sure with you (the child). I brought him every brown 
dog. Do you think it is good enough and if Goofy is freed? 
(=Before-Open-the-Box-Evaluation) 
 
Child:  (Expected to say) No! 
 
Grover: Oh-oh, did I make a mistake? (Child name), can you open the 
box and check insider together for him? 
 
Child: (Open the box. Found only the brown dogs.) 
 
Grover: Did I do something good enough to make the genie happy? 
 
Child: No, you forgot the white dogs. 
 
Genie: What? I told you to bring me every dog. Something is wrong! 
(Child name), can you help Grover to satisfy me? 
 
Child: (Get the white dogs from the experimenter and give them to the 
genie.) 
 




Trial 5: “Second-Argument” Item–“Satisfactory” Condition 
 
Demand: Every one of you brings me a cat 
Fulfillment: Every one of us brought you a white cat 
 (“Valid” inference from Demand to Fulfillment) 
 
(At the genie’s place: Big Bird (BB) and Cookie Monster (CM) joined 
Grover(G).) 
 
BB & CM: Grover, we came here to join you! Let’s free the poor people 
from the genie’s spell. 
 
Grover: Thank you, my friends. Genie, now three of us are here. You 
cannot do anything bad any more! 
 
Genie: Do you think so? Let’s see. Here we have pretty Snow White 
(Snow White appears on the monitor), and… Hahaha I will put 
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a spell on her and look (The monitor shows a strange monster, 
replacing with Snow White.), can you believe that this little 
monster is in fact Snow White? Hahaha. 
 
Three:   You should free her! 
 
Genie: Ok I will let him, if every one of you brings me a cat, I will 
free her. 
 
Three:   Got it. We will be back! 
 
Grover: We know sometimes we are silly and forgetful. So let’s now 
forget what the request is! 
 
(They disappear, and reappear with a box each.) 
 
Three:  We think we did it! But it was so hard that we might have 
forgotten what the request was. So before going back to the 
genie’s palace, let’s make sure if we are right. (Child name), 
what do you think? Every one of us brought him a white cat. 
Is it good enough and Snow White freed? (=Before-Open-the-
Box-Evaluation) 
 
Child:  (Expected to say) Yes! 
 
Grover: Thank you, (Child name)! Genie, here are our boxes. (Child 
name), can you open them for genie? 
 
Child:  (Open the boxes. Each box has a white cat.) 
 




Trial 6: “Second-Argument” Item–“Unsatisfactory” Condition 
 
 Demand: Every one of you brings me an orange noodle. 
 Fulfillment: Every one of us brought you a noodle. 
 (“Valid” inference from Demand to Fulfillment) 
 
 (At Genie’s Palace: Big Bird (BM) and Cookie Monster (CM) joined Grover.) 
  
Genie: I won’t stop it, because it’s fun to turn people to monsters! 
Now we have Simba here (The monitor shows Simba). I’m 
going to change him into a little monster too… (Simba turns 
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into a monster on the monitor.) Can you believe that this little 
monster is in fact Simba the Lion King? Hahaha. 
 
Three:   Stop being nasty! Free him! 
 
Genie: Ok, then you all have to do something for me. I’m hungry, and 
want eat my favorite food, noodle… Especially I love orange 
ones, so remember; every one of you brings me an orange 
noodle. Then I will free him. 
 
Three:   Got it. We will be back! 
 
Grover: Here comes another request- let’s not be silly and forgetful! 
 
(They disappear, and reappear with a box each.) 
 
Heroes:  We think we did it! But it was so hard that we might have 
forgotten what the genie said. So before going back to the 
genie’s palace, let’s make sure if we are right. (Child name), 
what do you think? Every one (of us) brought a noodle. Is 
Nemo freed? (=Before-Open-the-Box-Evaluation) 
 
Child:  (Expected to say) No/I need to see inside the box… 
 
Grover: Oops, did we make mistakes? Let’s see what genie is going to 
say. Genie, here are the boxes we brought. (Child name), can 
you open them for him? 
 
Child: (Open the boxes one by one. One of the boxes has an orange 
noodle, but two of them have a green noodle each.) 
 
Genie: This one has an orange noodle. Good. But this one and this one 
have a green noodle! These green noodles seem to be spinach 
flavored. I don’t like spinach. I told every one of you to bring 
me an orange noodle! 
 
Exp.: Maybe you can help them, (Child name). Here are some orange 
noodles. You can give them to genie. 
 
Genie: Wow, orange noodles! Yummy. Thank you so much (Child 






Appendix 4B: Individual Reponses of the Subjects 
 









Subject 1 4;2 Y N2 Y (1) N/A (1) Y N2 
Subject 2 4;2 Y N1 Y *Y Y *Y 
Subject 3 4;4 Y N1 Y N1 Y N1 
Subject 4 4;4 Y N2 Y N1 Y N2 
Subject 5 4;5 Y *Y Y N1 Y N2 
Subject 6 4;5 *N1 N2 Y N1 Y N1 
Subject 7 4;5 *N1 *Y Y *Y Y N2 
Subject 8 4;8 Y N2 Y N1 Y N2 
Subject 9 4;10 *N1 N2 N/A (1) *Y (1) Y N1 
Subject 10 4;10 Y N1 Y N1 Y N1 
Subject 11 5;0 Y N1 Y N1 Y N1 
Subject 12 5;1 Y N2 N/A (1) N/A (1) Y N1 
Subject 13 5;5 Y N2 *N1 N1 Y N2 
Subject 14 5;6 Y *Y Y N1 Y N2 
Subject 15 5;7 Y N2 Y N1 Y N1 
Subject 16 6;0 Y N2 Y N1 Y N2 
 
Control = Control Item 
First = “First-Argument” Item 
Second = “Second-Argument” Item 
(S) = “Satisfactory” Condition 
(U) = “Unsatisfactory” Condition 
Y = “Yes” Response 
N1= Non-“Yes” Response by rejection at the Before-Open-the-Box-Evaluation 
N2= Non-“Yes” Response by rejection at the After-Open-the-Box-Evaluation 
N/A= No answer 
* = Incorrect responses 
(1) = The responses in the shaded cells were excluded from the analyses. 
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Chapter 5. Reversed Entailments: Semantic Interaction with 
Negation 
 
5.1. Semantic Interaction with Negation–The Phenomenon 
 
The previous chapters have discussed children’s ability to compute the logical 
inference involving the universal quantifier every. The experimental findings 
demonstrated children’s competence in applying the semantic property of every to the 
computation of the logical relations between the entailing and entailed pairs of every-
sentences. The discussion so far thus has pointed toward positive answers to both 
research questions we began with (originally addressed in (34)):  
 
(101)  a.  Can children compute inferences from subsets to supersets and vice  
versa appropriately? 
b.  Does their knowledge about the universal quantifier every extend to 
the computation of the valid and invalid inferences created between 
propositions involving every? 
 
 However, in order to have a full picture of what children do or do not know 
regarding the encoding of meaning from sentences involving quantifiers such as every 
and the computation of inferences across related sentences involving quantification, 
there are additional properties to consider. As we will see, investigating these factors 
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will tell us more about what children know about the linguistic encoding of 
quantification, while providing important further testing grounds for whether children 
indeed compute inferences involving every from these linguistic structures. 
So far, we have been considering the entailment patterns of the universal 
quantifier every in the ‘positive’ context. In the present chapter, we will switch our 
perspective to the ‘negative’ context, which will reveal an interesting feature of 
entailment and addresses an important issue about children’s semantic competence. 
To begin, recall that the first argument of every yields a DE environment. As a 
consequence, inferences between two se-referring expression go from set (e.g., dog) 
to subset (e.g., brown dog). In the sentences below, since the first argument of every 
is DE, the inference is licensed from (102a) to (102b). That is, when (102a) is true, 
(102b) is also true, but not vice versa. 
 
(102)  a.  The vet vaccinated [every dog in town]. 
b.  The vet vaccinated [every brown dog in town]. 
 
Next, recall that negation, like the first argument of every, triggers DE 
environment, as mentioned in Chapter 1. As the following example shows, both 
arguments of the negative quantifier no are DE environment (cf., Milserk 1977; 
Barwise and Cooper 1981, among others).  
 
(103)  a.  Elliot is interested in no movies. 
b.  Elliot is interested in no French movies. 
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(104) Elliot is interested in no movies. 
 Elliot is interested in no French movies. 
 
Note that (103a) which has a set-denoting expression (movies) entails (103b) which 
contains its subset-referring expression (French movies), but not vice versa, yielding 
the inference from set to subset. This typically demonstrates the pattern of a DE 
operator. 
 
Every and Negation 
Keeping this in mind, let us consider the example in (105) below, in which every and 
negation both appear. Now, the every NP phrase shown in (102) is embedded in the 
first argument of a second quantifier, no. 
 
(105)  a.  No vet vaccinated [every dog in town]. (Ludlow, 2002) 
b.  No vet vaccinated [every brown dog in town].              (Ludlow 2002)  
(106) No vet vaccinated [every brown dog in town].   (=(105a)) 
 No vet vaccinated [every dog in town].   (=(105b)) 
 
Notice that every dog does not entail every brown dog any longer, as it did in the 
positive context. In particular, the entailment pattern of every is now reversed; now 
every brown dog in town entails every dog in town, but not vice versa, as (106) 
illustrates. Consequently, the inference created between these sentences has been 
flipped as well, and thus we now have the opposite inference, from subset (brown 
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dog) to its set (dog). In sum, the first argument of every by nature DE, but its 
entailment is influenced by the linguistic environment in which it occurs (e.g., in 
context of negation), as a consequence of which the reversed pattern of entailment is 
generated. 
 These observations point to an important issue about how entailment is 
linguistically represented: the entailment pattern created by the universal quantifier 
every is sensitive to the linguistic environment in which it occurs. In the next section, 
we consider this property in more detail. 
 
5.2. Entailment and Scope 
 
The mechanism behind the phenomenon discussed in the previous section relates to 
the interaction between the two scope-bearing operator (negation and every in the 
present discussion), and how their scope relations are represented at the LF level. In 
principle, if the multiple scope-bearing operators appear in the subject and object 
positions in a sentence, it has been assumed that the ambiguity is yielded by the two 
possible LF representations, with respect to which operator takes wider scope over 
the other. In particular, if a scope-bearing operator appears in the subject position and 
another in the object position, this sentence generates the following two LF 
representations: one demonstrates the isomorphic scope representation, in which the 
subject is higher than the object on a par with the surface representation; the other 
exhibits the inverse scope representation, in which the object is higher than the 
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subject. For example, the following is one of the typical cases that demonstrate this 
phenomenon, as has been widely quoted. 
(Ioup, 1975; May, 1977) 
(107)  Some professor admires every student.   (May 1985)  
(108) a.  For some professor x (for every student y, x admires y). (∃ > ∀) 
b.  For every student y (for some professor x, x admires y). (∀ > ∃) 
 
This ambiguity is due to the two possible LF representations assigned to the sentences 
(107), as illustrated in (109). (Chomsky, 1981; Kayne, 1981; Chomsky, 1986) 
 
(109)  a.  [IP1 some professori [IP2 every studentj [IP3 ti admires tj]]] ((108a)) 
b.  [IP1 every studentj [IP2 some professori [IP3 ti admires tj]]] ((108b)) 
(May, 1977; May, 1985; Aoun and Li, 1989) 
The relevant technical observation is that quantifiers can undergo raising at the LF 
representation. The inverse scope interpretation as in (108b) is generated by the 
raising of the lower operator every to the higher position than the position in which 
some is generated, which is called Quantifier Raising (QR). QR has been discussed 
from various points of view in the past. One of the primary hypotheses about this 
phenomenon is the one proposed mainly by May (1977), which claimed that QR 
applies uniformly to all Quantifier Phrases (QPs), and in principle, any QP can be 
raised and adjoined to any non-argument XP.32 (Koopman and Sportiche, 1982) 
                                                
32 For the technical details about the QR, see May (1977, 1985) and Aoun and Li (1989). In 
particular, for the debate about what restrictions QR is sensitive to, see May (1977), Chomsky 
(1981, 1986) and Kayne (1981); for the debate about what the landing site of the QRs is, see 
Koopman and Sportiche (1982) and Chomsky (1986); for the debate about whether LF serves 
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On the other hand, it has been pointed out that the scope ambiguity due to the 
interaction between the multiple operators is not uniformly generated by all 
combinations of scope-bearing operators33; crucially, the relation between every in 
the object position and negation is one of such cases in which the scope relation 
between them cannot be interchangeably represented at the LF. Negation and some 
behave differently in terms of whether or not they allow every to raise higher than the 
position that they are generated; in particular, unlike the case in (107), in which the 
every-QP in the object position can raise higher than the other operator some in the 
subject position, the object every-QP cannot take the wide scope over the negation in 
the higher position. For example, Beghelli and Stowell (1997) categorized the various 
QPs into five major classes, and proposed the hierarchical positions for each class of 
QPs (Beghelli and Stowell, 1997); in that account, the LF position for the QP headed 
by every is lower than that for the negation. Putting the technical details aside at the 
moment,34 the relevant part in their claim is that the case of the universal quantifier 
every and negation is a case in which there is no scope ambiguity; the QP headed by 
the universal quantifier every in the object position does not QR over the negation in 
the higher position. Ben-Shalom (1993) also discussed that the QPs with the universal 
quantifier every in the object position does not take the wide scope over the negation 
in simple negative sentences, taking the following sentence as an example. 
 
(110) John did not read every book. (¬ > ∀, *∀ > ¬)        (Ben-Shalom, 1993) 
                                                                                                                                      
as the ground for QRs to take place, see Aoun et al. (1980), Hornstein (1984) and Huang 
(1982), among others. (Aoun, Hornstein and Sportiche, 1980; Huang, 1982; Hornstein, 1984). 
33 There has been a debate about in what circumstances the scope ambiguity is yielded, as 
pointed out by Pietroski and Hornstein (2002). (Pietroski and Hornstein, 2002) 
34 We will discuss their argument more in detail later. 
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Therefore, the universal quantifier every in object position of the sentences with 
negation (including both negative sentences containing the negative operator no as in 
(105) and simple negative sentences as in (110)) is obligatorily under the influence of 
the negation.  
The interaction between every and negation at the LF level crucially triggers 
the reverse of the entailment that every evokes. More accurately, there must be a c-
commanding relation35 (e.g., Reinhart, 1976; Chomsky, 1986) between negation and 
every, as the following examples contrastively show. 
 
(111)  a.  No vet has vaccinated every dog in the town 
                     *   No vet has vaccinated every brown dog in the town 
b. No vet has vaccinated every brown dog in the town 
  No vet has vaccinated every dog in the town 
c.  The vet [with no experience] has vaccinated every dog in the town 
  The vet [with no experience] has vaccinated every brown 
dog in the town 
d. The vet [with no experience] has vaccinated every brown dog in the 
town 
                     *  The vet [with no experience] has vaccinated every dog in  
     the town 
                                                
35 In the current discussion, we will assume that children possess the hierarchical structural 
representation, which provides the c-commanding relation, as has been positively discussed 
in a number of previous studies (e.g., Crain, 1991; Crain, Gardner, Gualmini and Rabbin, 
2002; Lidz and Musolino, 2002; Meroni, Minai, Gualmini and Crain, 2003; Minai, 2004; 
Minai and Crain, 2004). 
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Therefore, as a result of being c-commanded by the higher negation at the LF, the DE 
environment which every creates in its first argument by nature is canceled by the 
interaction with the negation, and thus its first argument is no longer DE.  
 
5.3. Issues in Child Language 
 
The discussion in the previous sections constitutes an important set of issues in child 
language; (i) whether children are aware that the QPs in the object position headed by 
the universal quantifier every is under the influence of the negation; (ii) whether they 
are aware that, as a result of the interaction between every and negation, the 
entailment of every-QPs in the object position is reversed. Considering these issues 
directly relate the research question addressed in (34a), i.e., whether children are able 
to compute the superset-to-set and set-to-superset inferences appropriately, expanding 
this question to a new aspect of linguistic-to-logical mapping (logico-semantics), 
namely the non-local dependency among the universal quantifier and negation. In 
what follows, we will revisit the research questions, taking the reversed entailment 
into our consideration. 
 
Research Questions Revisited 
The interactions among operators in yielding logical forms are a critical ingredient in 
logico-semantic competence. Probing children’s knowledge of these interactions will 
bring us closer to the goal of fully understanding children’s logico-semantic 
competence, and more deeply understanding the linguistic knowledge that children 
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bring to bear on this task. In particular, in order for a child to compute the reversed 
inferences due to the reversed entailment appropriately, he/she has to be aware of the 
semantic interaction between operators such as every and negation. In order for 
him/her to compute the semantic interaction between the negation and the universal 
quantifier every in an adult-like way, they must know the following facts. 
 
(112)  a.  The universal quantifier every constitutes a DE environment in its first  
 argument. 
b.  The universal quantifier every does not QR over the negation in the 
higher position, and thus it must be interpreted under the scope of the 
negation.36 
c.  Consequently, the entailment created in the first argument of every is 
reversed due to the influence of the negation, and thus it is no longer 
DE in this environment. 
 
Considering the above scenario, we now have a new testing ground by which to 
extend the research questions addressed in (34) regarding children’s ability to validate 
the logical inference as a consequence of the entailment structure that every creates.  
The reversed entailment discussed here thus constitutes another important 
case for the current discussion of children’s ability to compute the inferences 
appropriately, in which the inferences should be evaluated appropriately, not only on 
the basis of the semantic feature of every but also on the basis of the linguistic 
                                                
36 This fact itself relies on computations over hierarchical representations using c-command, 
as noted above. 
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environment that every appears. Hence it expands the original question in (34); if 
children are able to compute the inferences from subset to superset and vice versa 
appropriately, they should be sensitive to the reversed version of the entailment 
created in the every-QP under the negation. Answering the question in this way would 
consequently be informative regarding the status of the properties described in (112b) 
and (112c) in children’s grammar; for example, an investigation of every and 
negation, which probes whether children can represent the scope relation between 
every and negation in an adult-like way, may shed light the nature of children’s 
knowledge of scope phenomena, which is of crucial interest in understanding how 
children construct meanings from surface structures.  
Additional relating issue, regarding what children know about the properties 
of quantificational elements in their grammar, involves whether and how children 
know that a scope ambiguity is not yielded by the interaction between the negation 
and every in the lower position; this problem is made clear when we see that while the 
universal quantifier every in the object position does not QR over the negation in the 
higher position, other highly similar quantifiers, such as each, do not share this 
property with every. We describe this important contrast and its impact on 
representing and testing semantic knowledge in children, and the suggestive 
implication from our experiments in Chapter 8. 
The phenomena of reversed entailment described above thus provides an 
important additional ground for us to consider whether children are able to compute 
the valid and invalid inferences containing every appropriately, and what that implies 
about children’s linguistic knowledge. Let us revisit our major research questions, in 
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light of the reversed entailment properties that have been shown to be a part of the 
syntax, semantics and logic of quantification. 
 
(113) Research Question – Revisited 
Can children compute inference from subsets to supersets and vice versa 
appropriately, not only on the basis of the entailment property of an operator 
but also on the basis of the semantic interaction between two operators? In 
particular: 
a.  Do they know that the truth conditions of each sentence involved in an 
inference licensed by the reversed entailment? 
b.  Can they compute the valid inference between sentences in which the 
relevant entailment is reversed under the influence of the semantic 
interaction between the two operators? 
 
In the following chapters, we report the experiments to consider this question. 
On a par with the discussion of the Experiments I, II and III, we utilize the Truth 
Value Judgment Task in order to examine whether children are aware of the truth 
values of the entailing and entailed sentences individually (Experiments IV and V). 
Then we will move ahead to report Experiment VI, utilizing the “Demand-
Fulfillment” Task, in order to directly test children’s ability to compute the reversed 
direction in which logical inferences are licensed across every-sentences with 
reversed entailments in the every-QP under negation.  
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Chapter 6. Experiments IV and V: Truth Conditional Evaluation 
of Each Proposition–Reversed Entailment 
 
6.1. EXPERIMENT IV 
 
In this chapter, we will consider children’s knowledge regarding the reversed 
entailment of every-QP under negation, focusing on whether children are able to 
compute the relevant inferences licensed in an opposite way compared with every-QP 
in positive contexts, due to reversed entailment. Before directly assessing children’s 
sensitivity to the changes in inference pattern due to reversed entailment patterns in 
every under negation, we first ensure whether children are able to evaluate the truth 
values of the antecedent and the consequence of the relevant inference, using the 
Truth Value Judgment task (Crain and McKee, 1985; Gordon, 1996; Crain and 
Thornton, 1998). Thus, Experiment IV was designed to investigate the following 
issue: whether children are aware of the reversed entailment pattern in the first 
argument of every appearing in the negative context, and its consequence in 
determining the truth conditions of the entailed and entailing negative sentences 
containing every-QP in object position. Hence, in Experiment IV we investigate the 
object-position every-QP embedded in the scope of the subject-position negative 
operator nobody as a case study, focusing on children’s interpretation of the minimal-
paired sentences as in (114).37  
                                                
37  Gualmini and Crain (2002) have revealed children’s knowledge that the partitive 
expression none of the Ns creates a DE environment in both first and second arguments. 
Given that nobody is semantically equivalent to none of the Ns, we assume that children 
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(114)  a. Nobody fed every dog. 
b.  Nobody fed every brown dog. 
 
In order for children to compute the meanings of minimal-paired every-
sentences that also contain nobody as in (114), they need to know the following 
factors that determine the truth-conditional meanings of these sentences: (i) the 
entailment property of every-QP (i.e., DE); (ii) the entailment property of nobody 
(i.e., DE); (iii) the structural relation between every-QP and nobody (i.e., c-
command). 
To what extent do children know about the three linguistic devices above? 
Here are the insights from the previous studies. As for (i), we have thus far discussed 
children’s highly sophisticated knowledge about the universal quantifier every, which 
were found to be applied not only at the level of composition of meanings (i.e., the 
evaluation of the truth conditional meaning of sentences with every) but also at the 
level of comparison of meanings (i.e., the evaluation of the inferential relations 
between sentences with every). As for (ii) and (iii), a number of studies have reported 
children’s highly sophisticated knowledge about DE property of negation (e.g., Crain, 
et al., 2002; Gualmini and Crain, 2002) and about the hierarchical linguistic 
representation via c-command (e.g., Crain, 1991; Crain, et al., 2002; Lidz and 
Musolino, 2002; Meroni, et al., 2003; Minai, 2004; Minai, in press). 
Given these findings, Experiment IV aims at investigating the following 
hypothesis. 
                                                                                                                                      
know that nobody is DE in both first and second arguments, as well as that every is DE in its 
first argument. (Gualmini and Crain, 2002) 
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(115) Hypothesis: Experiment IV 
Children would be able to correctly compute the truth values assigned to the 
entailing and entailed sentences that contain every and nobody, on the basis of 
their knowledge about the DE property of every and nobody and the 




The experimental design of Experiment IV is virtually the same as that of Experiment 
I. That is, two virtually minimal-paired sentences, entailing and entailed, were 
presented in the same context, which assigns contrastive truth values to the two 
sentences, based on the inference patterns due to the entailment of the quantifier 
every. In Experiment IV, the every-QP was crucially in the object position and the 
negative operator nobody is the subject. Hence the relevant entailment with respect to 
every-QP is no longer DE due to the interaction with nobody. Consequently, the 
relevant inference pattern is the default (non-DE) pattern, from the subset-denoting 
expression to its related superset-denoting expression. 
Consider the sample minimal-paired sentences as in (114), repeated below as 
in (116). 
 
(116) a.  Nobody fed every dog. 
b.  Nobody fed every brown dog. 
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Imagine a situation in which there are three cages for dogs, each of which contains a 
few brown dogs and white dogs. Suppose that there are three feeders, and that each 
feeder goes to a cage and feeds a few of the dogs in that cage, as illustrated in Figure 
18. 
 
Figure 18 Basic Paradigm 
 brown   brown   brown  white  white   brown  brown  white   white  white                brown  brown   white   white   white 
 dog       dog      dog      dog    dog   dog      dog     dog      dog    dog                   dog      dog      dog     dog      dog   
 
                               
 
                        
 Feeder #1   Feeder #2           Feeder #3 
 
 Cage #1   Cage #2   Cage #3 
 
 
Note that the feeder #1 fed all the brown dogs but not the white dogs in his cage; the 
feeder #2 fed one of the white dog and two of the brown ones, but not the rest in his 
cage; the feeder #3 fed all the white dogs but not the brown dogs in his cage. 
Consider the description as in (116a) presented in the context as in Figure 18; it is 
true in the situation illustrated above that “Nobody fed every dog”, because none of 
the characters fed all the dogs in his cage. Now, consider the sentence (116b), in 
which the noun dog is replaced with its subset-denoting noun brown dog; it is false in 
the same situation, because the feeder #1 fed all the brown dogs, even though he did 
not feed all the dogs in his cage. Therefore, we say that (116b) entails (116a); as a 
consequence, it licenses the inference from the subset-denoting noun brown dog in 
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(116b) to the set-denoting noun dog in (116a), showing the “default” non-DE pattern, 
i.e., the reversed DE in every-QP under negation. 
 Hence, we have observed the following relation between the sentences in 
(116). 
 
(117) a.  Nobody fed every dog    (=(116a)) 
         *  Nobody fed every brown dog  (=(116b)) 
b.  Nobody fed every brown dog   (=(116b)) 
 Nobody fed every dog   (=(116a)) 
 
Experiment IV was designed on the basis of the above paradigm, and thus the 
experimental stimuli were virtually the same as the entailing and entailed pair of 
sentences shown in (116); likewise, the stimuli were presented in a context virtually 
identical to that illustrated in Figure 18. 
 
6.1.2. Experimental Design 
 
Two experimental conditions, the “True” Condition and the “False” Condition, were 
generated; the true sentences and false sentences were presented in virtually identical 





(118) “True” Condition 
a.  Nobody could clean every chocolate guy. 
b. Nobody could rescue every dolphin. 
(119) “False” Condition  
a.  Nobody could feed every big koala bear.  
b. Nobody could reward every black horse. 
 
Each child was presented all the sentences above, with an equal number of fillers; the 
full set of trials was balanced regarding the number of expected affirmative and 
negative responses.  
 
Contexts: 
There are always the three domains in all the contexts, in each of which a character 
has to take care of five props in a certain way. The five props in each domain can be 
divided into two groups according to size or color, providing the needed set-subset 
relations. The three characters always succeed to take care of three props in the 
domain, which sometimes includes all the members of a subset, but none of them 
succeed to take care of all the props in the domain. This is the crucial context that 
assigns the contrasting truth conditions to the minimal-paired sentences containing a 






Let us review the experimental conditions. A typical trial for “True” Condition is 
presented in (120) below. 
 
(120) Sample trial: “Cleaning the Chocolate Guys” Story 
This is a story about the children from the Simpsons cartoon. Bart (big 
brother), Lisa (little sister) and Maggie (baby girl) are each in their own room. 
There are five chocolate containers, M&M’s Chocolate Guys (M&M’s 
characters which are hollow, and come filled with chocolate), in each room. A 
few of them in each room are red, and a few of them are green. They used to 
be full of chocolate, but now they are empty because the Simpsons children 
have eaten all of the chocolate. So the chocolate guys feel really empty and 
they want to be filled up once again. Bart, Lisa and Maggie decide to clean the 
chocolate guys first before they fill them up with chocolates, so they have 
brought chocolate-guy-cleaning kits (cotton swabs) with them. Bart cleaned 
all three green chocolate guys on the left hand side in his room, but then he 
found his cleaning kit bag empty. So he apologized to the green chocolate 
guys, which he could not clean. Lisa said; “I can do it better. I will start from 
the opposite side than Bart did.” She started cleaning the green chocolate guys 
on the right hand side in her room. She cleaned all the green chocolate guys, 
and then it was the red chocolate guys’ turn to be cleaned. She finished 
cleaning the first red one, but then she also found that she ran out of the 
cleaning kits. So she apologized the rest of the green chocolate guys, which 
she could not clean. Little Maggie said: “I can do it better. I will start with the 
red ones. That should be the way!” She started cleaning the red chocolate 
guys. She cleaned all the red chocolate guys and finally it was the green ones’ 
turn to be cleaned, but, alas, Maggie also found that her cleaning kit was 










Figure 19 “Cleaning the Chocolate Guys” Story: The Final Outcome 
 
   
  = unclean chocolate guy;   = cleaned chocolate guy 
 
 Target sentence presented in this outcome: 
 (118a) Nobody could clean every chocolate guy. (True) 




The test sentence (118a) (repeated in (121) below) was presented at the end of this 
story in the same way as Experiments I, i.e., the puppet described what he thinks 
happened in the story. 
 
(121) Nobody could clean every chocolate guy. 
 
Note that this sentence is true, since none of them succeeded to clean all the chocolate 
guys in their rooms.  
 Compare (121) with the sentence (122) below, in which chocolate guy is 
replaced with red chocolate guy.  
 
(122)  Nobody could clean every red chocolate guy. 
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Note that (122) is virtually the same as the test sentences in “False” Condition that 
will be described below, had we replaced the set-denoting expression chocolate guy 
with its subset-denoting expression red chocolate guy; this sentence becomes false in 
the same context, since Maggie cleaned all the red chocolate guys, even though she 
could not clean the green chocolate guys. 
 
“False” Condition  
Now, let us survey the other condition. The following is a sample trial of “False” 
Condition, in which the predicted response is ‘wrong’. Note that the plot is eventually 
the same one in “True” Condition. 
 
(123) Sample trial: “Zoo” Story 
This is a story about a zoo. There are three zoo-keepers, and they have to feed 
5 koala bears each. The koala bears are divided among three different cages. 
The three zoo-keepers are Eeyore, Tigger and Winnie the Pooh. Each zoo-
keeper’s job is to feed the five koala bears in one of the cages. In Eeyore’s 
cage, there are three small koala bears and two big ones. In Tigger and Winnie 
the Pooh’s cages, there are three big koala bears and two small koala bears. 
Eeyore has a bunch of pizzas and he starts feeding the small koala bears, but 
he soon realizes that he doesn’t have enough pizzas to feed the big koala 
bears. Then it’s Tigger’s turn. He says: “I will do better than you.” He starts 
feeding the small koala bears in his cage, and he manages to give a pizza to 
both of the small koala bears in his cage and to one of the big ones, before 
running out of pizzas. Finally, it’s Winnie the Pooh’s turn. He says: “I know 
why you didn’t make it! You have to start by feeding the big koala bears!” So 
he gives a pizza to each of the big koala bears in his cage, but he also runs out 
of pizzas, so the two small koala bears in his cage do not get fed.  
 
 




Figure 20 “Zoo” Story: The Final Outcome 
 
   
              Pooh         Eeyore                           Tigger  
  
Target sentence presented in this outcome: 
 (119a) Nobody could feed every big koala bear. (False) 
(cf. Nobody could feed every koala bear. =(125))  
 
  
The relevant observation is as follows: Tigger has managed to feed all the big koala 
bears in his cage, but no zoo-keeper has managed to feed all of the koala bears in his 
cage.  
 
(124) Nobody could feed every big koala bear.   
 
Given the context that is described above, the sentence is false, because Tigger 
managed to feed all of the big koala bears in his cage, although the small koala bears 
in the cage were not fed. The puppet narrated the sentence (46) in describing what he 
thinks happened in the story, after the story was acted out. 
 Compare (124) with (125) below, in which koala bear is substituted for big 
koala bear. 
 
(125)  Nobody could feed every koala bear. 
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Note that (125) is virtually the same as the sentences used in “True” Condition, such 
as (121). Crucially, presented in the same context, (125) becomes true, because all of 
them failed to feed all of the koala bears in their cage. This is virtually the identical 




If children are aware of the fact that the entailment pattern with regard to every-QP in 
the object is reversed because of the interaction with nobody in the subject, as we 
have hypothesized in (115), then they are expected to be able to appropriately 
compute the truth values of the entailing and entailed sentences containing nobody 
and every.  
 Alternatively, let us consider the following hypothesis, in which children 
would show the non-adult-like truth value judgments in interpreting the target 
sentences. Recall that, in order for children to compute the truth values of the test 
sentences in an adult-like way, they ought to know the outcomes addressed in (169) 
and (170), which is condensed and repeated below. 
 
(126)  a.  The universal quantifier every constitutes a DE environment in its first  
 argument. 
b.  The universal quantifier every does not QR over the negation, and thus 
it must be interpreted under the scope of negation; on the other hand, 
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another universal quantifier each obligatorily QRs over the negation, 
and thus it must be interpreted over the scope of the negation. 
c.  Consequently, the entailment created in the first argument of every is 
reversed due to the influence of the negation, and thus it is no longer 
DE. 
 
As for (126a), we have already concluded that children know this; the experiments 
that have been discussed in the previous chapters (Experiments I, II and III), as well 
as the previous studies demonstrating children’s adult-like knowledge about every 
(e.g., Crain, et al., 1996; Meroni, et al., 2000; Gualmini, 2005), have suggested 
children’s highly sophisticated knowledge about every, applying to their semantic 
computation.  
 Therefore, if children would not be aware of the reversed entailment, and thus 
would compute the truth values of the sentences as if every remained DE under 
negation, it would reflect their lack of knowledge about the restriction barring every’s 
QR over negation. Children would allow every-QP in the object position to raise at 
the higher LF position (e.g., the Spec of the DistP, as Beghelli and Stowell (1997) 
claimed), as a result of which every-QR remains free from being bound by the 
negation and thus remains a DE environment. An alternate scenario for this 
possibility would be that children would wrongly treat every as if it were equivalent 
to each, ignoring the fact that each, unlike every, is not influenced by the negation to 




Twenty-one English-speaking children aged from 4;0 to 6;2 (mean age 4;11)  
participated in this experiment. The participants were children enrolled for the Center 
for Young Children at University of Maryland, College Park; all participants had their 
parental permission to participate in the study. The children were tested one by one in 




We calculated the percentages of the acceptance, i.e., “true” judgments, in each 
condition. In “True” Condition, in which the acceptance was expected, children 
accepted the test sentences 86% of the time (36/42; Standard Error = 5.465); on the 
other hand, in “False” Condition, in which the acceptance was not the expected adult-
like responses, their ratio of acceptance was significantly lower, 26% of the time 
(11/42; Standard Error = 6.867). These results are schematically illustrated below. 
 
Table 13 Percentages of the Acceptances 
 “True” Condition “False” Condition 







Figure 21 Percentages of the Acceptances 
 
 
A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test was conducted to examine whether there is a 
significant difference in the rates of acceptance between the “True” Condition and the 
“False” Condition. Each acceptance was scored as 1, and the total scores were 
compared condition by condition. According to the test, the rates of acceptances 
observed in “True” Condition was significantly higher than that observed in “False” 
Condition, z = -4.642, p < 0.001.  
A t-test was also conducted to examine whether the percentage of acceptances 
in the “True” Condition was significantly higher than that in the “False” Condition. 
According to the t-test, there was a significant difference between conditions, t(41) = 




(Minai, 2004; Minai and Crain, 2004; Minai, in press). 
On the basis of the results, we reject the null hypothesis, concluding that children are 
aware of the fact that the every-QP in the object of the sentences with nobody in the 
subject is no longer DE, and thus the entailment pattern and the truth value 
assignment to the entailing and entailed sentences containing nobody and every-QP 
are reversed. Experiment IV thus revealed children’s sophisticated interpretations of 
quite complex sentences, such as those in (117) and (118), in which a quantifier 
phrase is embedded in the scope of another quantifier.38 
In the following part of this chapter, we will report a control experiment in 
which another quantifier which patterns in the opposite direction regarding entailment 
is substituted for every. If children are indeed accessing the deep logic behind the 
surface forms to compute sentence meaning, they will be sensitive to the opposite 
truth conditions that are assigned due to the opposite entailment patterns created by 
the substituted quantifier. Thus, if this prediction would be borne out in the control 
experiment, the conclusion that was drawn from Experiment IV would be supported 




                                                
38 Minai (2004), Minai and Crain (2004) and Minai (in press) pointed out that, to the extent 
that a model lacks the representation of such non-local dependency via c-command, the 
model would face difficulties to account for the findings that children are aware of the non-
local dependency between nobody and every-QP (cf., Goldberg, 2003; Tomasello, 1995, 
2000, 2003).(cf., Tomasello, 1995; Tomasello, 2000;  Goldberg, 2003; Tomasello, 2003) 
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6.2. EXPERIMENT V: CONTROL 
 
Experiment V was thus conducted as a control in order to confirm whether children’s 
interpretation of two quantifiers in a sentence is due to the consequences of the deep 
logic that underlies their behavior, and that their computation of the individual 
sentence meanings is based on the interaction between the two quantifiers. Except for 
the following minimum change in stimuli, the experimental design was virtually the 
same as Experiment IV; the crucial difference in the stimuli is that every is substituted 
for by another quantifier, lots of, which yields the opposite entailment pattern 
compared with every, by its being non-DE operator by nature. 39 Thus, due to this 
substitution, the adult-like entailment patterns become the opposite of those in 
Experiment IV. In examining whether children are sensitive to this minimum 
substitution that would crucially reverse the entire patterning of the truth value 
assignments, we aim at confirming children’s ability to compute the semantic 
interaction at a deeper level. 
In order for children to correctly compute the entailing and entailed sentences 
that contain lots of and nobody, they need to be sensitive to the following linguistic 
devices: (i) the entailment properties of lots of (i.e., non-DE by nature); (ii) the 
entailment properties of nobody (i.e., DE by nature); (iii) the hierarchical linguistic 
representation (i.e., c-commanding dependency between lots of and nobody that 
triggers the reverse of the entailment of lots of). (Krämer, 2005) 
                                                
39 As we will discuss later, we treat lots of as the semantic equivalence of many, assuming 
Barwise and Cooper’s (1981) categorization in which many is a non-DE operator. 
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 Thus far we have discussed children’s highly sophisticated knowledge 
regarding (ii) and (iii) that were proven in a number of past studies (see 6.2. in the 
current chapter). Thus the remaining issue is to what extent children know about lots 
of, as described in (i) above. According to Krämer (2005), children are found to be 
able to compute the meanings of sentences containing many.40 On the basis of their 
findings, we would assume that children possess the ability to compute the semantics 
of lots of, and would hypothesize as follows, with respect to their truth value 
judgments of the minimal-paired sentences that contain nobody and lots of. 
 
(127) Hypothesis: Experiment V 
Children would be able to correctly compute the truth values assigned to the 
entailing and entailed sentences that contain lots of  and nobody, on the basis 
of their knowledge about the non-DE property of lots of and nobody and the 
interaction between them via c-commanding dependency, resulting in 
reversing the entailment that lots of evokes. 
 
If this hypothesis is borne out, it would provide the additional evidence to supplement 
the findings from Experiment IV, demonstrating children’s sensitivity to the semantic 
interaction between every and nobody on one hand and lots of and nobody on the 
other.  
                                                
40 In what follows, we will briefly describe that the interpretation of many is ambiguous with 
respect to (i) cardinality under “weak” interpretation (ii) proportion under “strong” 
interpretation (Partee 1989). Krämer pointed out children’s preference for cardinal (weak) 
interpretations of many, which contrasts with the adults’ preference for proportional (strong) 
interpretations in a context. However, in an adjusted experimental context children showed 
the adult-like interpretation, demonstrating that the apparent non-adult preference is not the 




The basic design adopted in Experiment IV was replicated, and virtually the same 
contexts were prepared for presentation with the test sentences. Crucially, we 
substitute lots of for every in the sentences used in the previous experiment, yielding 
the pairs of sentences listed below, which have similar apparent meaning to those in 
(117) and (118). Two of the target sentences, containing subset-referring expressions 
as listed in, are targets for which the expected adult-like answer is “True” (“True” 
Condition below). The other two target sentences, containing set-referring 
expressions, have “False” adult-like responses (“False” Condition below). 
 
(128) “True” Condition 
a. Nobody could catch lots of blue aliens.  
b. Nobody could carry lots of striped cats. 
(129)  “False” Condition 
a. Nobody could get lots of dogs. 
b. Nobody could eat lots of noodles. 
 
Each child heard all the test sentences listed above. Each child was also presented 






Notes on the Use of the Weak Quantifier Lots Of 
The substitution of every with lots of brings up a few additional issues that merit 
discussion. In particular, lots of may introduce other factors that would interfere with 
children’s interpretation, when presented in the experimental workspace, and that 
might blur our experimental objective. 
First, assuming that lots of is a semantic equivalent of another quantifier 
many, we see the categorical distinction between lots of/many and every; many is 
categorized as a weak quantifier, while universal quantifiers including every are 
classified as strong quantifiers (Milsark, 1977; Barwise and Cooper, 1981). The 
distinction between weak and strong quantifiers is based on the difference in their 
behavior in some linguistic environment. Milsark’s (1977) original diagnosis in 
determining the strong/weak quantifiers, which was essentially preserved in Barwise 
and Cooper’s detailed categorization of quantifiers, is whether a quantifier creates 
noun phrases acceptable in sentences after there is or there are. According to this 
diagnosis, the major quantifiers in English language can be categorized as follows. 
 
(130) Strong/Weak Quantifiers in English  (cf., Barwise and Cooper 1981) 
Weak     Strong 
 
 a     the 1, the 2, … 
 some     both 
 one, two, three …   all 
 many     every 
 a few     each 
 few     most 




In addition, there is also a clear distinction between many/lots of and every 
with respect to their interpretations. The interpretation of many/lots of requires some 
sense of context dependence, and thus how many counts as lots of is determined 
depending on the context. Furthermore, Partee (1989) pointed out that the 
interpretation of many evokes the ambiguity between cardinal reading and 
proportional reading, and the context dependence holds in either meaning. On the 
other hand, the interpretation of every is not context dependent. (Partee, 1989) 
 Given the discussion above, in order to make lots of felicitous on both 
readings, we conducted a pilot study to test what children require for proportional and 
cardinal readings. In particular, we examined how many objects children accept as 
referring to lots of Xs, i.e., how many objects can be accepted as a minimal 
cardinality. According to this study, there should be at least five of the X’s in the 
experimental workspace to license lots of X’s. As for the proportional reading, our 
pilot revealed that children accepted the two-thirds of objects as being lots of. 
Taken together, our observations determined that there should be at least five 
objects, to allow for a minimal cardinality of objects for lots of, and two-thirds of the 
objects should be included under lots of in the experimental workspace, in order to 
proportionally license lots of. Therefore, we combined the toy props so that that each 
subset had 6 or 7 members, so that we could felicitously represent lots of within a 
subset; since we presented two subsets that can be referred to as one set in one 
domain, each domain had 13 objects. This pattern was used in each of the target 
stories used in Experiment V.  
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6.2.2. Experimental Design 
 




A typical trial for the “True” Condition is presented below. 41 
 
(131) Sample trial: “Alien Catching Game” Story 
This is a story about three children from the Rugrats cartoon: Chucky, Tommy 
and Lil. They came to a theme park, and decided to play the “alien catching 
game”. Each of them has got his/her own playing field where there are 13 
aliens, 6 blue aliens and 7 red aliens. Using a catching tool, each of them took 
a turn. First, Chucky tried. He could only catch four aliens, two blue ones and 
two red ones. Second, Tommy tried. He, too, could only catch four aliens, two 
blue ones and two red ones. Finally, it was Lil’s turn. Before starting, she 
thought of a good idea: to make the catching tool bigger, in order to catch 
many aliens. With this brilliant idea, she could do a great job; she caught 9 
aliens including all seven of the red aliens, even though she could only catch 
two of the blue aliens. 
 
 







                                                
41 Full script of all the stories used in this experiment will be presented in Appendix 7B. 
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Figure 22 “Alien Catching Game” Story: The Final Outcome 
   
 
 = blue alien;   = red alien;            = was caught 
 
 Target sentence presented in this outcome: 
 (128a) Nobody could catch lots of blue aliens. (True) 
 (cf. Nobody could catch lots of aliens. =(132)) 
 
 
The test sentence (128a), which is repeated below in (132), was presented, by which 
the puppet’s offering his description of what he thinks happened in the story. 
 
(132) Nobody could catch lots of blue aliens.  
 
Given such a situation, the test sentence (132) should be judged as true, since none of 
the characters succeeded to catch many blue aliens, even though one of the 
characters, Lil, could catch many aliens (i.e., she caught all the red aliens but only 
two blue aliens, which still makes the total 9 out of 13). 
Compare (132) with the sentence (133), in which blue alien is replaced with 
its superset-denoting counterpart, aliens. 
 




Given the same context as described above, (133) becomes false, since Lil caught 9 
aliens out of 13, which can count as lots of according to our calculation. Note that, 
despite the fact that lots of is similar to every in the surface meaning in the sense that 
both quantifiers denote a plural number of set members, the sentences in (132) and 
(133), validate the inference from subset-denoting expression to its set-denoting 
expression (aliens and blue aliens).  
 
“False” Condition 
The following is a typical trial for “False” Condition. 
 
(134) Sample trial:  “Noodle Party” Story 
This is a story about Hello Kitty, who invented a brand new recipe for 
noodles. She cooked many green noodles and orange noodles, and invited 
three friends of hers, Skinny Genie, Big Genie and Blue Genie, to her “Noodle 
Party”. The three genies happily came to the party and had a noodle dish 
served to each of them, which had 7 orange noodles and 6 green noodles. 
Skinny Genie said, “Wow many noodles, green ones and orange ones. But 
honestly speaking, I don’t like noodles so much… but it’s very nice of Kitty 
to serve her new recipe, so I will try to eat this many.” He took 2 orange 
noodles and 2 green noodles. Big Genie said, “Wow I love noodles! But I was 
silly, I ate a big chocolate cake right before I came here, so I’m not so 
hungry… It’s a shame, but I cannot eat so many noodles!” He took 2 orange 
noodles and 2 green noodles. Blue Genie said, “Wow I love noodles! They 
look yummy, but, I don’t like spinach, and the green noodles look like spinach 
flavored. So I will eat this many.” He took all the orange noodles and put 
them on his plate, and two of the green noodles. 
 
 





Figure 23 “Noodle Party” Story: The Final Outcome 
   
 = green noodle;  = orange noodle;             = was eaten 
 
 Target sentence presented in this outcome: 
 (129b) Nobody could eat lots of noodles. (False) 
 (cf. Nobody could eat lots of green noodles. =(136)) 
 
 
With this situation presented, the puppet describes what he thinks happened in the 
story, which gave the test sentence (129b), which is repeated in (135) below. 
 
(135) Nobody could eat lots of noodles.  
 
Given the context illustrated above, this test sentence is false, the Blue Genie ate 9 
noodles out of 13, which counts as lots of in our observation. 
Compare (135) with the sentence (136) below, in which noodles is replaced 
with its subset-denoting counterpart, green noodles.  
 




Given the same context as described above, (136) becomes true, since all the 
characters, including Blue Genie who ate the most, only ate two of the green noodles 




The experimental hypothesis was that children would not respond based on the 
apparent similar meaning of the quantifiers lots of and every. Thus, when they would 
evaluate the sentences in (128a) and (129b) relative to the context in (131) and (134), 
respectively, they would be able to judge the entailing and entailed sentences in the 
way that they reflect which entails which in the opposing truth values. In particular, 
they should know that the entailments with regard to the denotation of lots of-QPs 
under negation pattern on a par with the DE operator as a consequence of the 
semantic interaction between them. Therefore, they could falsify the sentence 
containing the set-denoting noun in the lots of-QP, which is entailing the other, 
relative to the context; contrarily, they could verify the sentence containing the 
subset-denoting noun in the lots of-QP, which is entailed by the other, relative to the 
context. 
 On the other hand, another hypothesis would predict the reverse pattern in 
children’s responses. In particular, children would treat lots of as if it were a DE 
operator by nature (on a par with every), and thus would reverse its DE property 
under negation, resulting in a non-DE pattern. Thus, children falsify the sentence with 
the subset-denoting noun in the lots of-QP (i.e., entailing sentence) relative to the 
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context, and verify the sentence containing the set-denoting noun in the lots of-QP 
(i.e., entailed sentence) relative to the context. If this would be borne out, it could be 
suggested that children may have been influenced by the similar surface meaning that 
every and lots of share, and that they would treat both as if they were semantically 
equivalent in terms of the entailment representation. Under such a scenario, one might 
reconsider whether children’s apparently adult-like truth value judgment observed in 
Experiment IV was actually the output of their semantic computation accessing the 
interaction between nobody and every. 
 
Subjects 
Twenty-two English-speaking children aged from 3;11 to 6;3, whose average age is 
5;0, participated in this experiment. The participants were children enrolled for the 
Center for Young Children at University of Maryland, College Park; all participants 
had their parental permission to participate in the study. The children were tested one 




We calculated the percentage of the acceptance of the sentences in each condition. In 
“True” Condition, in which the acceptance was the expected responses, children 
showed 86% of acceptance (38/44; Standard Error = 5.233); in “False” Condition, in 
which the acceptance counted as the incorrect responses, their percentage of 
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acceptance was 5% (2/44; Standard Error = 3.177). These results are illustrated 
below. 
 
Table 14 Percentages of the Acceptance 
 “True” condition “False” condition 
Percentage of Acceptance 86% (38/44) 5% (2/44) 
 
 
Figure 24 Percentages of the Acceptance 
 
 
A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test was conducted to examine whether there is a 
significant difference in the rates of acceptance between the “True” Condition and the 
“False” Condition. Each acceptance was scored as 1, and the total scores were 
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compared condition by condition. According to the test, the rates of acceptance 
observed in the “True” Condition were significantly higher than those observed in the 
“False” Condition, z = -6.000, p < 0.0001. 
A t-test was also conducted, which revealed a significant difference across 
condition, t(43) = 13.91, p < 0.0001, Standard Error Mean = 5.882. 
Therefore, the results were consistent with the experimental hypothesis, in 
which children were sensitive to the replacement of the elements in the sentences, 
every with lots of, even though they share the similar apparent meaning. Despite the 
reversed pattern of entailments, children could interpret the test sentences presented 




The findings demonstrate the following two points. First, children were not 
influenced by the apparent similar meaning of quantifiers on the surface. Secondly, 
children computed the sentence meaning accessing the logic beneath surface forms. 
These points are consistent with the discussion about their ability to distinguish every 
and each, which we have discussed in Chapter 5. The relevant implication is that even 
though every and each are hugely similar, children would not confuse them either, 
knowing that every does not have the movement property that each has.  
In pursuing further studies in the same vein, the most direct way to approach 
these issues would be to use the original two operator, every and negation, but put 
them outside the c-commanding relationship. Based on our conclusion that children 
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are sensitive to the mechanisms of the semantic interaction between two operators, 
i.e., the reverse entailment due to the c-commanding relationship at the LF, we could 
predict that children are aware of the following facts: every-QP, without being c-
commanded by the upper negation, remains DE; thus the sentences like (137) create 
an inference in a DE pattern, i.e., from a set-denoting expression (dog) to a subset-
denoting expression (brown dog); thus in a certain context, (137a) is false and (137b) 
is true. 
 
(137)  a.  The boy with no hat fed every dog. 
b.  The boy with no hat fed every brown dog. 
 
6.3. Discussion of Experiments IV and V 
 
Experiment IV was conducted to examine whether children are able to compute the 
meanings of the every-sentences forming a minimal-pair with respect to the every-QP 
that appears in the scope of nobody. This objective in turn questions whether children 
are sensitive to the reversed entailment pattern evoked by every under the influence of 
nobody and its consequence represented in the reversed pattern of the opposing truth 
values assigned to the entailing and entailed sentences. The findings demonstrated 
children’s adult-like ability to compute the truth values of the minimal-paired 
sentences containing every and nobody and their sensitivity to the interaction between 
every and nobody.  
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Experiment V, serving as the control of Experiment IV, revealed children’s 
adult-like interpretation of the minimal-paired sentences containing lots of instead of 
every (which yield the opposite patterns of entailment, and by extension, the opposite 
direction of inference created between sentences). Recall that the minimum 
replacement of every with lots of in the paradigm crucially reverses the entailment 
pattern, and thus reverses the truth value assignments to the entailing and entailed 
sentences, although the quantifiers share a similar “surface” meaning. The findings 
suggest that children had no difficulty discriminating among these two quantifiers 
despite the similar surface meaning of lots of and every; this in turn suggests that they 
accessed the semantic features of these two quantifiers, confirming their adult-like 
computation of the truth values of the minimal-paired every-sentences with nobody, 
even when the relevant entailment was reversed due to the interaction between every 
and nobody.  
Having shown that children are able to compute the individual sentence 
meanings at the within-propositional level even when this involves a semantic 
interaction between two quantifiers, we are ready to move ahead to investigate 
whether children are able to compute the semantic interaction between the two 
quantifiers for encoding across-proposition meaning. To do so, we turn once again to 




Appendix 6A: Full Sentences and Stories provided in Experiment IV 
 
 
Trial  (=(120) on p. 152) 
 
Story:  This is a story about the children from the Simpsons cartoon. Bart (big 
brother), Lisa (little sister) and Maggie (baby girl) are each in their 
own room. There are five chocolate containers, M&M’s Chocolate 
Guys (M&M’s characters which are hollow, and come filled with 
chocolate), in each room. A few of them in each room are red, and a 
few of them are green. They used to be full of chocolate, but now they 
are empty because the Simpsons children have eaten all of the 
chocolate. So the chocolate guys feel really empty and they want to be 
filled up once again. Bart, Lisa and Maggie decide to clean the 
chocolate guys first before they fill them up with chocolates, so they 
have brought chocolate-guy-cleaning kits (cotton swabs) with them. 
Bart cleaned all three green chocolate guys on the left hand side in his 
room, but then he found his cleaning kit bag empty. So he apologized 
to the green chocolate guys, which he could not clean. Lisa said; “I can 
do it better. I will start from the opposite side than Bart did.” She 
started cleaning the green chocolate guys on the right hand side in her 
room. She cleaned all the green chocolate guys, and then it was the red 
chocolate guys’ turn to be cleaned. She finished cleaning the first red 
one, but then she also found that she ran out of the cleaning kits. So 
she apologized the rest of the green chocolate guys, which she could 
not clean. Little Maggie said: “I can do it better. I will start with the 
red ones. That should be the way!” She started cleaning the red 
chocolate guys. She cleaned all the red chocolate guys and finally it 
was the green ones’ turn to be cleaned, but, alas, Maggie also found 
that her cleaning kit was empty. She could not go on any more, and 
apologized the green chocolate guys. 
 





Story:  This is a story about three farmers who have five horses their farms 
each. Each of them has a few of black horses and brown horses in his 
farm. One day, they decided to give them a reward because they have 
been working so hard these days. The first farmer started to give a 
reward. He rewarded all the first black horses in his farm, and it is brown 
horses’ turn to be rewarded. However, the farmer found him out of 
rewards already! So he apologized to the brown horses. The second 
farmer started to give a reward. He rewarded all the first black horses in 
his farm, and he gave a reward to one of the brown horses. However, he 
found him out of rewards already, even though he still has two brown 
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horses to reward. So he apologized the brown horses. Now, the third 
farmer started. He gave a reward to all the brown horses in his farm, and 
it is the black horses’ turn to receive rewards. However, the farmer found 
him out of rewards already! So he apologized the black horses. 
 





Story: This is a story about three pirates who are sailing a big ocean. One 
day, a big wave attacked each of their ship. Their ships were fine, but 
each of them found that there were a few of black dolphins and gray 
dolphins launched on the deck! There is no water on their deck, so the 
dolphins are having a hard time! So they decided to rescue the dolphin 
into the small pool that they loaded on their ship. The first pirate 
started to rescue the dolphins in his ship. He rescued all the black 
dolphins in his ship, putting them in his pool. Now it is gray dolphins’ 
turn to be rescued. But the pirate found that his little pool is already 
full. So he went to the cabin of his ship to find something else to put 
the water and the gray dolphins. The second pirate started to rescue the 
dolphins in his ship. He rescued all the black dolphin and one gray 
dolphin in his ship, putting them in his pool. But he found that his little 
pool is already full, even though he still has two gray dolphins to be 
saved! So he ran into the cabin to look for another pool. The third 
pirate started. He rescued all the gray dolphins in his ship, putting 
them in his pool. Then he found that his little pool is already full, even 
though the black dolphins are still on the deck to be saved! So he 
dashed into the cabin to look for another pool. 
 
Target sentence: (3) Nobody could rescue every dolphin.   (True)  
 
Trial 4  (=(123) on p. 154) 
  
Story: This is a story about a zoo. There are three zoo-keepers, and they have 
to feed 5 koala bears each. The koala bears are divided among three 
different cages. The three zoo-keepers are Eeyore, Tigger and Winnie 
the Pooh. Each zoo-keeper’s job is to feed the five koala bears in one 
of the cages. In Eeyore’s cage, there are three small koala bears and 
two big ones. In Tigger and Winnie the Pooh’s cages, there are three 
big koala bears and two small koala bears. Eeyore has a bunch of 
pizzas and he starts feeding the small koala bears, but he soon realizes 
that he doesn’t have enough pizzas to feed the big koala bears. Then 
it’s Tigger’s turn. He says: “I will do better than you.” He starts 
feeding the small koala bears in his cage, and he manages to give a 
pizza to both of the small koala bears in his cage and to one of the big 
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ones, before running out of pizzas. Finally, it’s Winnie the Pooh’s 
turn. He says: “I know why you didn’t make it! You have to start by 
feeding the big koala bears!” So he gives a pizza to each of the big 
koala bears in his cage, but he also runs out of pizzas, so the two small 
koala bears in his cage do not get fed.  
 
Target sentence: (4) Nobody could feed every big koala bear.  (False) 
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Appendix 6B: Individual Responses of the Subjects: Experiment IV 
 Subject #  Age Target (1) (T) Target (2) (F) Target (3) (T) Target (4) (F) 
Subject 1 4;0 *W *R  *W *R  
Subject 2 4;0 R W R *R 
Subject 3 4;5 R W R W 
Subject 4 4;5 R R R W 
Subject 5 4;6 R RW (2) R RW (2) 
Subject 6 4;7 R W R W 
Subject 7 4;8 R *R R *R 
Subject 8 4;9 *W W *W W 
Subject 9 4;10 R W R W 
Subject 10 4;10 R W R W 
Subject 11 4;10 R W R W 
Subject 12 4;10 R W R W 
Subject 13 4;11 R *R R W 
Subject 14 5;0 R W R W 
Subject 15 5;1 R W R *R 
Subject 16 5;1 *W W *W W 
Subject 17 5;1 R *R R *R 
Subject 18 5;5 R W R W 
Subject 19 5;6 RW (1) W R *R 
Subject 20 5;8 R W R W 
Subject 21 6;2 R W R W 
 
(T) = “True” Condition 
(F) = “False” Condition 
R = “Right” responses (Judged as “True”) 
W = “Wrong” responses (Judged as “False”) 
* = Incorrect responses 
(1) = provided the correct description with the incorrect response (interpreted as 
“correct”) 
(2) = provided the correct description with both correct and incorrect response (“yes 
and no”; interpreted as “correct”) 
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Appendix 6C: Full Sentences and Stories provided in Experiment V 
 
Trial 1  (=(131) on p. 166) 
  
Story: This is a story about three children from the Rugrats cartoon: Chucky, 
Tommy and Lil. They came to a theme park, and decided to play the 
“alien catching game”. Each of them has got his/her own playing field 
where there are 13 aliens, 6 blue aliens and 7 red aliens. Using a 
catching tool, each of them took a turn. First, Chucky tried. He could 
only catch four aliens, two blue ones and two red ones. Second, 
Tommy tried. He, too, could only catch four aliens, two blue ones and 
two red ones. Finally, it was Lil’s turn. Before starting, she thought of 
a good idea: to make the catching tool bigger, in order to catch many 
aliens. With this brilliant idea, she could do a great job; she caught 9 
aliens including all seven of the red aliens, even though she could only 
catch two of the blue aliens. 
 
 Target sentence: (1)  Nobody could catch lots of blue aliens.  (True) 
 
Trial 2  
 
Story: This is a story about a funny game called “Dog-calling game”. The 
three characters, Cookie Monster, Grover and Big Bird, will 
participate in this game. Each of them is in a field, where there are 
several brown dogs and spotted dogs. They each will show a tasty food 
to the dogs in his field, and make as many dogs as possible came 
toward him. Let’s see how many dogs they can attract with their food. 
Cookie Monster said: “I’ll go first. I have the tastiest food in the 
world, a cookie! I’m sure that dogs also love cookies, and that I can 
make many of them come. OK, dogs, if you want to have a bite, please 
come to me now.” In the end, two brown dogs and two spotted dogs 
came to Cookie Monster. Now, Grover is ready. He said: “Hey, look at 
this, dogs! The tastiest food in the world, a donut! Please come to me 
if you want to have a bite!” In the end, Grover got two brown dogs and 
two spotted dogs. Now, it’s Big Bird’s turn. He said: “I know much 
about dogs, and I’m sure that their favorite food is this--- a bone! Hey 
dogs, look, I have a big yummy bone for you. If you want to have a 
bite, come to me right now!” Big Bird had a better idea than the others. 
Finally he got many of them, all the brown dogs and two of the spotted 
dogs.  
  





Story: This is a story about three islands, each of which has several white cats 
and striped cats on it. They are called cats’ islands! But, the cats look a 
bit sad, because they want to leave the islands and go back to their 
home. Unfortunately, they cannot go back by themselves, because they 
have to swim in the ocean to get out of the islands--- they are afraid of 
water! So, three characters, Dwarf, Smurf and Gumby, stood up to 
pick up the cats. They each sailed the ocean in their ships and arrived 
at three islands each. Dwarf talked to the cats in the first island: “Hey 
cats! I’m here with my cool ship to pick you up. Let’s go home 
together, and ride on my ship!” The cats were happy, but when two of 
the white cats and two of the striped cats got on his ship, Dwarf found 
that his ship is already full. So he said to the rest of the cats: “Oops, 
sorry my ship is already full. I have to go now, but I will be back very 
soon.” Now, Smurf arrived at another island and talked to the cats 
there: “Hey cats! Don’t be afraid because I’m here to pick you up. Get 
on my ship now.” The cats were really happy, but when two of the 
white cats and two of the striped cats got on his ship, Smurf found that 
his ship is already full. So he said to the rest of the cats: “Oops, sorry, 
my ship was a bit too small. I have to go now, but I will be back after I 
send these cats back.” Now, Gumby arrived at the other island. He 
talked to the cats there: “Hey, here I am with my big ship! Get on my 
ship, and let’s go home together!” The cats were really happy. But, 
Gumby’s big ship was also a bit too small; when all the white cats and 
two of the striped cats got on, it’s already out of space! So Gumby said 
to the rest of the cats: “Oh-oh, my ship is still too small! But don’t 
worry, I will be back soon after I send these cats back. So wait for 
me.” 
 
Target sentence: (3) Nobody could carry lots of striped cats.  (True) 
 
 
Trial 4  (=(134) on p. 168) 
 
Story: This is a story about Hello Kitty, who invented a brand new recipe for 
noodles. She cooked many green noodles and orange noodles, and 
invited three friends of hers, Skinny Genie, Big Genie and Blue Genie, 
to her “Noodle Party”. The three genies happily came to the party and 
had a noodle dish served to each of them, which had 7 orange noodles 
and 6 green noodles. Skinny Genie said, “Wow many noodles, green 
ones and orange ones. But honestly speaking, I don’t like noodles so 
much… but it’s very nice of Kitty to serve her new recipe, so I will try 
to eat this many.” He took 2 orange noodles and 2 green noodles. Big 
Genie said, “Wow I love noodles! But I was silly, I ate a big chocolate 
cake right before I came here, so I’m not so hungry… It’s a shame, but 
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I cannot eat so many noodles!” He took 2 orange noodles and 2 green 
noodles. Blue Genie said, “Wow I love noodles! They look yummy, 
but, I don’t like spinach, and the green noodles look like spinach 
flavored. So I will eat this many.” He took all the orange noodles and 
put them on his plate, and two of the green noodles. 
 
 Target sentence: (4) Nobody could eat lots of noodles. (False) 
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Appendix 6D: Individual Responses of the Subjects: Experiment V 
Subject #  Age Target (1) (T) Target (2) (F) Target (3) (T) Target (4) (F) 
Subject 1 3;11 R W R W 
Subject 2 4;1 *W W *W W 
Subject 3 4;1 *W W R W 
Subject 4 4;2 R W *W W 
Subject 5 4;5 R *R R *R 
Subject 6 4;6 R W R W 
Subject 7 4;6 R W R W 
Subject 8 4;8 R W R W 
Subject 9 4;10 R W R W 
Subject 10 4;10 R W R W 
Subject 11 4;11 R W R W 
Subject 12 4;11 R W R W 
Subject 13 5;2 R W R W 
Subject 14 5;2 R W R W 
Subject 15 5;3 R W R W 
Subject 16 5;3 R W R W 
Subject 17 5;5 R W R W 
Subject 18 5;9 R W R W 
Subject 19 5;10 *W W *W W 
Subject 20 5;11 R W R W 
Subject 21 6;3 R W R W 
Subject 22 6;3 R W R W 
 
(T) = “True” Condition 
(F) = “False” Condition 
R = “Right” responses (Judged as “True”) 
W = “Wrong” responses (Judged as “False”) 









Given that children were found to be aware of the truth conditions of the entailing and 
entailed sentences containing every and nobody, in which the entailment regarding 
every is reversed due to the interaction with nobody, this chapter will be devoted to 
reporting Experiment VI, investigating whether children are able to compute the 
inferences created between entailing and entailed sentences with every and nobody.  
Recall that we have discussed the following findings thus far: (i) children 
know the asymmetric entailments that the first and second arguments of every yield in 
the composition of the truth conditional meanings for the individual entailing and 
entailed every-sentences (Experiment I); (ii) children know the asymmetric 
entailments that the first and second arguments of every yield in the comparison of 
the inferential relations between the entailing and entailed every-sentences 
(Experiments II and III); (iii) children know the fact that the pattern of the DE that 
every-QP creates is reversed by the interaction with nobody that c-commands every-
QP in the composition of the truth conditional meanings for the individual entailing 
and entailed sentences containing every and nobody (Experiments IV and V). Given 
these findings that we have drawn thus far, we will provide the hypothesis as in (138) 




(138) Hypothesis: Experiment VI 
Children would be able to evaluate the validity of inferences that are created 
between the entailing and entailed sentences that contain every and negation, 
on the basis of the logical consequence (i.e., the reverse of DE in every-QP 
under the c-commanding negation) that determines the pattern of inferences. 
 
 In order to examine this hypothesis, we have developed a negative version of 
“Demand-Fulfillment” Task, adopting the same basic logic as for Experiment III 
(“Demand-fulfillment” in positive context), discussed in Chapter 4. In designing the 
negative version of this task, the additional attention was paid in order to create a 
felicitous context in which a “negative demand” can be naturally uttered, in order to 





We once again rely on the logical foundation of the Demand-Fulfillment task 
discussed in Chapter 4 in designing Experiment VI: the “demand-fulfillment” context 
is capable of reflecting the direction of inferences by virtue of whether the demand 
can be logically satisfied by the fulfillment. Let us start with reviewing the logic that 
underlies the demand-fulfillment contexts which represents the inferential relation 
between the two premises.  
 186 
Repeated below is the summary of the basic logic behind the “Demand-
Fulfillment” Task. 
 
Figure 25 Relation among Sentences in Inference and Demand-Satisfaction 
(= Figure 8) 
 
  Demanded       Fulfillment   Inference Demand 
  Outcome (D)       Outcome (F)  (D)  (F) Satisfaction 
  John brings a pen      John brings a red pen Invalid  Satisfactory 
  John brings a red pen     John brings a pen  Valid  Unsatisfactory 
 
 
In Experiment VI, the negative versions of the outcomes illustrated above were 
prepared. On a par with Figure 25, the demand-fulfillment paradigm in the negative 
version is schematized in Figure 26 below. 
 
Figure 26 Relation among Negative Sentences in Inference and Demand- 
Satisfaction  
 
  Demanded                 Fulfillment      Inference    Demand 
  Outcome (D)                 Outcome (F)                  (D)  (F)   Satisfaction 
  John doesn’t bring any pen         John doesn’t bring any red pen    Valid          Unsatisfactory 
  John doesn’t bring any red pen   John doesn’t bring any pen    Invalid        Satisfactory 
 
 
As Figure 26 show, demand-fulfillment can serve as an indicator of direction of 
inference; next, we review the design of Experiment VI, including specific aspects of 
the contexts which served to make specifically ‘negative’ demands felicitous.   
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7.2. Experimental Design–“Demand-Fulfillment” Task, Negative Version 
 
We aim to investigate the above hypothesis in designing the experiment featuring the 
“Demand-Fulfillment” Task in Negative Version, which will be discussed in detail in 
what follows. 
 
7.2.1. Basic Plot 
First, let us review the basic plot or story line in which each demand-fulfillment will 
take place. The basic structure of the plot will be virtually identical to that of the 
“Demand-Fulfillment” task in Experiment III. In the present plot, Ursula, the queen 
of the ocean who has the magic power, served as the demander. Ursula put spells on 
various characters (the process of putting a spell on each character was presented in 
animated images in Microsoft PowerPoint format on the monitor of a laptop 
computer, which was called Ursula’s ‘magic screen’ in the story). Grover serves as 
the main fulfiller; Big Bird and Cookie Monster occasionally join (depending on the 
type of item, which we will discuss below) or replace him (simply for the purpose of 
entertaining children). Ursula demanded that Grover bring her something, but, 
crucially, not to bring certain other objects. Grover served as the fulfiller of her 
demand, who is slightly forgetful and always doing something that is very close, but 
not exactly, what the demander requested.  
Grover leaves for a while to find the things Ursula wants. The object(s) that 
Ursula referred to in the negative demand, and the one(s) that Grover avoids bringing 
in the fulfilling outcome are related, forming set-subset relations; for example, Ursula 
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demands Grover not to bring a car, and Grover does not bring a red car (bringing 
something else), Ursula demands Grover not to bring a blue train, and Grover does 
not bring a train (bringing something else), and so on.  
Just as in Experiment III (demand-fulfillment in positive context), what 
Grover brought was carried in the closed bag, and what Grover did not bring was also 
kept out of the visual scene (this was done by having Grover search for objects 
outside of the participant’s sight, as we will see below). What the child could see was 
only a depiction of the entire set of potential objects which Grover would work on in 
responding Ursula’s demand, shown up on the laptop (i.e., “Ursula’s magic screen”). 
Grover, when he comes back from the search, tells the child what he did not 
bring to Ursula, attempting to follow her rule, without showing what is in his bag, and 
asks the child whether what he did met Ursula’s rule about what he was forbidden to 
bring. After the child answered Grover’s question, he/she was asked to open the bag 
and to show what is inside to Ursula. If it turned out that Grover could satisfy 
Ursula’s demand, not bringing the objects she did not like, the spell was removed and 
the character was set free on the screen. If it turned out that Grover failed to satisfy 
Ursula’s demand, bringing something that violated her prohibition, the child was 
asked to help Grover correct his mistake. In the end, the character was freed as well. 






(139) Basic Plot (Negative Version) – Simplified Outline 
a.  Ursula puts a spell on a character. (The transformation of the character 
is shown in the animation on the display of the laptop computer 
“Ursula’s magic screen”.) 
b.  Ursula presents the demand < the negative demand presented >  
“If you want me to free this character, you should bring me more than 
one thing, but remember one condition; don’t bring me X.” 
c.  Grover leaves for a while and comes back with a bag. 
d.  Grover tells the child what is inside the bag, and what was left, without 
showing it < the fulfilling outcome presented >  
“I brought her some things, but I didn’t bring her X’ (using a set- or 
subset- denoting phrase (e.g., a red ball, every ball, etc.).” 
e.  After the child answers, Grover lets the child open the bag and see 
what is inside. 
f.  If Grover satisfies Ursula, then the spell was resolved. 
g.  If Grover failed to satisfy Ursula, then the child was asked to correct 
Grover’s mistake, helping the character being freed.  
 
7.2.2. Experimental Conditions and Stimuli 
As in Experiment III, two experimental conditions were generated: “Satisfactory” 
Condition, in which the demand is logically satisfied by the fulfilling outcome (e.g., 
the request don’t bring me a red pen is logically satisfied by the fulfillment I didn’t 
bring you a pen), and thus the demand does not logically imply the fulfillment (e.g., 
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there are no red pens, *therefore there are no pens); “Unsatisfactory” Condition, in 
which the demand is not logically satisfied by the fulfilling outcome (e.g., the request 
don’t bring me a pen is not logically satisfied by the fulfillment I didn’t bring you a 
red pen), and thus the demand does logically imply the fulfillment (e.g., there is no 
pens, therefore there is no red pens). 
 We prepared the three types of stimuli (i.e., the propositions about “bringing”) 
to be used both in “Satisfactory” Condition and “Unsatisfactory” Condition. The 
stimuli can be categorized into the following three types: Negative Control Item 
served as a control item presenting simple negative sentences without every; “Simple 
Negation” items served as a test case in which the simple negative sentences 
including every-QP in the object position; “None-Every” items served as another test 
case, in which the sentence include none in the subject position and every-QP in the 
object position, respectively. All the stimuli were listed below. 
 
(140)  “Satisfactory” Condition 
a.  Negative Control Item 
i)   Demand: “Don’t bring me any red ring.” 
ii)   Response: “I didn’t bring you any ring. 
b.  “Simple Negation” Item 
i)   Demand: “Don’t bring me every apple.” 






c.  “None-Every” Item 
i)   Demand: “None of you should bring me every candy.” 
ii)   Response: “None of us brought you every red candy.” 
(141) “Unsatisfactory” Condition 
a.  Negative Control Item 
i)   Demand: “Don’t bring me any robot.” 
ii)   Response: “I didn’t bring you any red robot.” 
b.  “Simple Negation” Item 
i)   Demand: “Don’t bring me every gold coin.” 
ii)   Response: “I didn’t bring you every coin.” 
c.  “None-Every” Item 
i)   Demand: “None of you should bring me every red crab.” 
ii)   Response: “None of us brought you every crab.” 
 
7.2.3. Notes on Felicity in Presenting Negative Demands 
A crucial methodological issue in presenting negative demands in the experiment is 
how to create a context in which the negative demand is presented as part of a 
felicitous exchange. We determined that a major prerequisite for a negative demand 
to be felicitous in context would be that it is presented as a condition to be met in 
order to satisfactorily complete an affirmative demand. In our case, this can be 
achieved by introducing the negative demand as a condition to be met in order to 
successfully compete an affirmative request to bring objects: thus Ursula’s whole 
request would not simply be “don’t bring X”; rather, the request is for bringing of 
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objects selectively among a set, such as “You should bring me X, but don’t bring me 
Y”. Therefore, care was taken for the negative demands to be presented as a condition 
or further specification of an affirmative request.  
In order for these demands to be plausible in the story context, information 
should be explicitly provided as to what the demander wants and doesn’t want— and 
crucially, why. That is, a suitable context further requires that the demander should 
selectively requests some of the objects among a set, but selectively leave the others 
out of the request, for some plausible reason. In doing so, the set of objects among 
which the demander selectively requests ought to be presented in the lead-in and 
demander’s speech in such a way that it becomes obvious what she wants/needs/likes 
among the objects, and what she doesn’t.  
Keeping this information in mind, let us observe each item prepared for this 
experiment one by one as to how the felicity described above was controlled.42 
 
(142) “Simple Negation” Item 
a. Demand: “You should bring me apples from the garden, but  
remember; don’t bring me every apple.” 
b.  Ursula’s reason: she has a small box for each apple to be held, but the 
number of the boxes that can really hold apples is smaller than all the 
apples she has (she accidentally crushed one box that she brought for 
this purpose). 
 
                                                
42 Here we examine how felicity conditions were met for the conditions involving every-
sentences. For how felicity was controlled in presenting Negative Control Items, see the 
sample trials shown in (146) and (147) below. 
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(143) “Simple Negation” Item 
a.  Demand: “You should bring me coins from the chest, but  
remember; don’t bring me every gold coin.” 
b.  Ursula’s reason: she has some gold coin boxes and silver coin boxes 
for each coin to be held individually, and she wants to put the coins 
that will be brought back in boxes of matching color (each gold coin-
its own gold box, each silver coin-its own silver box). But the number 
of the gold boxes is smaller than the number of all the gold coin she 
has (she accidentally crushed one gold box that she brought for this 
purpose). 
(144)  “None-Every” Item 
a.  Demand: “You should bring me candies from your kitchen, but  
remember; none of you should bring me every candy.” 
b.  Ursula’s reason: she has three bags, and she wants to put the candies 
which each character brings each in a separate bag. But the bags are so 
small that she suddenly realized that they couldn’t hold all the candies. 
(145) “None-Every” Item 
a.  Demand: “You should bring me crabs from your tank, but  
remember; none of you should bring me every red 
crab.” 
b.  Ursula’s reason: she has a blue cage and a red cage, and she wants to 
put the crabs (there are red crabs and blue crabs) that each of the 
character brings into the matching-color cage (blue crabs-blue cage, 
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red crabs-red cage). But she suddenly realizes that the red cage is 
much smaller than the blue cage and that it cannot hold all the red 
crabs that could potentially be brought. 
 
7.2.4. Evaluation of the Stimuli 
The child was asked to evaluate the demand-fulfillment in the same way as the 
“Demand-Fulfillment” Task in Experiment III. That is, there were two points at 
which children were asked to make a decision about whether Grover did a 
satisfactory job or not. The first was the Before-Open-the-Box-Evaluation, i.e., the 
evaluation at the point that Grover asked the child whether he did something good 
enough without showing the inside of his box (i.e., at the point of (139d) in the trial 
structure above). Recall that this requires the child consider whether what Grover said 
logically satisfies what Ursula demanded solely based on the linguistically-presented 
description of the fulfillment (i.e., Grover’s sentence about what he did), rather than 
relating the propositions to the situation visually presented in front of them, as in the 
experiment using the Truth Value Judgment task. In the “Satisfactory” Condition, the 
expected response was providing the affirmative answer to Grover’s question, such as 
“Yes”; we call it “Yes” Responses, just as in Experiment III. In the “Unsatisfactory” 
Condition, the expected response was providing the negative answer such as “No, or 
uncertain answer, such as “I need to check inside the box”; we call it Non-“Yes” 
responses, as in Experiment III. 
 After the primary evaluation, children were given a second phase to confirm 
their evaluation, which was referred to as the After-Open-the-Box-Evaluation. Recall 
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that children were asked to open Grover’s bag, and check insider to see whether 
Grover brought something that satisfies Ursula (i.e., at the point of (139e) in the trial 
structure above).  
 
7.2.5. Sample Trials 
The following is the sample script in “Satisfactory” Condition. 
 
(146) Sample Trial: “Satisfactory” Condition (Negative Control Item) 
Ursula: Look. Here we have Winnie the Pooh (The monitor shows an 
image of Winnie the Pooh). I will put a spell on him and turn 
her into a little monster! Hahaha! (Winnie the Pooh turned into 
a monster on the monitor) 
Grover: Wow! It’s a cool magic, but, poor Pooh, I’m sure he wants to 
come back. Why don’t you free him? 
Ursula: You want me to free him? Ok, then, you have to do something 
for me.  
Grover: Ok, I’m listening. 
Ursula: I have my magic chest behind this magic curtain. Inside of it, I 
have lots of accessories; I have many rings and combs in many 
colors such as red, blue and yellow, as my magic screen shows 
you (All the rings and combs are presented in the monitor). 
You have to go behind the curtain and bring me something 
from the chest. You can bring as many things as you want, but, 
look (showed the red rings) I have already gotten enough red 
rings with me, and I don’t need any more red rings.43 So 
remember: don’t bring me any red ring. If you forget this, I 
won’t free Pooh. 
Grover: Ok, I will put it in my bag carefully and will be back right 
away. I know that sometimes I’m forgetful and careless, so I 
should be careful not to forget… let me make sure; I will not 
bring you … (prompts the child). 
                                                
43 This part serves as Ursula’s reason for not wanting any more red rings. 
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Child: (Expected to help Grover repeat the demand)44 You should not 
bring her any red ring! 
Grover: Right! Thank you for the reminder. Ok let me go and work. 
(Leaves behind the curtain) 
 Ursula: (Speak to the child while Grover is away) What do you think, 
(the child)? Can Grover satisfy me to free Pooh? Remember 
what I said? I don’t want to have any more red rings, so I really 
hope that Cookie Monster is doing something good enough for 
me. Can you make sure if he is going to do something good 
enough for me when he is back, OK? 
Grover: (Came back with his carrying bag) Mmm, it was so hard that I 
forgot what Ursula said! But I did my best as much as I could 
remember, and I want to make sure with you (the child) before 
meeting Ursula again. In this bag, I brought her something. I 
can’t remember exactly what, but I remember that I didn’t 
bring her any ring. Do you remember what she said? Is it good 
enough to save Pooh? 
Child:  (Expected to say) Yes. (=Before-Open-the-Box-Evaluation) 
Grover: Great. Now can you (=the child) open my bag and show it to 
Ursula? (Show what he brought in the bag) 
 Child:  (Open the bag. There are only combs in the bag.) 
 Grover: Did I do what Ursula wants? 
 Child:  (Expected to say) Yes. (=After-Open-the-Box-Evaluation) 
Ursula: Let me see. Good. As I promised you, I will free Pooh now. 
 
Now, the following is the sample script for the “Unsatisfactory” Condition. 
 
(147) Sample Trial: “Unsatisfactory” Condition (Negative Control Item) 
Ursula: Look, we have Ariel here (the monitor shows an image of 
Ariel), and I will put a spell on her! Now she is a little monster 
(Ariel became a monster on the monitor)! 
Big Bird: Wow, you did it again. It’s cool, but Ariel may want to come 
back. You should free Ariel. 
Ursula: You want me to free her? Ok, you have to do something for 
me. 
                                                
44 Letting the child repeat Ursula’s “condition (i.e., what Grover is prohibited to bring)” 
serves as a reminder, as well as reinforcing Grover’s being forgetful. 
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Big Bird: Ok, I’m ready to listen. 
Ursula: I have a box of magic toys behind this magic curtain, and I 
have so many magic toys in there; I have many robots and 
teddy bears in many colors such as red, blue and yellow, as you 
can see on my magic screen (all the items presented on the 
monitor). You have to go behind the curtain, and bring me 
anything from there, but look, (show many of red, blue and 
yellow robots) I have already had enough robots with me, and I 
don’t need any more robots.45 So remember: don’t bring me 
any robot! If you forget this, I will never free Ariel. 
Big Bird: Ok, I won’t forget this, well, I will not bring you … (prompts 
the child) 
Child: (Expected to help Big Bird repeat the demand) You should not 
bring her any robot. 
Big Bird: Right! Ok, thank you for your reminder. Let me go and work. 
(Big Bird leaves behind the curtain and disappears.) 
 Ursula: (Speak to the child while Brig Bird is away) What do you 
think, (the child)? Can Big Bird satisfy me to free Ariel? I 
don’t want to have any more robot, so I really hope that Big 
Bird can do something good enough for me. Can you make 
sure if he is going to do something good enough for me when 
he is back, OK? 
Big Bird: (Came back with his carrying bag) Oops, that was so hard that 
I might have forgotten exactly what Ursula said! But I did my 
best as much as I could remember, so let me make sure with 
you; I brought her something in my bag, but I didn’t bring her 
any red robot. Do you remember what she said? Is it good 
enough to free Ariel? 
Child: (Expected to provide Non-“Yes” Response) We have to make 
sure that you didn’t bring any robot, not only red robots… 
(=Before-Open-the-Box-Evaluation) 
Big Bird: Well, why don’t you open the bag?  
Child: (Open the bag. There are a few blue and yellow robots as well 
as teddy bears.) 
Big Bird: Do you think the queen would be happy with this? 
Child: No, because you brought these robots! (=After-Open-the-Box-
Evaluation) 
Ursula: I don’t want see robots, return them! Then I will free Ariel. 
                                                
45 This part serves as Ursula’s reason for not wanting any more robots. 
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Child:  (Asked to help Big Bird, and return the robots) 
Ursula: Great. Now I got what I wanted, so I will free Ariel. 
 
 To sum up, the following table schematically represents the conditions and 
stimuli. 
 
Table 15 The Schema of “Demand-Fulfillment” Task-Negative Version 
Types 
of Items 
Demand (D) Fulfillment in 
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Recall again that we have ensured in Experiments IV and V that children are sensitive 
to the reversed entailment that was reflected in the pattern of opposing truth 
conditions assigned to the entailing and the entailed sentences that contain nobody 
and every. Thus our hypothesis addressed in (138) would predict that children would 
be able to compute the reversed pattern of inferences created between two 
propositions containing negation and every. If this prediction were be borne out, then 
it would further support the argument that children are able to compute set-to-subset 
and subset-to-set inferences appropriately with respect to the properties on the 
elements in the propositions and their interaction in the linguistic environment.  
 
Subjects 
Fifteen English-speaking children aged from 4;4 and 6;0, whose mean age was 5;1, 
participated in this experiment. These subjects were the children enrolled for the 
Center for Young Children at the University of Maryland, College Park, and the ones 
enrolled for the Greenwood Nursery School, Hyattsville, Maryland; all participants 
had their parental permission to participate in the study. The children were tested one 







The percentages of the “Yes” Responses were calculated in each condition, token by 
token.  
 
Results: “Satisfactory” Condition 
In the “Satisfactory” Condition, in which the “Yes” Responses were expected, 
children showed the following percentages. In evaluating the demand-fulfillment 
presented in Negative Control items, in which the inference from the demand to the 
fulfillment is licensed in the set-to-subset pattern (i.e., the genuine DE pattern due to 
negation), the percentage of the “Yes” Responses was 87% (13/15). In evaluating the 
demand-fulfillment presented in “Simple Negation” items, in which the relevant 
inference is licenses in the subset-to-set pattern (i.e., the reversed DE pattern in the 
first argument of every due to the influence from negation), the percentage of the 
“Yes” Responses was 93% (14/15). In evaluating the demand-fulfillment presented in 
the “None-Every” items, in which the relevant inference is licensed in the subset-to-
set pattern (i.e., the reversed DE pattern in the first argument of every due to the 
influence from none), the percentage of the “Yes” Responses was 93% (14/15).   
 
Results: “Unsatisfactory” Condition 
In the “Unsatisfactory” Condition, in which the “Yes” Responses were not expected, 
children’s ratio of showing the “Yes”-Responses was significantly lower. In 
evaluating the demand-fulfillment presented in Negative Control items, in which the 
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inference from the demand to the fulfillment is licensed in the set-to-subset pattern 
(i.e., the genuine DE pattern due to negation), the percentage of the “Yes” Responses 
was 7% (1/15). In evaluating the demand-fulfillment presented in “Simple Negation” 
items, in which the relevant inference is licenses in the subset-to-set pattern (i.e., the 
reversed DE pattern in the first argument of every due to the influence from 
negation), the percentage of the “Yes” Responses was 7% (1/15). In evaluating the 
demand-fulfillment presented in the “None-Every” items, in which the relevant 
inference is licensed in the subset-to-set pattern (i.e., the reversed DE pattern in the 
first argument of every due to the influence from none), the percentage of the “Yes” 
Responses was 20% (3/15). These results were illustrated below. 
 
Table 16 Percentages of the “Yes” Responses 
Condition Validity of 
Inference  
(D)  (F) 
Types of Item Pattern of Inference  
(D)  (F) 
% of “Yes” 
Responses 
Negative Control Subset-to-set  
(Invalid genuine DE) 
87% (13/15) 
“Simple Negation” Set-to-subset  
(Invalid reversed DE) 
93% (14/15) 
“Satisfactory” Invalid 
“None-Every” Set-to-subset  
(Invalid reversed DE) 
93% (14/15) 
Negative Control Set-to-subset  
(Valid genuine DE) 
7% (1/15) 
“Simple Negation” Subset-to-set  




“None-Every” Subset-to-set  










 A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test was conducted to examine whether the rates of 
“Yes” Responses observed in the “Satisfactory” Condition were significantly higher 
than those observed in the “Unsatisfactory” Condition. Once again, the children’s 
correct responses were calculated in the following way; a “Yes” Response was scored 
as 1, and a “Non”-Yes Response was scored as 0. The total scores in each condition 
were compared in terms of whether the total scores for the “Satisfactory” Condition 
were significantly higher than those for the “Unsatisfactory” Condition, with respect 
to each type of item. According to the test, the total scores for the “Satisfactory” 
Condition were significantly higher than those for the “Unsatisfactory” Condition 
with respect to each type of item: z = -3.464, p < 0.01 for the Negative Control items; 
 203 
z = -3.606, p < 0.001 for the “Simple Negation” items; z = -3.317, p < 0.01 for the 
“None-Every” item.  
 A t-test was also conducted across-conditionally. There was a significant 
difference in the percentages of “Yes” Responses between the “Satisfactory” 
Condition and the “Unsatisfactory” Condition with respect to each type of item: t(14) 
= 7.438, p < 0.001 for the Negative Control items; t(14) = 9.539, p < 0.001 for the 




According to the results, our prediction on the basis of the findings from Experiment 
IV and V were borne out; children’s responses were consistent with adults’ inference 
patterns created between the negative propositions. 
 
7.5.1. Evaluations at the Two Phases: Before- and After-Open-the-Box 
Note that the children’s responses at the two evaluation phases in each experimental 
condition were interpreted in the same way as Experiment III. What counted as “Yes” 
Responses, which is expected in the “Satisfactory” Condition, and what counted as 
the Non-“Yes” Responses, which is expected in the “Unsatisfactory” Condition, were 
determined based on the following standards summarized in (99) and (100), which 
are repeated in (148) and (149) respectively. 
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(148)  “Yes” Responses, expected in “Satisfactory” Condition 
To answer “Yes” to Grover’s question at the Before-Open-the-Box-
Evaluation, AND To confirm the answer at the After-Open-the-Box-
Evaluation, with checking what is inside the box. 
(149)  Non-“Yes” Responses, expected in “Unsatisfactory” Condition 
a.  To provide a negative or uncertain answer to Grover’s question at the 
Before-Open-the-Box-Evaluation (e.g., “No, you didn’t do something 
good enough”, or “I don’t know until I see what’s inside your box.”), 
OR 
b.   To provide a non-negative answer to Grover’s question at the Before-
Open-the-Box-Evaluation (e.g., “Yes” or “I think so”), but rejecting it 
at the After-Open-the-Box-Evaluation (e.g., “No, this is not what the 
genie wanted”) 
 
Keeping them in mind, let us now discuss the detailed percentages of the responses 
both at the Before- and the After-Open-the-Box-Evaluations observed in each 
condition. 
 As for the legitimate “Yes” Responses observed in this experiment, all of 
them met the standard in (148). As for the legitimate Non-“Yes” Responses, the 
following table and chart illustrate the percentages both at the Before- and the After-
Open-the-Box-Evaluations observed in the “Unsatisfactory” Condition, where the 
Non-“Yes” Responses were interpreted as “correct”. 
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Table 17 Percentages of Non-“Yes” Responses at the Before- and the After- 
Open-the-Box-Evaluations in “Unsatisfactory” Condition 
 Before-Box After-Box 
Negative Control 29% (4/14) 71% (10/14) 
“Simple Negation” 14% (2/14) 86% (12/14) 
“None-Every” 25% (3/12) 75% (9/12) 
 
 
Figure 28 Percentages of Non-“Yes” Responses at the Before- and the After- 
Open-the-Box-Evaluations in “Unsatisfactory” Condition 
 
 
As can be seen above, the Non-“Yes” Responses that were correctly made in the 
“Unsatisfactory” Condition were mostly made at the After-Open-the-Box-Evaluation 
phase regardless of the type of the item.  
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 Remember the contrast we have observed in Experiment III; all the Non-
“Yes” Responses that were correctly made in the “Unsatisfactory” Condition were 
made at the Before-Open-the-Box-Evaluation phase when children evaluate the 
“First-Argument” items whose relevant inferences pattern in a DE fashion, whereas 
children relied on After-Open-the-Box-Evaluation phase in order to provide the Non-
“Yes” Responses in the “Unsatisfactory” Condition when they evaluate the Control 
items and the “Second-Argument” items whose relevant inferences pattern in a non-
DE (default) fashion. As the chart illustrates above, such contrast disappeared in 
children’s response patterns in Experiment VI.46  
 Also recall that in Experiment III, there were two types of “Yes” Responses 
observed in “Unsatisfactory” Condition (i.e., the incorrect responses), i.e., responses 
by saying “Yes” and the ones by saying “I think so”, at the Before-Open-the-Box-
Evaluation phase. We have concluded that this variation might have shown children’s 
sensitivity to the unsatisfactory of the demand-fulfillment based on the deductive 
logic (i.e., the validity of the inference created from the demand to the fulfillment), 
even though children failed to explicitly reject it before visually checking the 
fulfilling outcome. Such variation in the “Yes” Responses in the “Unsatisfactory” 
                                                
46 Recall that we have pointed out a problem that remains open, i.e., why children could show 
the Non-“Yes” Responses robustly at the Before-Open-the-Box-Evaluation phase in 
evaluating the demand-fulfillment represented in the “First-Argument” items in Experiment 
III (see the footnote 31). Note that the “Simple Negation” items utilized in Experiment VI 
were the negative variations of the “First-Argument” items in Experiment III (“Don’t bring 
me every X”–“I didn’t bring you every X’” vs. “Bring me every X’”–“I brought you every 
X”). As we have briefly mentioned in the foot note 31, the fact that there was no robust 
Before-Open-the-Box rejections for the demand-fulfillments represented in the “Simple 
Negation” items implies that it is not the number of the denotation that triggered the robust 
Before-Open-the-Box rejection for the “First-Argument” demand-fulfillments. Thus, what the 
source of children’s robust Before-Open-the-Box rejection observed in Experiment III for the 
“First-Argument” demand-fulfillments would be still remains an open question. 
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Condition has not been robustly observed in Experiment VI. Virtually all the children 
said “Yes” before opening the box, and rejected the outcome after opening the box 
(i.e., the legitimate Non-“Yes” Responses that met in the second standard repeated in 
(149b) above). 
 Taken together, children have shown some difficulty in evaluating the 
negative demand-fulfillments, compared to the evaluation of the simple affirmative 
demand-fulfillments, to the extent that their detailed responses were less adult-like. 
  
7.5.2. Additional Discovery 
Experiment VI has revealed an additional interesting discovery. In the pilot versions 
of this experiment, the test items were presented in the following order in the trial: (i) 
Negative Control Item; (ii) “Simple Negation” Item; (iii) “None-Every” Item. 
Interestingly, a number of children were biased by the initial presentation of Negative 
Control Item; they wrongly treat the “Simple Negation” Item (i.e., “Don’t bring me 
every apple”) as if it were the same as Negative Control Item (i.e., “Don’t bring me 
any apple”). Not only did they treat “Simple Negation” items oppositely in the 
evaluation, i.e., they showed the reversed pattern of demand-fulfillment evaluation, 
but also they substituted any for every when they were told to repeat Ursula’s demand 
in the trial. Such an order effect has completely disappeared when we have scrambled 
the order of the presentation of the items in the later version. At this point, we have 
no explanation about what this order effect tells us about children’s responses; this 
issue should be pursued in the future research. 
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 Experiment VI thus revealed children’s adult-like computation of the logical 
inferences that pattern as a consequence of the reversed entailment due to the 
interaction between the negation and every. In Chapter 8, we consider the findings 
from all the experiments we have reported so far, and discuss the possible answers to 
the research questions and the implications to the future researches. 
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Appendix 7A: Full Script of “Demand Fulfillment” Task, Negative Version 
 
General Lead-in 
Ursula, the queen of the ocean, has the powerful magic power. She can do 
whatever she wants to do. She is sometimes a good queen, and she uses 
her magic power in a good way. But other times she is evil, and she uses 
her magic power in a mean way. Today, Grover, Big Bird and Cookie 
Monster visit her palace. Let’s see what happens next. How does the 
queen treat these three guests? Let’s see what is going to happen in the 
stories together. In the middle of the stories, you (the child) will need to 
help these people. They really need your help. Could you do that? 
 
Trial 1: “Simple Negation” Item–“Satisfactory” Condition 
 
 Demand: Don’t bring me every apple. 
 Fulfillment: I didn’t bring you every red apple. 
 (“Invalid” inference from Demand to Fulfillment) 
 
Ursula: Welcome to my palace! You want to see my welcome 
treatment? Look at my magic screen. Here we have Pikachu 
(The monitor shows an image of Pikachu). I will put a spell on 
him and turn her into a little monster (Pikachu becomes a 
monster on the monitor)! Hahaha! 
 
Grover: Wow! It’s a cool magic, but, poor Pikachu. It may not be a 
good thing to do, Ursula. You should free Pikachu. 
 
Ursula: Oh well, Grover, you seem to want to free Pikachu. Then, you 
need to do something for me. In my magical garden behind the 
curtain, there are many apples ready to be picked up, three red 
apples and three blue apples, as you can peek through my 
magic screen (The monitor shows the entire set of apples, three 
red apples and three blue apples). I need them back to my 
palace… 
 
Grover: Got it! You want me to bring some apples back to this palace 
from the garden! Am I right? 
 
Ursula: Right, you should bring me more than one apple from there. I 
will then put each apple you bring in a box (Shows pictures of 
five boxes and one crashed box), but, look, I crushed one of the 
boxes yesterday; look (points to the crushed box), this one 
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cannot hold anything. So listen very carefully: don’t bring me 
every apple. If you forget this, I will never free Pikachu! 
 
Grover: Ok, I won’t forget. Let me make sure with you, (the child). I 
should bring Ursula some apples, but I shouldn’t bring … what 
did she say (asked the child)? 
 
 Child:  (Asked to help Grover repeat Ursula’s demand)  
 
Grover: That’s right! Thank you, (the child). I should be careful not to 
forget. Ok, let me go behind the curtain and work. See you 
soon! 
   
(Grover leaves behind the curtain.) 
 
Ursula: (Speak to the child while Grover is away) What do you think, 
(the child)? Can Grover satisfy me and free Pikachu? I don’t 
want to have every apple, because, remember, I broke one of 
the boxes. So I really hope that he is doing something good 
enough for me. Can you make sure if he does something good 
enough for me when he is back, OK? 
 
Grover: (Comes back with a bag) There are so many apples there! I 
started filling this bag, but I don’t know which ones I picked! 
But I did my best as much as I could remember… Can you 
help me to check if I did something good, (the child)? Here is 
what I remember I did; I brought her apples, but I didn’t bring 
her every red apple. I cared about the color. Do you 
remember what the queen said? Does the color matter? Is it 
good enough to free Pikachu? 
 
Child:  (Expected to say) Yes. (=Before-Open-the-Box-Evaluation) 
 
Grover: Good. (To the child) Can you open the bag and show inside? 
 
Child: (Opens the bag. There are a couple of blue apples and a red 
apple.) 
 
Ursula: Good. As I promised you, I will free Pikachu now! 
 
 
Trial 2: “Simple Negation” Item–“Unsatisfactory” Condition 
 
 Demand: Don’t bring me every gold coin. 
 Fulfillment: I didn’t bring you every coin. 
 (“Valid” inference from Demand to Fulfillment) 
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Ursula: My magic trick goes on, and now I put a spell on Hamutaro! 
Look, he is a little monster and nobody can see that this little 
monster is in fact lovely Hamutaro (The monitor shows that 
Hamutaro becomes a monster)! Hahaha! 
 
Big Bird: That’s not fair. Hamutaro did not do anything to you, Ursula. 
Why don’t you free him? 
 
Ursula: You seem so eager to free Hamutaro, Big Bird. Ok, I will give 
you a chance. Big Bird, it’s your turn. In my magic cave 
behind the curtain, there are beautiful coins hidden everywhere, 
three gold coins and three silver coins, as you can peek through 
my magic screen (The monitor shows the set of three gold 
coins and three silver coins). I need them back to my palace … 
 
Big Bird: I got it! So you want me to bring you some coins from there! 
Am I right? 
 
Ursula: Right, you should bring me more than one coin from there. I 
will put each of the coins you bring in the color matching coin 
chest (Shows three gold boxes and three silver boxes; one of 
the gold boxes is crushed), but, look, one of the gold chests is 
pinched and it does not work anymore. So listen very carefully: 
don’t bring me every gold coin. If you forget this, I will never 
free Hamutaro! 
 
Big Bird: Ok, I won’t forget. Let me make sure with you, (the child). I 
should bring Ursula coins, but I shouldn’t bring … what did 
she say (asked the child)? 
 
 Child:  (Asked to help Big Bird repeat the demand) 
 
Big Bird: That’s right! Thank you, (the child). I should be careful not to 
forget. Ok, let me go behind the curtain and work. See you 
soon! 
   
(Big Bird leaves behind the curtain.) 
 
Ursula: (Speak to the child while BB is away) What do you think, (the 
child)? Can Big Bird satisfy me to free Hamutaro? I don’t want 
to have every gold coins carried here at once, because one of 
the gold envelops is torn, and so I really hope that he is doing 
something good enough for me. Can you make sure if he is 




Big Bird: (Comes back with a bag) There are so many things there! I 
started filling this bag, but I don’t know which ones I picked! 
But I did my best as much as I could remember. (the child), can 
you check with me whether I did something good? Here is 
what I remember I did; I brought her coins, but I didn’t bring 
her every coin. I didn’t care so much about the color. Do you 
remember what the queen said? Is it good enough to save 
Hamutaro? 
 
Child: (Expected to say) We have to check which color of coins you 
did (not) bring. (=Before-Open-the-Box-Evaluation) 
 
Big Bird: Ok, can you (=the child) open the bag and check what’s inside? 
 
Child: (Opens the bags and sees the inside. There are three gold coins 
and a silver coin.) You brought all the gold coins! 
 
Ursula: You brought them all!? Too bad. (the child), you can help Big 
Bird return them very carefully, then I will free Hamutaro. 
 
 
Trial 3: “None-Every” Item–“Satisfactory” Condition 
 
 Demand: None of you should bring me every candy. 
 Fulfillment: None of us brought you every red candy. 
 (“Invalid” inference from Demand to Fulfillment) 
 
Ursula: Do you think I’m satisfied? Not yet, not yet. Now, I put a spell 
on Tigger, and look, he turned into a monster, too (The monitor 
shows Tigger, and then a monster). Funny! 
 
Grover: Wow, you did it again! 
 
Big Bird: Poor Tigger. 
 
Cookie M.: You should free Tigger. 
 
Ursula: Sounds like you are ready to do something for me… Ok, now 
each of you should do something for me again. 
 
Three:  What do you want us to do? 
 
Ursula: Now, I’ll change the scene! (The magic curtain disappears, 
and the three curtains show up) Here, I have three magic 
kitchens behind those curtains. In each of my magic kitchens, 
there are magic candies, three red candies and three blue 
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candies, as you can see through my magic screen (The monitor 
shows three red candies and three blue candies in the three 
domains each). You each have to go to one of my kitchens, and 
bring me more than one candy from there. (Shows a small bag) 
I will then put the candies you bring in a bag and carry them 
together, but I realized that my bag is a little bit small to fit 
many. So, don’t forget the following; none of you should 
bring me every candy (from your kitchen). If you forget this, 
I won’t free Tigger. 
 
Three: Ok, each of us will bring you something from your kitchen, 
and we’ll make sure that none of us brings you … what did 
Ursula say, (the child)? 
 
Child: (Asked to help three characters repeat Ursula’s demand) 
 
  Three:  That’s right! Thank you. We should not forget this.   
 
(Three leaves behind each of the three curtains) 
 
Ursula: (Speak to the child while they are away) What do you think, 
(the child)? Can they satisfy me to free Tigger? I don’t want 
them to bring every candy, because my bag is a little too small. 
So I really hope that they are doing something good enough for 
me. Can you make sure if he is going to do something good 
enough for me when they are back, OK? 
 
  (Three characters come back from behind the curtains with a bag each) 
 
Grover: There are so many things there! I started filling this bag, but I 
don’t remember which ones I picked!  
 
Big Bird: Me, too!  
 
Cookie M: Me, too!  
 
Three: That’s too bad. (the child), can you check if we did a good job? 
Here is what we remember we did; each of us brought her 
candies, but none of us brought her every red candy. We 
cared about the color. Do you remember what Ursula said? Is it 
good enough to free Tigger? 
 
Child:  (Expected to say) Yes. (=Before-Open-the-Box-Evaluation) 
 
Three: Good. Can you (=the child) open the bags? 
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Child: (Open the bags and see inside. One bag has a red candy and 
two blue candies, the other each have two red candies and a 
blue candy.) 
 
Three: (To the child) did we do something good enough? 
  
Child: (Expected to say) Yes. 
 
Ursula: Good job. Now I will free Tigger. 
 
 
Trial 4: “None-Every” Item–“Unsatisfactory” Condition 
 
 Demand: None of you should bring me every red crab. 
 Fulfillment: None of us brought you every crab. 
 (“Valid” inference from Demand to Fulfillment) 
 
Ursula: Do you think I’m satisfied? Not yet, not yet. Now, I put a spell 
on Piglet, and look, she turned into a monster, too. Funny! 
 
Grover: It’s not funny, Ursula! 
 
The two: Right, stop doing that. 
 
Ursula: Sounds like you are ready to do something for me… Ok, now 
each of you should do something for me. 
 
Three:  What do you want? 
 
Ursula: Well, I have three magic aquariums behind those curtains. In 
each of my magic aquarium, there are magic crabs, three red 
crabs and three blue crabs. I will then put them in the matching 
colored separate cages, but I realized that the red cage is a little 
too small to fit many. So listen very carefully: none of you 
should bring me every red crab (from your aquarium). If 
you forget this, I won’t free Piglet. 
 
Three: Ok, each of us will bring you something, and we’ll make sure 
that none of us brings you … (prompts the child) every red 
crab! 
 
(Each of the three leaves with a bag, and come back one by one) 
 
Ursula: (Speak to the child while they are away) What do you think, 
(the child)? Can they satisfy me to free Piglet? I don’t want 
them to bring every red crab, because the red cage is a little too 
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small, as I said. So I really hope that they are doing something 
good for me. Can you make sure if he is going to do something 
good enough for me when they are back, OK? 
 
Grover: There are so many things there! I started filling this bag, but I 
don’t know which ones I picked! 
 
BB:  Me, too! 
 
CM: Me, too!  
 
Three: So all we know is that none of us brought her every crab. Do 
you remember what Ursula said? Is it good enough to free 
Piglet? 
 
Child: (Expected to say) No, we have to check the color of the crabs 
that you brought. (=Before-Open-the-Box-Evaluation) 
 
(See inside the bags. One of them brought three red crabs from the aquarium.) 
 
Child:  You brought all the red crabs! 
 
Ursula: Too many red crabs! You brought all of them from your 
aquarium! Return them, or I won’t free Piglet! 
 
 
Trial 5: Negative Control Item–“Satisfactory” Condition (=(146) on p. 195) 
 
 Demand: Don’t bring me any red ring. 
 Fulfillment: I didn’t bring you any ring. 
 (“Invalid” inference from Demand to Fulfillment) 
 
Ursula: Look. Here we have Winnie the Pooh (The monitor shows an 
image of Winnie the Pooh). I will put a spell on him and turn 
her into a little monster! Hahaha! (Winnie the Pooh turned into 
a monster on the monitor) 
 
Grover: Wow! It’s a cool magic, but, poor Pooh, I’m sure he wants to 
come back. Why don’t you free him? 
 
Ursula: You want me to free him? Ok, then, you have to do something 
for me.  
 
Grover: Ok, I’m listening. 
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Ursula: I have my magic chest behind this magic curtain. Inside of it, I 
have lots of accessories; I have many rings and combs in many 
colors such as red, blue and yellow, as my magic screen shows 
you (All the rings and combs are presented in the monitor). 
You have to go behind the curtain and bring me something 
from the chest. You can bring as many things as you want, but, 
look (showed the red rings) I have already gotten enough red 
rings with me, and I don’t need any more red rings. So 
remember: don’t bring me any red ring. If you forget this, I 
won’t free Pooh. 
 
Grover: Ok, I will put it in my bag carefully and will be back right 
away. I know that sometimes I’m forgetful and careless, so I 
should be careful not to forget… let me make sure; I will not 
bring you … (prompts the child). 
 
Child: (Expected to help Grover repeat the demand) You should not 
bring her any red ring! 
 
Grover: Right! Thank you for the reminder. Ok let me go and work. 
(Leaves behind the curtain) 
 
 Ursula: (Speak to the child while Grover is away) What do you think, 
(the child)? Can Grover satisfy me to free Pooh? Remember 
what I said? I don’t want to have any more red rings, so I really 
hope that Cookie Monster is doing something good enough for 
me. Can you make sure if he is going to do something good 
enough for me when he is back, OK? 
 
Grover: (Came back with his carrying bag) Mmm, it was so hard that I 
forgot what Ursula said! But I did my best as much as I could 
remember, and I want to make sure with you (the child) before 
meeting Ursula again. In this bag, I brought her something. I 
can’t remember exactly what, but I remember that I didn’t 
bring her any ring. Do you remember what she said? Is it 
good enough to save Pooh? 
 
Child:  (Expected to say) Yes. (=Before-Open-the-Box-Evaluation) 
 
Grover: Great. Now can you (=the child) open my bag and show it to 
Ursula? (Show what he brought in the bag) 
 
 Child:  (Open the bag. There are only combs in the bag.) 
  
Grover: Did I do what Ursula wants? 
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Child:  (Expected to say) Yes. (=After-Open-the-Box-Evaluation) 
 
Ursula: Let me see. Good. As I promised you, I will free Pooh now. 
 
 
Trial 6: Negative Control Item–“Unsatisfactory” Condition (=(147) on p. 196) 
 
 Demand: Don’t bring me any robot. 
 Fulfillment: I didn’t bring you any red robot. 
 (“Valid” inference from Demand to Fulfillment) 
 
Ursula: Look, we have Ariel here (the monitor shows an image of 
Ariel), and I will put a spell on her! Now she is a little monster 
(Ariel became a monster on the monitor)! 
 
Big Bird: Wow, you did it again. It’s cool, but Ariel may want to come 
back. You should free Ariel. 
 
Ursula: You want me to free her? Ok, you have to do something for 
me. 
 
Big Bird: Ok, I’m ready to listen. 
 
Ursula: I have a box of magic toys behind this magic curtain, and I 
have so many magic toys in there; I have many robots and 
teddy bears in many colors such as red, blue and yellow, as you 
can see on my magic screen (all the items presented on the 
monitor). You have to go behind the curtain, and bring me 
anything from there, but look, (show many of red, blue and 
yellow robots) I have already had enough robots with me, and I 
don’t need any more robots. So remember: don’t bring me 
any robot! If you forget this, I will never free Ariel. 
 
Big Bird: Ok, I won’t forget this, well, I will not bring you … (prompts 
the child) 
 
Child: (Expected to help Big Bird repeat the demand) You should not 
bring her any robot. 
 
Big Bird: Right! Ok, thank you for your reminder. Let me go and work. 
 
(Big Bird leaves behind the curtain and disappears.) 
 
 Ursula: (Speak to the child while Brig Bird is away) What do you 
think, (the child)? Can Big Bird satisfy me to free Ariel? I 
don’t want to have any more robot, so I really hope that Big 
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Bird can do something good enough for me. Can you make 
sure if he is going to do something good enough for me when 
he is back, OK? 
 
Big Bird: (Came back with his carrying bag) Oops, that was so hard that 
I might have forgotten exactly what Ursula said! But I did my 
best as much as I could remember, so let me make sure with 
you; I brought her something in my bag, but I didn’t bring her 
any red robot. Do you remember what she said? Is it good 
enough to free Ariel? 
 
Child: (Expected to provide Non-“Yes” Response) We have to make 
sure that you didn’t bring any robot, not only red robots… 
(=Before-Open-the-Box-Evaluation) 
 
Big Bird: Well, why don’t you open the bag?  
 
Child: (Open the bag. There are a few blue and yellow robots as well 
as teddy bears.) 
 
Big Bird: Do you think the queen would be happy with this? 
 
Child: No, because you brought these robots! (=After-Open-the-Box-
Evaluation) 
 
Ursula: I don’t want see robots, return them! Then I will free Ariel. 
 
Child:  (Asked to help Big Bird, and return the robots) 
 






Appendix 7B: Individual Responses of the Subjects: Experiment VI 
 



















Subject #1 4;4 Y N2 Y N2 Y *Y 
Subject #2 4;6 Y *Y Y N1 Y N1 
Subject #3 4;6 *N2 N1 Y N2 *N1 N1 
Subject #4 4;6 Y N2 Y N2 Y N2 
Subject #5 4;7 Y N2 Y N2 Y N2 
Subject #6 4;8 Y N2 Y N2 Y N2 
Subject #7 5;0 Y N1 Y N1 *N1 N1 
Subject #8 5;1 Y N2 Y N2 Y N2 
Subject #9 5;1 Y N2 *N1 N1 Y N1 
Subject #10 5;3 Y N2 Y *Y Y N2 
Subject #11 5;7 Y N2 Y N2 Y N2 
Subject #12 5;7 Y N2 Y N2 Y N2 
Subject #13 5;9 Y N2 Y *Y Y N2 
Subject #14 5;10 Y N2 Y *Y Y N2 
Subject #15 6;0 Y N2 Y N2 Y N2 
 
 
(S) = “Satisfactory” Condition 
(U) = “Unsatisfactory” Condition 
Y = “Yes” Responses 
N1= Non-“Yes” Responses by rejecting at the Before-Open-the-Box-Evaluation 
N2= Non-“Yes” Responses by rejecting at the After-Open-the-Box-Evaluation 





Chapter 8. General Discussions 
 
8.1. Summary of Experimental Findings 
 
The previous chapters have discussed several experiments designed to investigate 
children’s knowledge about the universal quantifier every with respect to its property 
of creating entailment structure asymmetrically in both arguments. This chapter will 
be devoted to summarizing the findings from the experiments. 
 The experiments were conducted in order to consider the following research 
questions, originally addressed in (34) repeated here as (150). 
 
(150)  Research Questions 
a. Can children compute inference from subsets to supersets and vice 
versa appropriately? 
b. Does their knowledge about the universal quantifier every extend to 
the computation of the valid and invalid inferences created between 
the propositions involving every? 
 
Experiment I revealed children’s ability to judge the truth values assigned to 
minimal pairs of entailing and entailed every-sentences, between which the relevant 
inferences are created regarding the first and the second arguments of every. The 
results demonstrated that children could calculate the truth values of the antecedent 
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and consequence of the relevant inferences, providing the basic ground for us to move 
ahead to directly approach their ability to evaluate the inferences. 
 Experiment II was the first attempt to directly investigate children’s ability to 
compute the inferences between pairs of entailing and entailed every-sentences. A 
new methodology was designed for this experiment, the “Prediction-Rephrase” Task, 
which allowed us to access older children’s ability to evaluate the validity of 
inferences involving every. The results drawn from the older children’s data 
suggested that they were able to distinguish the valid and invalid inferences regarding 
every. On the other hand, this methodology exposed the difficulty in providing an 
experimental context such that young children are also able to participate in the task. 
 Given that the “Prediction-Rephrase” Task limited young children’s 
participation, an improved novel methodology, the “Demand-Fulfillment” Task, was 
designed for Experiment III, with the aim of testing younger children’s sensitivity to 
the validity of inferences with every-sentences. Taking the advantage of the fact that 
inferential relations between two every-propositions are reflected in the demand-
fulfillment context by whether or not the demand is logically satisfied by the fulfilling 
outcome, we were able to elicit children’s evaluation of the inferential relations 
between two every-propositions. The results drawn in this experiment extend the 
initial findings from the “Prediction-Rephrase” Task and further demonstrate even 
young children’s ability to evaluate the logical relations between two propositions 
involving every.  
 Experiments IV, V and VI were designed to further specify the nature and 
extent of children’s logico-semantic competence regarding universal quantification, 
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entailment and inference, by investigating a new domain, reversed entailment. 
Specifically, these experiments investigated whether children are indeed sensitive to 
the influence of the linguistic environment (i.e., the effects of the non-local structural 
dependency among negation and universal quantifiers) to flip the entailment pattern 
licensed by every.  
 Experiment IV revealed children’s awareness of the truth values of the 
entailing and entailed every-sentences determined by reversed entailment when every 
appears in a negative context. Experiment V, conducted as a control for Experiment 
IV, supported the conclusion that children calculated these truth values on the basis of 
reversed entailment rather than some extraneous surface pattern, as children were 
sensitive to the distinct effects of negation on the similar quantifiers every and lots of. 
Their adult-like ability to compute the truth values due to the reversed entailment 
licensed by every in the negative context also demonstrated children’s knowledge 
about the nature of the scope interaction between every and negation. 
 Given the results from Experiments IV and V, Experiment VI attempted to 
assess children’s ability to evaluate the direction of inferences which were determined 
by the property of reversed entailment in every appearing in the negative context (i.e., 
under the scope of c-commanding negation). Featuring the negative version of the 
“Demand-Fulfillment” Task, this experiment revealed children’s adult-like evaluation 
of the inferences due to the reversed entailment. 
 Taken together, the findings can be summarized as follows. Children are 
found to be aware of the various consequences that follow from the entailment 
properties of the universal quantifier every: (i) the universal quantifier every creates 
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asymmetric entailment patterns in its first and second arguments 47; (ii) entailment 
patterns influence the logical relation between sentence meanings, i.e., across-
propositional meanings; (iii) entailment patterns are influenced by the semantic 
interaction with other logical words in particular structural relations. Therefore, 
children’s adult-like knowledge about every was revealed in these six experiments 
involved not only at the within-propositional meaning level but also at the across-
propositional meaning level ––– demonstrating that children’s knowledge regarding 
the universal quantifier every is indeed applied to the computation of inferences 
created between the two propositions containing every, which are licensed in part 
based on the semantic feature of every that determines the entailment patterns among 
its two arguments.  
 
8.2. Learning of the Universal Quantifier(s) 
 
These findings raise the question about the origin of children’s adult-like semantic 
representation for quantifiers like every. From a learning perspective, this can be 
rephrased as how children settle on “∀ ⇔ every”.  
To begin with, let us review the entailment patterns in the first and second 
arguments of a selection of determiners in English.  
 
 
                                                
47 The findings thus were consistent with the Full Competence View (e.g., Crain, et al., 1996; 
Gualmini, 2005), providing further evidence to support this approach from the viewpoint of 
inferences and entailments. 
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(151)  Set-to-subset inference with respect to the first argument 
a.  Every/each dog ran 
 Every/each brown dog ran 
b. All the/no dogs ran 
 All the/the/no brown dogs ran 
c.  Some/many/most48 dogs ran 
         *  Some/many/most brown dogs ran 
(152)  Subset-to-set inferences with respect to the first argument 
a. Every/each brown dog ran 
        *  Every/each dog ran   
b.  All the/no brown dogs ran 
        *  All the/the/no dogs ran 
c.  Some/many/most brown dogs ran 
   Some/many/most dogs ran 
(153)  Set-to-subset inferences with respect to the second argument 
a.  Every/each dog chased a cat 
         *  Every/each dog chased a brown cat 
b. All the/some/many/most dogs chased a cat 
         *  All the/the/some/many/most dogs chased a brown cat 
 c.  No dogs chased a cat  
    No dogs chased a brown cat 
                                                
48 There seems to be a controversy as to whether most is non-DE, or it is neither DE nor non-
DE. For the purpose of discriminating most from the universals (every, each and all) as the 
genuine DE operators in the current discussion, we would categorize it as a non-DE 
quantifier, following Barwise and Cooper’s (1981) classification among quantifiers in terms 
of the direction of entailment that each of them evokes. 
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(154)  Subset-to-set inferences with respect to the second argument 
a.  Every/each dog chased a brown cat 
          Every/each dog chased a cat 
b. All the/some/many/most dogs chased a brown cat 
          All the/the/some/many/most dogs chased a cat 
 c.  No dogs chased a brown cat  
           *  No dogs chased a cat 
 
The following table is a summary of the above across-quantifier analyses. 
(Clark, 1973; Bowerman, 1978; Carey, 1978; Clark, 1993; Gleitman, Cassidy, Nappa, 
Papafragou and Trueswell, 2005) 
Table 18 Across-Quantifier Analyses of the Inference Patterns: Summary 









Every √ * * √ 
Each √ * * √ 
All √ * * √ 
Some * √ * √ 
Many * √ * √ 
Most * √ * √ 
No √ * √ * 
 
 
Based on the above analyses, it is observed that the sentences that pattern the same as 
those containing every are those containing each and all. 49 Therefore, the crucial 
                                                
49 Plural definite NPs headed by the also behave in the same way as the QPs headed by the 
universal quantifiers on the basis of the maximality assumption, in which the denotation 
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observation here is that to know these determiners is to know their DE property as the 
positive universals, and their asymmetric DE/non-DE representations across 
arguments.50 In other words, the asymmetric entailment representation that every 
creates, which children are found to know, directly follows from every’s being a 
positive universal. To consider why the positive universals including every are 
asymmetric with respect to entailments they create would go beyond the goal of the 
current discussion, but one related speculation about this aspect of linguistic 
knowledge children have would be as follows; the logical constant ∀ has been 
specified as a DE environment creator. The range on which its nature as a DE 
operator spreads over would be determined when ∀ is implemented as a linguistic 
expression such as every in the way that its DE property influences only over the DP 
domain, but not over the predicate VP domain (Ladusaw 1979, 1980). From such a 
perspective, children’s adult-like knowledge about every is considered to be the 
evidence for their adult-like linguistic representation.51  
In sum, children are found to know that the universal quantifier every is DE in 
its first argument and is non-DE in its second argument. Given that the asymmetric 
                                                                                                                                      
should be maximalized in the domain. There has been a debate as to whether children can 
implement the maximality assumption in the representation of the definite determiner. 
According to Maximality Trouble Hypothesis by Wexler (2003), children’s semantics of the 
definite article the lacks the maximality assumption. On the other hand, the recent study by 
Syrett, Lidz and Kennedy (2006) has experimentally demonstrated children’s awareness of 
the maximality assumption denoted in the definite plural. For the purpose of the current 
discussion, we won’t make any commitment regarding this debate, and will exclude plural 
definite NPs from our analysis. (Wexler, 2003) 
50 A further prediction on the basis of the current discussion would be that children can 
distinguish the valid and invalid inferences involving other representations of the universal ∀, 
such as all and each. (Syrett, Lidz and Kennedy, 2006) 
51 This is consistent with the claim of Minai (2004) and Minai and Crain (2004), which is that 
children’s sensitivity to the interaction between nobody and every would demonstrate their 
ability to implement the structural representation. 
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patterns of entailment/inference under discussion directly follow from the semantic 
properties of every, children have learned its semantics correctly.  
The findings that demonstrate children’s adult-like semantics about every 
would motivate us to consider an important debate about learnability, i.e., how 
children come to know about the semantic property of every. In what follows, we will 
survey a possible learning model from the perspective of lexical learning.  
 As we have just discussed, every, each and all are the set of the universal 
quantifiers in English. Therefore, let us now assume that the semantic property of 
every that creates the asymmetric entailment structure is the representation of the 
logical property ∀ in natural language. Given this, the learning of every can be 
attributed to be mapping between the universal quantifier symbolized as ∀ and the 
phonological form every.52 (Ladusaw, 1979; Ladusaw, 1980) 
Lexical learning by means of mapping constitutes an important problem; in 
order for children to learn a word by mapping of the semantic properties onto the 
relevant form, they need to (i) identify possible meanings and (ii) isolate possible 
forms. This is called the mapping problem (e.g., Clark, 1993). Let us now consider 
how the learning of every would be achieved from the perspective of mapping.  
In order for children to relate the logical constant ∀ to the lexical form every 
(and/or vice versa), they need the evidence to convince themselves that it is indeed 
the case that “∀ ⇔ every”. Suppose now that the target sentence with which children 
learn the meaning of every is represented as follows. 
                                                
52 For the detailed discussion about the mapping problem, see Bowerman (1978), Carey 
(1978), Clark (1973, 1993) and Gleitman, Cassidy, Nappa, Papafragou and Trueswell (2005), 
among others.  
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(155)  [Q] dog is running 
 
Suppose that, in (155), [Q] stands for the placeholder for any quantifier. What 
children aim to do is to uncover which quantifier(s) can fit in [Q] to make (155) a true 
description in which contexts. Now, suppose that the sentence (155) is presented in 
the context in which there are five dogs, and they all are running, as is illustrated 
below. 
 













                                                
53 The quantifiers listed in (156) are not the complete set of all the competing quantifiers, and 
other quantifiers such as several or many, and also complex quantificational expressions such 
as more than two, less than ten, about half a dozen and so on would be included in the set of 
possible candidates. For the sake of illustrating this possible learning model, we keep our 
discussion to the above set of quantifiers (i.e., the set in example (156)), and exclude the 
above-mentioned, relatively complex candidates from our demonstration.   
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(156) a.  All the dogs are running. 
b.  Every dog is running 
c.  Each dog is running 
d. Some54 dogs are running 
e.  Five dogs are running 
 
The underlined quantifiers above are the candidates for [Q] in (155) to hold in order 
to serve as a true description of Context 1. Given this, the sentence (155) is 
considered to be ambiguous among the interpretations listed in (156) above. Among 
them, all, every and each are the representations of the universal ∀. Therefore, the 
possible “candidates” to fit in the placeholder [Q] to make (155) true in the Context 1 
will be summarized as follows. 
 
(157)  a.  ∀ (every, each, all) 
b.  some  
c.  five (5) 
 
                                                
54 Note that the quantifier some can be ambiguous between the following two possible 
interpretations: 
 
(vii)  Some children are swimming 
a.) pure plurality 
b.) “Not ∀” 
(Papafragou and Musolino, 2003) (Grice, 1989); 
Between these two interpretations, the first is the purely semantic contribution of some, 
whereas the second is a derived interpretation at the pragmatic level, which is called a Scalar 
Implicature (SI). The relevant meaning in the current discussion is the first interpretation 
based on the semantic contribution of some, in which it denotes “genuine plural”. For a 
detailed discussion on the SIs, see Grice (1989); for a discussion on SIs and children’s 
knowledge, see Papafragou and Musolino (2003). 
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Now suppose another context, illustrated in Figure 30 below, which has six running 
dogs, and consider which of the items summarized in (157) makes (155) a true 
description. 
 





Given Context 2, among the listed candidates in (156), the numeral five in (156e) is 
no longer a candidate for [Q] in (155). Children’s analysis across Context 1 and 
Context 2 in examining the sentence (155) as a true description, thus, gives them the 
evidence to discriminate the numeral five and the rest of the candidates.  
The distinction between the number word five on one hand and the quantifiers 
∀ and some on the other would be clear from the following perspective. Number 
words are on a par with other quantifiers in the sense that they both predicate over 
sets of individuals. On the other hand, while the number words such as five index the 
distinct numerosity of the sets, the quantifiers ∀ and some specify the size of the sets 
in terms of inclusion between sets. It may be worthwhile to note here that some 
researchers attribute number word leaning to be a process initially guided by means 
of the capacity to capture the numerosity of small sets of items, up to three (e.g., 
Wynn, 1990; Wynn, 1992; Spelke, 1994). Such a guiding would not be applicable 
when children learn quantifiers, since they do not denote the numerosity. Thus, one 
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possibility is that the number words and the other quantifiers would be easily 
distinguished by children, distinctively mapping number words to numerosities.  
Another potential cue, which would even strongly lead children to 
discriminate numerals from other quantifiers including ∀, would be provided in the 
behavioral difference between the non-numeral quantifiers such as ∀ and some on 
one hand and the numeral quantifiers such as five. Bloom and Wynn (1997) pointed 
out that the former (e.g., every) is not compatible with the definite article the, whereas 
the latter (e.g.,  five) is, as (158) illustrates below. 
(Bloom and Wynn, 1997) 
(158)  a.       * The every dog ran. 
b.  The five dogs ran. 
 
Given such observation, Bloom and Wynn claimed that numerals can be 
discriminated genuinely on a distributional basis. Hence, at any rate, the across-
context inferential process to determine what [Q] can host in (155) can potentially 
distinguish five from the other candidates. If the numeral five is distinctively 
recognized and removed from consideration for [Q], then (155) is ambiguous in two 
ways, i.e., between “[Q]⇔∀” and “[Q]⇔some”.  
Now the question is how these two quantifiers could be distinctively 
recognized. Children need a tool to distinctively recognize these hypothesized 
interpretations for the target sentence (155). One such tool would be provided by the 
Subset Principle (Berwick, 1985). The Subset Principle plays an important role in 






          Later Hypothesis 
According to this principle, when there are multiple available options for children to 
learn, children initially hypothesize the “narrowest” possible option; then, positive 
evidence would reveal other broader options. This principle can be illustrated as 
follows. 
 









The Subset Principle more specifically helps children ordering the multiple available 
interpretations to an ambiguous sentence. Crain and his colleagues (e.g., Crain, 1992; 
Crain and Philip, 1993; Crain, Ni and Conway, 1994) have argued for a role for this 
principle at the semantic level, as follows: 
 
(159)  Semantic Subset Principle 
Suppose that the interpretive component of Universal Grammar makes two 
interpretations, A and B, available for a sentence, S. If so, then see if S is true 
in a narrower range of circumstances on interpretation A than on 
interpretation B. If so, then A will be hypothesized before B in the course of 




A related issue in attributing the current learning model to the Semantic Subset 
Principle is what the source of the “strength” that constitutes the set-subset relation 
would be. Here we will adopt the Semantic Subset Principle on the basis of the 
assumption that the strength that constitutes the set-subset relation lies in the truth 
conditional meanings of the possible interpretations, with respect to which one holds 
as a “true” description in broader circumstances.55 
Keeping this in mind, let us go back to the sentence (155), repeated in (160) 
below.  Given that, for [Q] in the sentence in (160), the interpretive component 
provides two available interpretations, ∀ and some, as illustrated in (161) below, the 
Semantic Subset Principle helps children distinguish ∀ and some by determining 
which would be initially hypothesized.  
 
(160)  [Q] dog is running 
(161)  a.  ∀ dog is running 
b.  some dogs are running 
 
Now, we need to determine which interpretation between (161a) and (161b) 
would be the “narrower” possible option, and which interpretation would be the 
“broader” possible option that will be revealed by the positive evidence. The 
                                                
55 Hence, we won’t consider other types of strength (e.g., Gricean strength in pragmatics that 
would influence the sentence interpretations) in the current discussion, and thus don’t intend 
to argue against any other models that rely on other types of strength; we show one way, 
using the Semantic Subset Principle, that may lead children to the correct meaning of logical 
words like every. Whether alternative scenarios based on other notions of strength could also 
succeed would highly depend on what the exact nature of the strength would be. 
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following figure shows the contexts corresponding to the candidate interpretations of 
sentence (160), [Q] dog is running. 
 
Figure 32 Sets of Contexts Corresponding to the Alternative Interpretations of  
Sentence (160) 
 
 [Q] dog is running (160)        [Q] dog is running (160)  













The left side of Figure 32 shows the contexts in which [Q] hosts ∀, whereas the right 
side shows the contexts in which [Q] hosts some. The contexts in the (a) and (b) 
pictures make both interpretations true. On the other hand, the context in the (c) 
pictures makes the interpretation (161a) (i.e., Q = “some”) true, but the interpretation 
(161b) (i.e., Q = ∀) false. Therefore, (161b) constitutes the initial hypothesis, as is 
illustrated below. 
 






           Later Hypothesis 
 [Q] dog is running 
≈ Some dogs are running  
 








Thus, in this way children would come to distinguish the possible candidates for [Q] 
to host in order to make (161) a true description of Context 1 in Figure 29, resulting 
in reaching the conclusion that (161) serves as a true description of Context 1, 
relating [Q] onto ∀ (and indeed, this initial interpretation is the adult interpretation of 
every, which would suggest that the correct mapping “∀ ⇔ every” was successful).56 
 
8.3. Remaining Issues 
 
The next step would be that children relate ∀ with every, isolating it from the other 
possible forms such as all, each and the (as the definite plural maximalized in the 
domain). One implicative cue to solve this problem would be that children need to 
rely on some other distinctive feature among these candidates, such as distributivity.  
Among the universal quantifiers, all on one hand and every and each on the 
other indeed behave distinctly in terms of distributivity. We will borrow Beghelli and 
                                                
56 The current model would predict that children might treat some as if it were equal to every 
or all at the initial stage, in which the discrimination among ∀ and some by means of the 
Subset Principle has not yet taken place in child grammar. At this point, it is an open question 
whether it is a case, which should be pursued in future researches. 
Initial Hypothesis 
[Q] dog is running 
≈ ∀ dog is running 
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Stowell’s (1997) terminologies to distinctively label these two classes of the 
quantifier phrases; quantifier phrases headed by all are Group-denoting Quantifier 
Phrases (GQPs),57 and those headed by every or each are Distributive Quantifier 
Phrases (DQPs). The difference in distributivity between GQPs and DQPs is 
exhibited the following examples. 
 
(162) a.  All the boys surrounded the fort. 
b.       ? Every boy surrounded the fort. 
c.       ? Each boy surrounded the fort.               (Beghelli and Stowell, 1997) 
(163)  a.  All the men gathered at the stroke of the midnight. 
b.      * Every man gathered at the stroke of the midnight. 
c.      * Each man gathered at the stroke of the midnight.       (Gil, 1992) 
 
The verbs surround and gather which appear in the above examples semantically 
construe actions in which the multiple doers as a group must be involved. The 
compatibility between the GQPs and these verbs demonstrates that the quantification 
by all ranges over the entities as a group, rather than distributively. Likewise, the 
incompatibility between the DQPs with every and each and these verbs demonstrates 
the semantic mismatch between the distributive QPs and the group-selecting verbs. 
 Beghelli and Stowell (1997), assuming the conventional distinction between 
all on one hand as a group construer and every and each on the other as the 
                                                
57 According to the analysis by Beghelli and Stowell (1997), GQPs include the QPs headed 
by a, some, several, bare-numeral QPs like one student, three students…, and definite QPs 
like the students, as well as QPs headed by all. For the sake of the current discussion, we will 
not refer to the other GQPs than all-QPs. 
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distributors (e.g., Vendler, 1967; Gil, 1982), have shown that the distributive 
construers every and each yield distinct scope representations in relation with the 
negation. Assuming the following functional structures, they posited the different LF 
scope positions to the GQPs and DQPs. 
 
(164)   RefP 
   ei 
Spec   CP 
    |    ei 
GQP  Spec  AgrSP 
      ei  
  Spec  DistP 
          ei    
   Spec  ShareP 
      |    ei 
   DQP Spec  NegP 
       |    ei 
    GQP Spec  AgrOP 
         |     ei 
     NQP Spec  VP 
                    5   
            … 
 
According to Beghelli and Stowell, the scope representations are explained, 
assuming the functional tree in (164) and that the QR is motivated by feature 
checking. In particular, GQPs need to check their group reference feature [+group ref] 
under agreement with an existential operator head, ∃, which is located in both Share0 
and Ref0; thus GQPs may selectively land in the Spec of RefP or the Spec of ShareP, 
resulting in the different interpretations that they receive. DQPs, on the other hand, 
land in the spec of DistP, motivated by the checking of their distributive feature 
[+Dist] under agreement with a distributive operator hosted in Dist0.  
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Given the discussion above, one speculation would be as follows. Children 
would come to know that the universal quantifier every is distinct from other natural 
language universals through across-context analyses not with respect to inclusivity, 
but with respect to differences in representation regarding distributivity of the 
universals. Proposing any concrete solution for this issue, however, goes beyond the 
scope of this dissertation.58 
That said, our experimental findings do provide an interesting implication 
hinting that children have indeed solved this problem with respect to each and every. 
Crucially, Beghelli and Stowell (1997) pointed out that the DQPs headed by every 
and those headed by each behave differently with respect to the interaction with 
negation. Consider the following example. 
 
(165) a.  John didn’t read every book.  (¬ > ∀) 
b.     ?? John didn’t read each book.         ?? (¬ > ∀) 
 
 
Whereas every is interpreted under the scope of negation as in (165a), each prefers to 
take wide scope over the negation in (165b).59 Thus, in Beghelli and Stowell’s 
implementation, in (165), DQPs headed by each raise and land in the Spec of DistP 
higher than the NegP, whereas DQPs headed by every stay in the VP under the 
AgrOP. (Brooks and Braine, 1996) 
                                                
58 Brooks and Braine (1996) has reported that children are able to discriminate each and all 
among the universal quantifiers in English, although whether they are sensitive to the 
distinction between every and each has not yet reported at this point, to the best of my 
knowledge. 
59 The contrast observed in the examples as in (165) would be a piece of potential evidence 
that leads children to distinguish every and each on a distributional basis. 
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In order to account for this distinction, Beghelli and Stowell focused on the 
following distinct behaviors between every and each, with respect to their possibility 
of the generic construal. 
 
(166)  a.  Every dog has a tail. 
b.  Each dog has a tail. 
 
The crucial observation is that dog in (166a) can be construed as dogs in general, 
whereas dog in (166b) is construed as the definite set of dogs that has been previously 
introduced in the discourse.60  
The following comparison by Gil (1992) also makes the same point, observing 
that each-DQPs pattern with the definite GQPs, whereas every-GQPs pattern with 
generically construed GQPs headed by all. 
 
(167)  After devoting the last three decades to a study of lexical semantics, George 
made a startling discovery. 
a.  Every language has over twenty color words. 
b.  All languages have over twenty color words. 
c.       ? Each language has over twenty color words. 





                                                
60 The lack of generic interpretation in (166b) would also serve as the data that tells children 
about the difference between each and every with respect to the distributivity.  
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(168)  George has just discovered ten hitherto-unknown languages in the Papua New  
Guinea highlands.  
a.       ? Every language has over twenty color words. 
b.       ? All languages have over twenty color words. 
c.  Each language has over twenty color words. 
d.  The languages have over twenty color words. 
 
Gil accounts for this by attributing to each a feature [+Definite], while every lacks 
this feature.  
On the basis of the above observations, Beghelli and Stowell claimed the 
following. Every and each both introduce discourse referents, in the form of set 
variables. The set variable of each must be bound by a definite operator, while the set 
variable introduced by every can be bound by other operators as well, such as generic 
and negation. Hence, whereas each-QPs are endowed with a [+Dist] feature, which 
must be checked off in the Spec of the DistP obligatorily, every-QPs are 
underspecified for the feature [Distributive], and thus they selectively move to the 
Spec of DistP to check off their [Dist] only when their set variable is not bound by a 
lower operator, such as negation; thus, when there is a lower operator such as 
negation, every-DQPs are bound by it, and the [Distributive] feature checking does 
not occur.  
Let us summarize the discussion so far. In the discussion above, we have 
observed the commonality and differences among the universal quantifiers, every, 
each and all. The comparisons among them have exhibited that they all yield the 
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asymmetric entailment structures in their first and second arguments, but that they 
behave differently in terms of distributivity and its consequence for the interaction 
with negation. Relevant to this dissertation is the difference between each and every 
in terms of the scope interaction with negation; while each-DQPs in the object 
position obligatorily take wider scope over the negation, with QRing possibly driven 
by their [+Dist] feature checking, every-DQPs in the object position are bound by the 
negation and thus they do not QR. 
Recall that we have introduced the mechanism of reversed entailment in every 
under the scope of negation in Chapter 5, in which we discussed reversed entailment 
and began considering how the investigation of whether children are sensitive to this 
phenomenon relates to our major research questions. Given that every and each 
behave contrastively in terms of the semantic interaction with negation (which 
triggers reversed entailment only for every), we then raised questions regarding 
whether children are able to tease apart the two universal quantifiers, every and each, 
in terms of scope representation. In what follows, we will show that studying reversed 
entailment with every can not only teach us more about the nature of children’s 
semantic knowledge concerning every (including entailment and its relation with 
scope in linguistic structure) but also addresses the latter problem (whether children 
distinguish every and each) in an interesting way which has not been shown in 
previous Truth Value Judgment studies on the universal quantifier. 
Recall that in order for children to be aware of the phenomenon of reversed 
entailment in every-QPs under the scope of negation in an adult-like way, they should 
be sensitive to the following features listed in (112), repeated as (169) below. 
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(169)  a.  The universal quantifier every constitutes a DE environment in its first  
 argument. 
b.  The universal quantifier every does not QR over the negation in the 
higher position, and thus it must be interpreted under the scope of the 
negation. 
c.  Consequently, the entailment created in the first argument of every is 
reversed due to the influence of the negation, and thus it is no longer 
DE. 
 
Given the difference among the universal quantifiers every and each, in which each, 
but not every, QRs over the negation, the item in (169b) should be revised as follows. 
 
(170)  The universal quantifier every does not QR over the negation, and thus it is 
interpreted under the scope of negation; this distinguishes every from each, 
i.e., another universal quantifier each which obligatorily QRs over the 
negation, and thus it is interpreted over the scope of the negation. 
 
Given these considerations, if children were to be tested regarding reversed 
entailments in every under the scope of negation, and found to be able to compute the 
reversed entailment and logical inferences licensed by every-QP under negation, it 
would suggest that their adult-like ability reflects their knowledge about the 
mechanisms that determine this phenomenon. Interestingly, such results would also 
suggest that children know that every does not work on a par with each, as can be 
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seen most clearly when we consider possible non-adult-like behavior regarding every 
and negation. 
 Let us consider a possible pattern of responses in which children do not 
demonstrate adult-like knowledge. Suppose that children do not share the same 
grammar as adults with respect to the representation of reversed entailment. 
Specifically, suppose that children inappropriately treat every-QP in the object 
position of sentences with negation uniformly as DE. This non-adult pattern of 
responses may arise from any of the following potential origins for their errors.  
 
(171) a.  Ignorance of the presence of negation 
b.  Ignorance of negation’s linguistic contribution to flip the entailment of 
every-QP under its scope (i.e., its DE property) 
c.  Ignorance of the universal quantifier every 
d.  Ignorance of every’s linguistic contribution (i.e., its DE property) 
e.  Confusion of the universal quantifier every with another universal 
quantifier each (recall that, while highly similar, each and every 
behave differently with respect to reversed entailment) 
 
Considering these hypotheses, the first four may be unlikely based on 
previous findings of various studies on children’s awareness of the universal 
quantifier every and of negation (e.g., Lidz and Musolino, 2002; Gualmini, 2005).  
However, we should consider the fifth possibility, which is stated in (171e) in more 
detail. Notice that, at the truth-conditional level, each and every are interchangeable 
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most of the time, especially in the typical truth-value judgment experimental 
workspace. Consider the following examples. 
 
(172)  a.  Every dog is running in the field. 
b.  Each dog is running in the field. 
 
Suppose that these sentences are provided as the description in which all the dogs are 
running in the field. In such a context, the above sentences are equivalent at the truth-
conditional level. Thus, from this context we cannot conclude whether children take 
the phonological form every to mean adult every or each. Since every and each yield 
the same truth conditions in such contexts, notice that children’s truth-value 
judgments of these sentences do not reflect anything about their ability to distinguish 
every and each. 
 However, the paradigm of reversed entailment under negation does tease apart 
every and each, in context of testing entailment and inference in every, because these 
experiments focus on the universal quantifier every under negation. Recall that only 
every undergoes reversed entailment under negation, whereas every and each pattern 
the same in positive contexts. Adult-like sensitivity to entailment and inference in this 
context, then, not only argues for knowledge of entailment and inference, but also 
shows that every is adult every and not each, because in this paradigm unlike positive 
contexts, adult every and each predict different results. The reversed entailment by 
every-QP under negation, thus, provides an interesting test case to examine whether 
children are aware of the distinction between every and each, as well as for further 
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exploring our original research questions about children’s ability to compute logical 
inferences appropriately, on the basis of the direction of entailments between 
propositions.  
 Although this every/each distinction has not been systematically tested, 
Experiment VI reported in this dissertation indeed provides evidence in favor of the 
position in which children did distinguish the difference between every and each in 
terms of scope interaction with negation. Recall the “Simple Negation” Items 
prepared for the “Demand-Fulfillment” Task in Experiment VI. The trial that is 
crucial here is repeated in (173) and (174) below. 
 
(173)  “Simple Negation” Item – “Satisfactory” Condition (=(140b) on p. 190) 
a.  Demand: “Don’t bring me every apple.” 
b.  Response: “I didn’t bring you every red apple.” 
(174) “Simple Negation” Item – “Unsatisfactory” Condition (=(141b) on p. 191) 
a.  Demand: “Don’t bring me every gold coin.” 
b.  Response: “I didn’t bring you every coin.” 
 
The crucial logic behind these trials is as follows. Recall that, since every-QP above is 
under negation, the entailment pattern is flipped because of the influence from 
negation, and thus is no longer DE; consequently, the valid inference is licensed from 
a subset-denoting expression (red apple, gold coin) to a set-denoting expression 
(apple, coin). Therefore, an invalid inference is created from (173a) to (173b) (i.e., I 
didn’t bring every apple * I didn’t bring every red apple), whereas a valid 
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inference is created from (174a) to (174b) (i.e., I didn’t bring every gold coin  I 
didn’t bring every coin). Recall crucially that the demand is logically satisfied by the 
fulfillment when the demand does not logically imply the fulfillment; thus (173) 
demonstrates the satisfactory demand-fulfillment (i.e., the request don’t bring me 
every apple can be logically satisfied by the fulfillment I didn’t bring every red 
apple). On the other hand, the demand is not logically satisfied by the fulfillment 
when the demand does logically imply the fulfillment; thus (174) demonstrates the 
unsatisfactory demand-fulfillment (i.e., the request don’t bring me every gold coin 
cannot be logically satisfied by the fulfillment I didn’t bring every coin).  
 Suppose now that children would treat every-QP in these items on a par with 
each-QP, as hypothesized in (171e), in which they were confused by the huge 
similarity between every and each. If this were the case, children’s evaluation of the 
demand-fulfillment presented in the above tokens would have been reversed, since 
each-QP, unlike every-QP, undergoes QR in this linguistic environment, i.e., under 
simple negation (i.e., in children’s evaluation, the request don’t bring me every gold 
coin would have been satisfied by I didn’t bring every coin, if every were taken to be 
each for children, since the request don’t bring me each gold coin is logically 
satisfied by I didn’t bring each coin).  
However, Experiment VI revealed that it was not the case; children 
demonstrated the expected demand-fulfillment evaluation for “Simple Negation” 
Items reviewed above, judging that (173) was satisfactory whereas (174) was not. 
Thus, this data argues that every was not mapped to adult each, based on these 
findings. 
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 Therefore, the findings from Experiment VI would suggest one direction in 
which to expand the current investigation. One possible way to further move ahead 
would be to test whether children’s each is mapped onto adult each or adult every. A 
promising test case would be these quantifiers’ interactions with negation, as we have 
discussed, in which the difference between each and every becomes obvious. In 
addition, it would be promising to focus on children’s evaluation of across-
proposition meanings in doing so, since it would contrast the distinctive behavior of 
each and every regarding the interaction with negation, by means of their distinctive 
behavior with respect to reversed entailment (i.e., each scopes over negation and thus 
the entailment pattern remains DE, whereas every stays under the scope of negation 
and thus the entailment pattern is reversed by the influence from negation). Hence, an 
interesting further testing ground for exploring the nature of semantic competence in 
child language would be to investigate the precise role of scope representation in the 
interaction of quantification and negation; in this way, we may gain a better 
understanding of the role of children’s logico-semantic knowledge in across-
proposition meaning generation.  
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